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Initial TS-7553-V2 support #8

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merged 3 commits into from
Feb 7, 2023
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@ts-kris ts-kris commented Jan 18, 2023

Support for TS-7553-V2 in 5.10

This adds its own defconfig with the intent that it will likely be merged in to a more singular defconfig in the future. However, to ensure a point in time where everything is tested and support, that is included in this PR as well.

This also adds support for the LCD as a framebuffer as it was in older kernels. Long term, the goal is to be able to support the monochrome LCD as a DRM supported panel with backlight, etc. The goal for this PR however is basic support of all features.

Additionally, it has been observed that microSD access is a bit slow here. Some optimizations and improvements can come later to speed that up.

@ts-kris ts-kris force-pushed the linux-5.10.y-ts7553v2-support branch from b7572b0 to b9d9e26 Compare January 18, 2023 23:27
randytsi369
randytsi369 previously approved these changes Jan 18, 2023
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No issues found during review. Not tested.

ts-kris and others added 2 commits January 20, 2023 17:20
[ commit 2121d7f in 4.9.y ]

Bring in support for st7565p LCD using the driver shim and userspace
companion tool.

Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen <kris@embeddedTS.com>
Add initial support of the i.MX6UL based TS-7553-V2 platform.

Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen <kris@embeddedTS.com>
@ts-kris ts-kris force-pushed the linux-5.10.y-ts7553v2-support branch from de67d66 to a016e8f Compare January 21, 2023 00:52
@ts-kris ts-kris marked this pull request as draft January 24, 2023 00:52
@ts-kris ts-kris force-pushed the linux-5.10.y-ts7553v2-support branch from b2dab1d to 3834646 Compare January 24, 2023 01:08
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ts-kris commented Jan 24, 2023

Touches ts_defconfig to do the following:

  • Move many things from builtins to modules, e.g. touchscreen drivers (note that this needs commit 25c6e79 to work on resistive TPCs), audio codecs, IIO drivers, etc.
  • Remove useless drivers, e.g. any non PCIe or USB network device driver that is not used on any of our platforms, filesystem drivers for ancient/unrelated devices, NAND specific drivers, regulator drivers, some media drivers, etc.
  • Add in many new features from tsimx6ul_defconfig in 4.9 back here as modules, e.g. ipv6 netfilter
  • Remove framebuffer console, necessary for TS-7553-V2 use of mono LCD but this may break uses of TPC where console should be present on the FB. Also add the SNVS powerkey driver as a built in to maintain the TS-7553-V2 demo keypad input. This can be removed/modularized later once the mono LCD gets a DRM panel driver.
  • Add in driver support for TS-7553-V2 IIO

I did testing of the defconfig changes along the way under TS-4900, TS-7970, and TS-7990. Everything works as expected but I have not re-run through all of the testing again after doing this final squash. The last testing I did was with framebuffer console enabled and SNVS power key as a module. I don't suspect any issues (aside from resistive TPCs as I noted above) but will re-test things tomorrow.

@ts-kris ts-kris marked this pull request as ready for review January 24, 2023 01:08
@ts-kris ts-kris requested a review from randytsi369 January 24, 2023 01:08
Specifically adds IIO drivers, mono LCD driver, adds SNVS power
key as a builtin for compatibility with `keypad-test` demo in
ts7553v2-utils.git.

The framebuffer console is needed for TPC platforms, it causes
some issues in the TS-7553-V2 that will be resolved later.

Also removes drivers that would never be used, moves a few from
builtin to module, adds some other features/drivers in as a
module for potential future support.

Signed-off-by: Kris Bahnsen <kris@embeddedTS.com>
@ts-kris ts-kris force-pushed the linux-5.10.y-ts7553v2-support branch from 3834646 to 07e9f06 Compare January 24, 2023 21:47
@ts-kris ts-kris merged commit 7cf8694 into linux-5.10.y Feb 7, 2023
@ts-kris ts-kris deleted the linux-5.10.y-ts7553v2-support branch February 7, 2023 00:25
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 2, 2023
[ Upstream commit af68656 ]

While handling PCI errors (AER flow) driver tries to
disable NAPI [napi_disable()] after NAPI is deleted
[__netif_napi_del()] which causes unexpected system
hang/crash.

System message log shows the following:
=======================================
[ 3222.537510] EEH: Detected PCI bus error on PHB#384-PE#800000 [ 3222.537511] EEH: This PCI device has failed 2 times in the last hour and will be permanently disabled after 5 failures.
[ 3222.537512] EEH: Notify device drivers to shutdown [ 3222.537513] EEH: Beginning: 'error_detected(IO frozen)'
[ 3222.537514] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537516] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth14)]IO error detected [ 3222.537650] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537651] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): Invoking
bnx2x->error_detected(IO frozen)
[ 3222.537651] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_error_detected:14236(eth13)]IO error detected [ 3222.537729] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.1): bnx2x driver reports:
'need reset'
[ 3222.537729] EEH: Finished:'error_detected(IO frozen)' with aggregate recovery state:'need reset'
[ 3222.537890] EEH: Collect temporary log [ 3222.583481] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.0 [ 3222.583519] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.583557] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.583744] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.583892] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.583893] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.584079] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.584230] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.584378] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584416] EEH: of node=0384:80:00.1 [ 3222.584454] EEH: PCI device/vendor: 168e14e4 [ 3222.584491] EEH: PCI cmd/status register: 00100140 [ 3222.584492] EEH: PCI-E capabilities and status follow:
[ 3222.584677] EEH: PCI-E 00: 00020010 012c8da2 00095d5e 00455c82 [ 3222.584825] EEH: PCI-E 10: 10820000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E 20: 00000000 [ 3222.584826] EEH: PCI-E AER capability register set follows:
[ 3222.585011] EEH: PCI-E AER 00: 13c10001 00000000 00000000 00062030 [ 3222.585160] EEH: PCI-E AER 10: 00002000 000031c0 000001e0 00000000 [ 3222.585309] EEH: PCI-E AER 20: 00000000 00000000 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.585347] EEH: PCI-E AER 30: 00000000 00000000 [ 3222.586872] RTAS: event: 5, Type: Platform Error (224), Severity: 2 [ 3222.586873] EEH: Reset without hotplug activity [ 3224.762767] EEH: Beginning: 'slot_reset'
[ 3224.762770] EEH: PE#800000 (PCI 0384:80:00.0): Invoking
bnx2x->slot_reset()
[ 3224.762771] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14271(eth14)]IO slot reset initializing...
[ 3224.762887] bnx2x 0384:80:00.0: enabling device (0140 -> 0142) [ 3224.768157] bnx2x: [bnx2x_io_slot_reset:14287(eth14)]IO slot reset
--> driver unload

