isolate host containers and limit access to API socket #1056
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Previously we used the "container_t" label by default for processes running in host containers and in orchestrated containers, and they shared the "local_t" label for their files. Now orchestrated containers use "container_t" and "local_t", while host containers use "control_t" and "state_t". Separating the types allows us to enforce isolation even before we add MCS support. Signed-off-by: Ben Cressey <bcressey@amazon.com>
This inverts the default so that access to the API socket is blocked unless the container runs with a privileged label. A second label, `control_t`, has been added so that containers can opt-in to API access without using the break-glass `super_t` label. Signed-off-by: Ben Cressey <bcressey@amazon.com>
tjkirch
approved these changes
Aug 20, 2020
samuelkarp
approved these changes
Aug 20, 2020
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Issue number:
N/A
Description of changes:
Create a distinction between host containers and orchestrated containers in the SELinux policy, and update host-ctr to match. Now host containers will run with one of two privileged labels, and the files they write will receive a different label.
Limit access to the API socket to processes with one of the privileged labels. All host containers will have access to the API, but orchestrated containers will need to opt-in to its use by running as either
control_torsuper_t.Testing done:
Confirmed that
apiclientin the control container and admin container still works, and that the files they create are correctly labeled.Terms of contribution:
By submitting this pull request, I agree that this contribution is dual-licensed under the terms of both the Apache License, version 2.0, and the MIT license.