Uninterruptible tasks
=====================
crash> ps | grep UN
     213      2  11  c000000004c89e00  UN   0.0       0      0  [eehd]
     215      2   0  c000000004c80000  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/0:2]
    2196      1  28  c000000004504f00  UN   0.1   15936  11136  wickedd
    4287      1   9  c00000020d076800  UN   0.0    4032   3008  agetty
    4289      1  20  c00000020d056680  UN   0.0    7232   3840  agetty
   32423      2  26  c00000020038c580  UN   0.0       0      0
[kworker/26:3]
   32871   4241  27  c0000002609ddd00  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd
   32920  10130  16  c00000027284a100  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33092  32987   0  c000000205218b00  UN   0.1   48512  12608  sendmail
   33154   4567  16  c000000260e51780  UN   0.1   48832  12864  pickup
   33209   4241  36  c000000270cb6500  UN   0.1   18624  11712  sshd
   33473  33283   0  c000000205211480  UN   0.1   48512  12672  sendmail
   33531   4241  37  c00000023c902780  UN   0.1   18624  11648  sshd

EEH handler hung while bnx2x sleeping and holding RTNL lock
===========================================================
crash> bt 213
PID: 213    TASK: c000000004c89e00  CPU: 11  COMMAND: "eehd"
  #0 [c000000004d477e0] __schedule at c000000000c70808
  #1 [c000000004d478b0] schedule at c000000000c70ee0
  #2 [c000000004d478e0] schedule_timeout at c000000000c76dec
  #3 [c000000004d479c0] msleep at c0000000002120cc
  #4 [c000000004d479f0] napi_disable at c000000000a06448
                                        ^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^^
  #5 [c000000004d47a30] bnx2x_netif_stop at c0080000018dba94 [bnx2x]
  #6 [c000000004d47a60] bnx2x_io_slot_reset at c0080000018a551c [bnx2x]
  #7 [c000000004d47b20] eeh_report_reset at c00000000004c9bc
  #8 [c000000004d47b90] eeh_pe_report at c00000000004d1a8
  #9 [c000000004d47c40] eeh_handle_normal_event at c00000000004da64

And the sleeping source code
============================
crash> dis -ls c000000000a06448
FILE: ../net/core/dev.c
LINE: 6702

   6697  {
   6698          might_sleep();
   6699          set_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6700
   6701          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_SCHED, &n->state))
* 6702                  msleep(1);
   6703          while (test_and_set_bit(NAPI_STATE_NPSVC, &n->state))
   6704                  msleep(1);
   6705
   6706          hrtimer_cancel(&n->timer);
   6707
   6708          clear_bit(NAPI_STATE_DISABLE, &n->state);
   6709  }

EEH calls into bnx2x twice based on the system log above, first through
bnx2x_io_error_detected() and then bnx2x_io_slot_reset(), and executes
the following call chains:

bnx2x_io_error_detected()
  +-> bnx2x_eeh_nic_unload()
       +-> bnx2x_del_all_napi()
            +-> __netif_napi_del()

bnx2x_io_slot_reset()
  +-> bnx2x_netif_stop()
       +-> bnx2x_napi_disable()
            +->napi_disable()

Fix this by correcting the sequence of NAPI APIs usage,
that is delete the NAPI after disabling it.

Fixes: 7fa6f34 ("bnx2x: AER revised")
Reported-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Tested-by: David Christensen <drc@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Manish Chopra <manishc@marvell.com>
Signed-off-by: Ariel Elior <aelior@marvell.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220426153913.6966-1-manishc@marvell.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 2, 2023
[ Upstream commit ed6bc6b ]

If CONFIG_M54xx=y, CONFIG_MMU=y, and CONFIG_M68KFPU_EMU=y:

    {standard input}:272: Error: invalid instruction for this architecture; needs 68000 or higher (68000 [68ec000, 68hc000, 68hc001, 68008, 68302, 68306, 68307, 68322, 68356], 68010, 68020 [68k, 68ec020], 68030 [68ec030], 68040 [68ec040], 68060 [68ec060], cpu32 [68330, 68331, 68332, 68333, 68334, 68336, 68340, 68341, 68349, 68360], fidoa [fido]) -- statement `sub.b %d1,%d3' ignored
    {standard input}:609: Error: invalid instruction for this architecture; needs 68020 or higher (68020 [68k, 68ec020], 68030 [68ec030], 68040 [68ec040], 68060 [68ec060]) -- statement `bfextu 4(%a1){%d0,#8},%d0' ignored
    {standard input}:752: Error: operands mismatch -- statement `mulu.l 4(%a0),%d3:%d0' ignored
    {standard input}:1155: Error: operands mismatch -- statement `divu.l %d0,%d3:%d7' ignored

The math emulation support code is intended for 68020 and higher, and
uses several instructions or instruction modes not available on coldfire
or 68000.

Originally, the dependency of M68KFPU_EMU on MMU was fine, as MMU
support was only available on 68020 or higher.  But this assumption
was broken by the introduction of MMU support for M547x and M548x.

Drop the dependency on MMU, as the code should work fine on 68020 and up
without MMU (which are not yet supported by Linux, though).
Add dependencies on M68KCLASSIC (to rule out Coldfire) and FPU (kernel
has some type of floating-point support --- be it hardware or software
emulated, to rule out anything below 68020).

Fixes: 1f7034b ("m68k: allow ColdFire 547x and 548x CPUs to be built with MMU enabled")
Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Geert Uytterhoeven <geert@linux-m68k.org>
Reviewed-by: Greg Ungerer <gerg@linux-m68k.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/18c34695b7c95107f60ccca82a4ff252f3edf477.1652446117.git.geert@linux-m68k.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 2, 2023
…ace is dead

commit c3b0f72 upstream.

ftrace_startup does not remove ops from ftrace_ops_list when
ftrace_startup_enable fails:

register_ftrace_function
  ftrace_startup
    __register_ftrace_function
      ...
      add_ftrace_ops(&ftrace_ops_list, ops)
      ...
    ...
    ftrace_startup_enable // if ftrace failed to modify, ftrace_disabled is set to 1
    ...
  return 0 // ops is in the ftrace_ops_list.

When ftrace_disabled = 1, unregister_ftrace_function simply returns without doing anything:
unregister_ftrace_function
  ftrace_shutdown
    if (unlikely(ftrace_disabled))
            return -ENODEV;  // return here, __unregister_ftrace_function is not executed,
                             // as a result, ops is still in the ftrace_ops_list
    __unregister_ftrace_function
    ...

If ops is dynamically allocated, it will be free later, in this case,
is_ftrace_trampoline accesses NULL pointer:

is_ftrace_trampoline
  ftrace_ops_trampoline
    do_for_each_ftrace_op(op, ftrace_ops_list) // OOPS! op may be NULL!

Syzkaller reports as follows:
[ 1203.506103] BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 000000000000010b
[ 1203.508039] #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
[ 1203.508798] #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
[ 1203.509558] PGD 800000011660b067 P4D 800000011660b067 PUD 130fb8067 PMD 0
[ 1203.510560] Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN PTI
[ 1203.511189] CPU: 6 PID: 29532 Comm: syz-executor.2 Tainted: G    B   W         5.10.0 #8
[ 1203.512324] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[ 1203.513895] RIP: 0010:is_ftrace_trampoline+0x26/0xb0
[ 1203.514644] Code: ff eb d3 90 41 55 41 54 49 89 fc 55 53 e8 f2 00 fd ff 48 8b 1d 3b 35 5d 03 e8 e6 00 fd ff 48 8d bb 90 00 00 00 e8 2a 81 26 00 <48> 8b ab 90 00 00 00 48 85 ed 74 1d e8 c9 00 fd ff 48 8d bb 98 00
[ 1203.518838] RSP: 0018:ffffc900012cf960 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 1203.520092] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: 000000000000007b RCX: ffffffff8a331866
[ 1203.521469] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000008 RDI: 000000000000010b
[ 1203.522583] RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffffffff8df18b07
[ 1203.523550] R10: fffffbfff1be3160 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: 0000000000478399
[ 1203.524596] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: ffff888145088000 R15: 0000000000000008
[ 1203.525634] FS:  00007f429f5f4700(0000) GS:ffff8881daf00000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 1203.526801] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 1203.527626] CR2: 000000000000010b CR3: 0000000170e1e001 CR4: 00000000003706e0
[ 1203.528611] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[ 1203.529605] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400

Therefore, when ftrace_startup_enable fails, we need to rollback registration
process and remove ops from ftrace_ops_list.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20220818032659.56209-1-yangjihong1@huawei.com

Suggested-by: Steven Rostedt <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Steven Rostedt (Google) <rostedt@goodmis.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 2, 2023
…g the sock

[ Upstream commit 3cf7203 ]

There is a race condition in vxlan that when deleting a vxlan device
during receiving packets, there is a possibility that the sock is
released after getting vxlan_sock vs from sk_user_data. Then in
later vxlan_ecn_decapsulate(), vxlan_get_sk_family() we will got
NULL pointer dereference. e.g.

   #0 [ffffa25ec6978a38] machine_kexec at ffffffff8c669757
   #1 [ffffa25ec6978a90] __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c0a4d
   #2 [ffffa25ec6978b58] crash_kexec at ffffffff8c7c1c48
   #3 [ffffa25ec6978b60] oops_end at ffffffff8c627f2b
   #4 [ffffa25ec6978b80] page_fault_oops at ffffffff8c678fcb
   #5 [ffffa25ec6978bd8] exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d109542
   #6 [ffffa25ec6978c00] asm_exc_page_fault at ffffffff8d200b62
      [exception RIP: vxlan_ecn_decapsulate+0x3b]
      RIP: ffffffffc1014e7b  RSP: ffffa25ec6978cb0  RFLAGS: 00010246
      RAX: 0000000000000008  RBX: ffff8aa000888000  RCX: 0000000000000000
      RDX: 000000000000000e  RSI: ffff8a9fc7ab803e  RDI: ffff8a9fd1168700
      RBP: ffff8a9fc7ab803e   R8: 0000000000700000   R9: 00000000000010ae
      R10: ffff8a9fcb748980  R11: 0000000000000000  R12: ffff8a9fd1168700
      R13: ffff8aa000888000  R14: 00000000002a0000  R15: 00000000000010ae
      ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
   #7 [ffffa25ec6978ce8] vxlan_rcv at ffffffffc10189cd [vxlan]
   #8 [ffffa25ec6978d90] udp_queue_rcv_one_skb at ffffffff8cfb6507
   #9 [ffffa25ec6978dc0] udp_unicast_rcv_skb at ffffffff8cfb6e45
  #10 [ffffa25ec6978dc8] __udp4_lib_rcv at ffffffff8cfb8807
  #11 [ffffa25ec6978e20] ip_protocol_deliver_rcu at ffffffff8cf76951
  #12 [ffffa25ec6978e48] ip_local_deliver at ffffffff8cf76bde
  #13 [ffffa25ec6978ea0] __netif_receive_skb_one_core at ffffffff8cecde9b
  #14 [ffffa25ec6978ec8] process_backlog at ffffffff8cece139
  #15 [ffffa25ec6978f00] __napi_poll at ffffffff8ceced1a
  #16 [ffffa25ec6978f28] net_rx_action at ffffffff8cecf1f3
  #17 [ffffa25ec6978fa0] __softirqentry_text_start at ffffffff8d4000ca
  #18 [ffffa25ec6978ff0] do_softirq at ffffffff8c6fbdc3

Reproducer: https://github.com/Mellanox/ovs-tests/blob/master/test-ovs-vxlan-remove-tunnel-during-traffic.sh

Fix this by waiting for all sk_user_data reader to finish before
releasing the sock.

Reported-by: Jianlin Shi <jishi@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Jakub Sitnicki <jakub@cloudflare.com>
Fixes: 6a93cc9 ("udp-tunnel: Add a few more UDP tunnel APIs")
Signed-off-by: Hangbin Liu <liuhangbin@gmail.com>
Reviewed-by: Jiri Pirko <jiri@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2023
[ Upstream commit b18cba0 ]

Commit 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for the same uid
but different gss service") introduced `auth` argument to
__gss_find_upcall(), but in gss_pipe_downcall() it was left as NULL
since it (and auth->service) was not (yet) determined.

When multiple upcalls with the same uid and different service are
ongoing, it could happen that __gss_find_upcall(), which returns the
first match found in the pipe->in_downcall list, could not find the
correct gss_msg corresponding to the downcall we are looking for.
Moreover, it might return a msg which is not sent to rpc.gssd yet.

We could see mount.nfs process hung in D state with multiple mount.nfs
are executed in parallel.  The call trace below is of CentOS 7.9
kernel-3.10.0-1160.24.1.el7.x86_64 but we observed the same hang w/
elrepo kernel-ml-6.0.7-1.el7.

PID: 71258  TASK: ffff91ebd4be0000  CPU: 36  COMMAND: "mount.nfs"
 #0 [ffff9203ca3234f8] __schedule at ffffffffa3b8899f
 #1 [ffff9203ca323580] schedule at ffffffffa3b88eb9
 #2 [ffff9203ca323590] gss_cred_init at ffffffffc0355818 [auth_rpcgss]
 #3 [ffff9203ca323658] rpcauth_lookup_credcache at ffffffffc0421ebc
[sunrpc]
 #4 [ffff9203ca3236d8] gss_lookup_cred at ffffffffc0353633 [auth_rpcgss]
 #5 [ffff9203ca3236e8] rpcauth_lookupcred at ffffffffc0421581 [sunrpc]
 #6 [ffff9203ca323740] rpcauth_refreshcred at ffffffffc04223d3 [sunrpc]
 #7 [ffff9203ca3237a0] call_refresh at ffffffffc04103dc [sunrpc]
 #8 [ffff9203ca3237b8] __rpc_execute at ffffffffc041e1c9 [sunrpc]
 #9 [ffff9203ca323820] rpc_execute at ffffffffc0420a48 [sunrpc]

The scenario is like this. Let's say there are two upcalls for
services A and B, A -> B in pipe->in_downcall, B -> A in pipe->pipe.

When rpc.gssd reads pipe to get the upcall msg corresponding to
service B from pipe->pipe and then writes the response, in
gss_pipe_downcall the msg corresponding to service A will be picked
because only uid is used to find the msg and it is before the one for
B in pipe->in_downcall.  And the process waiting for the msg
corresponding to service A will be woken up.

Actual scheduing of that process might be after rpc.gssd processes the
next msg.  In rpc_pipe_generic_upcall it clears msg->errno (for A).
The process is scheduled to see gss_msg->ctx == NULL and
gss_msg->msg.errno == 0, therefore it cannot break the loop in
gss_create_upcall and is never woken up after that.

This patch adds a simple check to ensure that a msg which is not
sent to rpc.gssd yet is not chosen as the matching upcall upon
receiving a downcall.

Signed-off-by: minoura makoto <minoura@valinux.co.jp>
Signed-off-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com>
Tested-by: Hiroshi Shimamoto <h-shimamoto@nec.com>
Cc: Trond Myklebust <trondmy@hammerspace.com>
Fixes: 9130b8d ("SUNRPC: allow for upcalls for same uid but different gss service")
Signed-off-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2023
[ Upstream commit 031af50 ]

The inline assembly for arm64's cmpxchg_double*() implementations use a
+Q constraint to hazard against other accesses to the memory location
being exchanged. However, the pointer passed to the constraint is a
pointer to unsigned long, and thus the hazard only applies to the first
8 bytes of the location.

GCC can take advantage of this, assuming that other portions of the
location are unchanged, leading to a number of potential problems.

This is similar to what we fixed back in commit:

  fee960b ("arm64: xchg: hazard against entire exchange variable")

... but we forgot to adjust cmpxchg_double*() similarly at the same
time.

The same problem applies, as demonstrated with the following test:

| struct big {
|         u64 lo, hi;
| } __aligned(128);
|
| unsigned long foo(struct big *b)
| {
|         u64 hi_old, hi_new;
|
|         hi_old = b->hi;
|         cmpxchg_double_local(&b->lo, &b->hi, 0x12, 0x34, 0x56, 0x78);
|         hi_new = b->hi;
|
|         return hi_old ^ hi_new;
| }

... which GCC 12.1.0 compiles as:

| 0000000000000000 <foo>:
|    0:   d503233f        paciasp
|    4:   aa0003e4        mov     x4, x0
|    8:   1400000e        b       40 <foo+0x40>
|    c:   d2800240        mov     x0, #0x12                       // #18
|   10:   d2800681        mov     x1, #0x34                       // #52
|   14:   aa0003e5        mov     x5, x0
|   18:   aa0103e6        mov     x6, x1
|   1c:   d2800ac2        mov     x2, #0x56                       // #86
|   20:   d2800f03        mov     x3, #0x78                       // #120
|   24:   48207c82        casp    x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4]
|   28:   ca050000        eor     x0, x0, x5
|   2c:   ca060021        eor     x1, x1, x6
|   30:   aa010000        orr     x0, x0, x1
|   34:   d2800000        mov     x0, #0x0                        // #0    <--- BANG
|   38:   d50323bf        autiasp
|   3c:   d65f03c0        ret
|   40:   d2800240        mov     x0, #0x12                       // #18
|   44:   d2800681        mov     x1, #0x34                       // #52
|   48:   d2800ac2        mov     x2, #0x56                       // #86
|   4c:   d2800f03        mov     x3, #0x78                       // #120
|   50:   f9800091        prfm    pstl1strm, [x4]
|   54:   c87f1885        ldxp    x5, x6, [x4]
|   58:   ca0000a5        eor     x5, x5, x0
|   5c:   ca0100c6        eor     x6, x6, x1
|   60:   aa0600a6        orr     x6, x5, x6
|   64:   b5000066        cbnz    x6, 70 <foo+0x70>
|   68:   c8250c82        stxp    w5, x2, x3, [x4]
|   6c:   35ffff45        cbnz    w5, 54 <foo+0x54>
|   70:   d2800000        mov     x0, #0x0                        // #0     <--- BANG
|   74:   d50323bf        autiasp
|   78:   d65f03c0        ret

Notice that at the lines with "BANG" comments, GCC has assumed that the
higher 8 bytes are unchanged by the cmpxchg_double() call, and that
`hi_old ^ hi_new` can be reduced to a constant zero, for both LSE and
LL/SC versions of cmpxchg_double().

This patch fixes the issue by passing a pointer to __uint128_t into the
+Q constraint, ensuring that the compiler hazards against the entire 16
bytes being modified.

With this change, GCC 12.1.0 compiles the above test as:

| 0000000000000000 <foo>:
|    0:   f9400407        ldr     x7, [x0, #8]
|    4:   d503233f        paciasp
|    8:   aa0003e4        mov     x4, x0
|    c:   1400000f        b       48 <foo+0x48>
|   10:   d2800240        mov     x0, #0x12                       // #18
|   14:   d2800681        mov     x1, #0x34                       // #52
|   18:   aa0003e5        mov     x5, x0
|   1c:   aa0103e6        mov     x6, x1
|   20:   d2800ac2        mov     x2, #0x56                       // #86
|   24:   d2800f03        mov     x3, #0x78                       // #120
|   28:   48207c82        casp    x0, x1, x2, x3, [x4]
|   2c:   ca050000        eor     x0, x0, x5
|   30:   ca060021        eor     x1, x1, x6
|   34:   aa010000        orr     x0, x0, x1
|   38:   f9400480        ldr     x0, [x4, #8]
|   3c:   d50323bf        autiasp
|   40:   ca0000e0        eor     x0, x7, x0
|   44:   d65f03c0        ret
|   48:   d2800240        mov     x0, #0x12                       // #18
|   4c:   d2800681        mov     x1, #0x34                       // #52
|   50:   d2800ac2        mov     x2, #0x56                       // #86
|   54:   d2800f03        mov     x3, #0x78                       // #120
|   58:   f9800091        prfm    pstl1strm, [x4]
|   5c:   c87f1885        ldxp    x5, x6, [x4]
|   60:   ca0000a5        eor     x5, x5, x0
|   64:   ca0100c6        eor     x6, x6, x1
|   68:   aa0600a6        orr     x6, x5, x6
|   6c:   b5000066        cbnz    x6, 78 <foo+0x78>
|   70:   c8250c82        stxp    w5, x2, x3, [x4]
|   74:   35ffff45        cbnz    w5, 5c <foo+0x5c>
|   78:   f9400480        ldr     x0, [x4, #8]
|   7c:   d50323bf        autiasp
|   80:   ca0000e0        eor     x0, x7, x0
|   84:   d65f03c0        ret

... sampling the high 8 bytes before and after the cmpxchg, and
performing an EOR, as we'd expect.

For backporting, I've tested this atop linux-4.9.y with GCC 5.5.0. Note
that linux-4.9.y is oldest currently supported stable release, and
mandates GCC 5.1+. Unfortunately I couldn't get a GCC 5.1 binary to run
on my machines due to library incompatibilities.

I've also used a standalone test to check that we can use a __uint128_t
pointer in a +Q constraint at least as far back as GCC 4.8.5 and LLVM
3.9.1.

Fixes: 5284e1b ("arm64: xchg: Implement cmpxchg_double")
Fixes: e9a4b79 ("arm64: cmpxchg_dbl: patch in lse instructions when supported by the CPU")
Reported-by: Boqun Feng <boqun.feng@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6DEfQXymYVgL3oJ@boqun-archlinux/
Reported-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/Y6GXoO4qmH9OIZ5Q@hirez.programming.kicks-ass.net/
Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Cc: Arnd Bergmann <arnd@arndb.de>
Cc: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Cc: Steve Capper <steve.capper@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230104151626.3262137-1-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2023
[ Upstream commit 272970b ]

The driver shutdown callback (which sends EDL_SOC_RESET to the device
over serdev) should not be invoked when HCI device is not open (e.g. if
hci_dev_open_sync() failed), because the serdev and its TTY are not open
either.  Also skip this step if device is powered off
(qca_power_shutdown()).

The shutdown callback causes use-after-free during system reboot with
Qualcomm Atheros Bluetooth:

  Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address
  0072662f67726fd7
  ...
  CPU: 6 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Tainted: G        W
  6.1.0-rt5-00325-g8a5f56bcfcca #8
  Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
  Call trace:
   tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x4/0x30
   serdev_device_write_flush+0x24/0x34
   qca_serdev_shutdown+0x80/0x130 [hci_uart]
   device_shutdown+0x15c/0x260
   kernel_restart+0x48/0xac

KASAN report:

  BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50
  Read of size 8 at addr ffff16270c2e0018 by task systemd-shutdow/1

  CPU: 7 PID: 1 Comm: systemd-shutdow Not tainted
  6.1.0-next-20221220-00014-gb85aaf97fb01-dirty #28
  Hardware name: Qualcomm Technologies, Inc. Robotics RB5 (DT)
  Call trace:
   dump_backtrace.part.0+0xdc/0xf0
   show_stack+0x18/0x30
   dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0x84
   print_report+0x188/0x488
   kasan_report+0xa4/0xf0
   __asan_load8+0x80/0xac
   tty_driver_flush_buffer+0x1c/0x50
   ttyport_write_flush+0x34/0x44
   serdev_device_write_flush+0x48/0x60
   qca_serdev_shutdown+0x124/0x274
   device_shutdown+0x1e8/0x350
   kernel_restart+0x48/0xb0
   __do_sys_reboot+0x244/0x2d0
   __arm64_sys_reboot+0x54/0x70
   invoke_syscall+0x60/0x190
   el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x7c/0x160
   do_el0_svc+0x44/0xf0
   el0_svc+0x2c/0x6c
   el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x140
   el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194

Fixes: 7e7bbdd ("Bluetooth: hci_qca: Fix qca6390 enable failure after warm reboot")
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Krzysztof Kozlowski <krzysztof.kozlowski@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Luiz Augusto von Dentz <luiz.von.dentz@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 3, 2023
commit c6ec929 upstream.

In Google internal bug 265639009 we've received an (as yet) unreproducible
crash report from an aarch64 GKI 5.10.149-android13 running device.

AFAICT the source code is at:
  https://android.googlesource.com/kernel/common/+/refs/tags/ASB-2022-12-05_13-5.10

The call stack is:
  ncm_close() -> ncm_notify() -> ncm_do_notify()
with the crash at:
  ncm_do_notify+0x98/0x270
Code: 79000d0b b9000a6c f940012a f9400269 (b9405d4b)

Which I believe disassembles to (I don't know ARM assembly, but it looks sane enough to me...):

  // halfword (16-bit) store presumably to event->wLength (at offset 6 of struct usb_cdc_notification)
  0B 0D 00 79    strh w11, [x8, #6]

  // word (32-bit) store presumably to req->Length (at offset 8 of struct usb_request)
  6C 0A 00 B9    str  w12, [x19, #8]

  // x10 (NULL) was read here from offset 0 of valid pointer x9
  // IMHO we're reading 'cdev->gadget' and getting NULL
  // gadget is indeed at offset 0 of struct usb_composite_dev
  2A 01 40 F9    ldr  x10, [x9]

  // loading req->buf pointer, which is at offset 0 of struct usb_request
  69 02 40 F9    ldr  x9, [x19]

  // x10 is null, crash, appears to be attempt to read cdev->gadget->max_speed
  4B 5D 40 B9    ldr  w11, [x10, #0x5c]

which seems to line up with ncm_do_notify() case NCM_NOTIFY_SPEED code fragment:

  event->wLength = cpu_to_le16(8);
  req->length = NCM_STATUS_BYTECOUNT;

  /* SPEED_CHANGE data is up/down speeds in bits/sec */
  data = req->buf + sizeof *event;
  data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget));

My analysis of registers and NULL ptr deref crash offset
  (Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 000000000000005c)
heavily suggests that the crash is due to 'cdev->gadget' being NULL when executing:
  data[0] = cpu_to_le32(ncm_bitrate(cdev->gadget));
which calls:
  ncm_bitrate(NULL)
which then calls:
  gadget_is_superspeed(NULL)
which reads
  ((struct usb_gadget *)NULL)->max_speed
and hits a panic.

AFAICT, if I'm counting right, the offset of max_speed is indeed 0x5C.
(remember there's a GKI KABI reservation of 16 bytes in struct work_struct)

It's not at all clear to me how this is all supposed to work...
but returning 0 seems much better than panic-ing...

Cc: Felipe Balbi <balbi@kernel.org>
Cc: Lorenzo Colitti <lorenzo@google.com>
Cc: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Maciej Żenczykowski <maze@google.com>
Cc: stable <stable@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20230117131839.1138208-1-maze@google.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 25, 2023
commit 830a2a4 upstream.

If a BTI exception is taken from EL1, the entry code will treat this as
an unhandled exception and will panic() the kernel. This is inconsistent
with the way we handle FPAC exceptions, which have a dedicated handler
and only necessarily kill the thread from which the exception was taken
from, and we don't log all the information that could be relevant to
debug the issue.

The code in do_bti() has:

	BUG_ON(!user_mode(regs));

... and it seems like the intent was to call this for EL1 BTI
exceptions, as with FPAC, but this was omitted due to an oversight.

This patch adds separate EL0 and EL1 BTI exception handlers, with the
latter calling die() directly to report the original context the BTI
exception was taken from. This matches our handling of FPAC exceptions.

Prior to this patch, a BTI failure is reported as:

| Unhandled 64-bit el1h sync exception on CPU0, ESR 0x0000000034000002 -- BTI
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00131-g7d937ff0221d-dirty #9
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 20400809 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
| pc : test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10
| lr : test_bti_caller+0x1c/0x28
| sp : ffff80000800bdf0
| x29: ffff80000800bdf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: ffff80000a2b8000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
| x20: ffff8000099fa5b0 x19: ffff800009ff7000 x18: fffffbfffda37000
| x17: 3120676e696d7573 x16: 7361202c6e6f6974 x15: 0000000041a90000
| x14: 0040000000000041 x13: 0040000000000001 x12: ffff000001a90000
| x11: fffffbfffda37480 x10: 0068000000000703 x9 : 0001000040000000
| x8 : 0000000000090000 x7 : 0068000000000f03 x6 : 0060000000000f83
| x5 : ffff80000a2b6000 x4 : ffff0000028d0000 x3 : ffff800009f78378
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000040210000 x0 : ffff8000080257e4
| Kernel panic - not syncing: Unhandled exception
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00131-g7d937ff0221d-dirty #9
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| Call trace:
|  dump_backtrace.part.0+0xcc/0xe0
|  show_stack+0x18/0x5c
|  dump_stack_lvl+0x64/0x80
|  dump_stack+0x18/0x34
|  panic+0x170/0x360
|  arm64_exit_nmi.isra.0+0x0/0x80
|  el1h_64_sync_handler+0x64/0xd0
|  el1h_64_sync+0x64/0x68
|  test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10
|  smp_cpus_done+0xb0/0xbc
|  smp_init+0x7c/0x8c
|  kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x28c
|  kernel_init+0x28/0x13c
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

With this patch applied, a BTI failure is reported as:

| Internal error: Oops - BTI: 0000000034000002 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
| Modules linked in:
| CPU: 0 PID: 1 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 5.19.0-rc3-00132-g0ad98265d582-dirty #8
| Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
| pstate: 20400809 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=-c)
| pc : test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10
| lr : test_bti_caller+0x1c/0x28
| sp : ffff80000800bdf0
| x29: ffff80000800bdf0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
| x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 0000000000000000 x24: 0000000000000000
| x23: ffff80000a2b8000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: 0000000000000000
| x20: ffff8000099fa5b0 x19: ffff800009ff7000 x18: fffffbfffda37000
| x17: 3120676e696d7573 x16: 7361202c6e6f6974 x15: 0000000041a90000
| x14: 0040000000000041 x13: 0040000000000001 x12: ffff000001a90000
| x11: fffffbfffda37480 x10: 0068000000000703 x9 : 0001000040000000
| x8 : 0000000000090000 x7 : 0068000000000f03 x6 : 0060000000000f83
| x5 : ffff80000a2b6000 x4 : ffff0000028d0000 x3 : ffff800009f78378
| x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000040210000 x0 : ffff800008025804
| Call trace:
|  test_bti_callee+0x4/0x10
|  smp_cpus_done+0xb0/0xbc
|  smp_init+0x7c/0x8c
|  kernel_init_freeable+0x128/0x28c
|  kernel_init+0x28/0x13c
|  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
| Code: d50323bf d53cd040 d65f03c0 d503233f (d50323bf)

Signed-off-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Brown <broonie@kernel.org>
Reviewed-by: Anshuman Khandual <anshuman.khandual@arm.com>
Cc: Alexandru Elisei <alexandru.elisei@arm.com>
Cc: Amit Daniel Kachhap <amit.kachhap@arm.com>
Cc: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
Cc: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20220913101732.3925290-6-mark.rutland@arm.com
Signed-off-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jinjie Ruan <ruanjinjie@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 15, 2024
commit b684c09 upstream.

ppc_save_regs() skips one stack frame while saving the CPU register states.
Instead of saving current R1, it pulls the previous stack frame pointer.

When vmcores caused by direct panic call (such as `echo c >
/proc/sysrq-trigger`), are debugged with gdb, gdb fails to show the
backtrace correctly. On further analysis, it was found that it was because
of mismatch between r1 and NIP.

GDB uses NIP to get current function symbol and uses corresponding debug
info of that function to unwind previous frames, but due to the
mismatching r1 and NIP, the unwinding does not work, and it fails to
unwind to the 2nd frame and hence does not show the backtrace.

GDB backtrace with vmcore of kernel without this patch:

---------
(gdb) bt
 #0  0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=<optimized out>,
    newregs=0xc000000004f8f8d8) at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69
 #1  __crash_kexec (regs=<optimized out>) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974
 #2  0x0000000000000063 in ?? ()
 #3  0xc000000003579320 in ?? ()
---------

Further analysis revealed that the mismatch occurred because
"ppc_save_regs" was saving the previous stack's SP instead of the current
r1. This patch fixes this by storing current r1 in the saved pt_regs.

GDB backtrace with vmcore of patched kernel:

--------
(gdb) bt
 #0  0xc0000000002a53e8 in crash_setup_regs (oldregs=0x0, newregs=0xc00000000670b8d8)
    at ./arch/powerpc/include/asm/kexec.h:69
 #1  __crash_kexec (regs=regs@entry=0x0) at kernel/kexec_core.c:974
 #2  0xc000000000168918 in panic (fmt=fmt@entry=0xc000000001654a60 "sysrq triggered crash\n")
    at kernel/panic.c:358
 #3  0xc000000000b735f8 in sysrq_handle_crash (key=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:155
 #4  0xc000000000b742cc in __handle_sysrq (key=key@entry=99, check_mask=check_mask@entry=false)
    at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:602
 #5  0xc000000000b7506c in write_sysrq_trigger (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>,
    count=2, ppos=<optimized out>) at drivers/tty/sysrq.c:1163
 #6  0xc00000000069a7bc in pde_write (ppos=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>,
    buf=<optimized out>, file=<optimized out>, pde=0xc00000000362cb40) at fs/proc/inode.c:340
 #7  proc_reg_write (file=<optimized out>, buf=<optimized out>, count=<optimized out>,
    ppos=<optimized out>) at fs/proc/inode.c:352
 #8  0xc0000000005b3bbc in vfs_write (file=file@entry=0xc000000006aa6b00,
    buf=buf@entry=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>,
    count=count@entry=2, pos=pos@entry=0xc00000000670bda0) at fs/read_write.c:582
 #9  0xc0000000005b4264 in ksys_write (fd=<optimized out>,
    buf=0x61f498b4f60 <error: Cannot access memory at address 0x61f498b4f60>, count=2)
    at fs/read_write.c:637
 #10 0xc00000000002ea2c in system_call_exception (regs=0xc00000000670be80, r0=<optimized out>)
    at arch/powerpc/kernel/syscall.c:171
 #11 0xc00000000000c270 in system_call_vectored_common ()
    at arch/powerpc/kernel/interrupt_64.S:192
--------

Nick adds:
  So this now saves regs as though it was an interrupt taken in the
  caller, at the instruction after the call to ppc_save_regs, whereas
  previously the NIP was there, but R1 came from the caller's caller and
  that mismatch is what causes gdb's dwarf unwinder to go haywire.

Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com>
Fixes: d16a58f ("powerpc: Improve ppc_save_regs()")
Reivewed-by: Nicholas Piggin <npiggin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Michael Ellerman <mpe@ellerman.id.au>
Link: https://msgid.link/20230615091047.90433-1-adityag@linux.ibm.com
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Aditya Gupta <adityag@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request May 2, 2024
[ Upstream commit f8bbc07 ]

vhost_worker will call tun call backs to receive packets. If too many
illegal packets arrives, tun_do_read will keep dumping packet contents.
When console is enabled, it will costs much more cpu time to dump
packet and soft lockup will be detected.

net_ratelimit mechanism can be used to limit the dumping rate.

PID: 33036    TASK: ffff949da6f20000  CPU: 23   COMMAND: "vhost-32980"
 #0 [fffffe00003fce50] crash_nmi_callback at ffffffff89249253
 #1 [fffffe00003fce58] nmi_handle at ffffffff89225fa3
 #2 [fffffe00003fceb0] default_do_nmi at ffffffff8922642e
 #3 [fffffe00003fced0] do_nmi at ffffffff8922660d
 #4 [fffffe00003fcef0] end_repeat_nmi at ffffffff89c01663
    [exception RIP: io_serial_in+20]
    RIP: ffffffff89792594  RSP: ffffa655314979e8  RFLAGS: 00000002
    RAX: ffffffff89792500  RBX: ffffffff8af428a0  RCX: 0000000000000000
    RDX: 00000000000003fd  RSI: 0000000000000005  RDI: ffffffff8af428a0
    RBP: 0000000000002710   R8: 0000000000000004   R9: 000000000000000f
    R10: 0000000000000000  R11: ffffffff8acbf64f  R12: 0000000000000020
    R13: ffffffff8acbf698  R14: 0000000000000058  R15: 0000000000000000
    ORIG_RAX: ffffffffffffffff  CS: 0010  SS: 0018
 #5 [ffffa655314979e8] io_serial_in at ffffffff89792594
 #6 [ffffa655314979e8] wait_for_xmitr at ffffffff89793470
 #7 [ffffa65531497a08] serial8250_console_putchar at ffffffff897934f6
 #8 [ffffa65531497a20] uart_console_write at ffffffff8978b605
 #9 [ffffa65531497a48] serial8250_console_write at ffffffff89796558
 #10 [ffffa65531497ac8] console_unlock at ffffffff89316124
 #11 [ffffa65531497b10] vprintk_emit at ffffffff89317c07
 #12 [ffffa65531497b68] printk at ffffffff89318306
 #13 [ffffa65531497bc8] print_hex_dump at ffffffff89650765
 #14 [ffffa65531497ca8] tun_do_read at ffffffffc0b06c27 [tun]
 #15 [ffffa65531497d38] tun_recvmsg at ffffffffc0b06e34 [tun]
 #16 [ffffa65531497d68] handle_rx at ffffffffc0c5d682 [vhost_net]
 #17 [ffffa65531497ed0] vhost_worker at ffffffffc0c644dc [vhost]
 #18 [ffffa65531497f10] kthread at ffffffff892d2e72
 #19 [ffffa65531497f50] ret_from_fork at ffffffff89c0022f

Fixes: ef3db4a ("tun: avoid BUG, dump packet on GSO errors")
Signed-off-by: Lei Chen <lei.chen@smartx.com>
Reviewed-by: Willem de Bruijn <willemb@google.com>
Acked-by: Jason Wang <jasowang@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240415020247.2207781-1-lei.chen@smartx.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2024
[ Upstream commit ffbf4fb ]

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, we fail to add necessary padding bytes
to bug_table entries, and as a result the last entry in a bug table will
be ignored, potentially leading to an unexpected panic(). All prior
entries in the table will be handled correctly.

The arm64 ABI requires that struct fields of up to 8 bytes are
naturally-aligned, with padding added within a struct such that struct
are suitably aligned within arrays.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERPOSE=y, the layout of a bug_entry is:

	struct bug_entry {
		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes
		signed int      file_disp;	// 4 bytes
		unsigned short  line;		// 2 bytes
		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes
	}

... with 12 bytes total, requiring 4-byte alignment.

When CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the layout of a bug_entry is:

	struct bug_entry {
		signed int      bug_addr_disp;	// 4 bytes
		unsigned short  flags;		// 2 bytes
		< implicit padding >		// 2 bytes
	}

... with 8 bytes total, with 6 bytes of data and 2 bytes of trailing
padding, requiring 4-byte alginment.

When we create a bug_entry in assembly, we align the start of the entry
to 4 bytes, which implicitly handles padding for any prior entries.
However, we do not align the end of the entry, and so when
CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE=n, the final entry lacks the trailing padding
bytes.

For the main kernel image this is not a problem as find_bug() doesn't
depend on the trailing padding bytes when searching for entries:

	for (bug = __start___bug_table; bug < __stop___bug_table; ++bug)
		if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
			return bug;

However for modules, module_bug_finalize() depends on the trailing
bytes when calculating the number of entries:

	mod->num_bugs = sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry);

... and as the last bug_entry lacks the necessary padding bytes, this entry
will not be counted, e.g. in the case of a single entry:

	sechdrs[i].sh_size == 6
	sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 8;

	sechdrs[i].sh_size / sizeof(struct bug_entry) == 0;

Consequently module_find_bug() will miss the last bug_entry when it does:

	for (i = 0; i < mod->num_bugs; ++i, ++bug)
		if (bugaddr == bug_addr(bug))
			goto out;

... which can lead to a kenrel panic due to an unhandled bug.

This can be demonstrated with the following module:

	static int __init buginit(void)
	{
		WARN(1, "hello\n");
		return 0;
	}

	static void __exit bugexit(void)
	{
	}

	module_init(buginit);
	module_exit(bugexit);
	MODULE_LICENSE("GPL");

... which will trigger a kernel panic when loaded:

	------------[ cut here ]------------
	hello
	Unexpected kernel BRK exception at EL1
	Internal error: BRK handler: 00000000f2000800 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
	Modules linked in: hello(O+)
	CPU: 0 PID: 50 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O       6.9.1 #8
	Hardware name: linux,dummy-virt (DT)
	pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
	pc : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
	lr : buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
	sp : ffff800080533ae0
	x29: ffff800080533ae0 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: 0000000000000000
	x26: ffffaba8c4e70510 x25: ffff800080533c30 x24: ffffaba8c4a28a58
	x23: 0000000000000000 x22: 0000000000000000 x21: ffff3947c0eab3c0
	x20: ffffaba8c4e3f000 x19: ffffaba846464000 x18: 0000000000000006
	x17: 0000000000000000 x16: ffffaba8c2492834 x15: 0720072007200720
	x14: 0720072007200720 x13: ffffaba8c49b27c8 x12: 0000000000000312
	x11: 0000000000000106 x10: ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x9 : ffffaba8c49b27c8
	x8 : 00000000ffffefff x7 : ffffaba8c4a0a7c8 x6 : 80000000fffff000
	x5 : 0000000000000107 x4 : 0000000000000000 x3 : 0000000000000000
	x2 : 0000000000000000 x1 : 0000000000000000 x0 : ffff3947c0eab3c0
	Call trace:
	 buginit+0x18/0x1000 [hello]
	 do_one_initcall+0x80/0x1c8
	 do_init_module+0x60/0x218
	 load_module+0x1ba4/0x1d70
	 __do_sys_init_module+0x198/0x1d0
	 __arm64_sys_init_module+0x1c/0x28
	 invoke_syscall+0x48/0x114
	 el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x40/0xe0
	 do_el0_svc+0x1c/0x28
	 el0_svc+0x34/0xd8
	 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x120/0x12c
	 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194
	Code: d0ffffe0 910003fd 91000000 9400000b (d4210000)
	---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
	Kernel panic - not syncing: BRK handler: Fatal exception

Fix this by always aligning the end of a bug_entry to 4 bytes, which is
correct regardless of CONFIG_DEBUG_BUGVERBOSE.

Fixes: 9fb7410 ("arm64/BUG: Use BRK instruction for generic BUG traps")

Signed-off-by: Yuanbin Xie <xieyuanbin1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Jiangfeng Xiao <xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/1716212077-43826-1-git-send-email-xiaojiangfeng@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jun 16, 2024
commit d4f9d5a upstream.

A system crash like this

  Failing address: 200000cb7df6f000 TEID: 200000cb7df6f403
  Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
  AS:00000002d71bc007 R3:00000003fe5b8007 S:000000011a446000 P:000000015660c13d
  Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ...
  CPU: 8 PID: 7556 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7 #8
  Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
  Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 0000014b75e7b606 (ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8)
  R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
  Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 ffffffffffffffc0 0000000000000001 00000048f96b75d3
  000000cb00000100 ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 000000cb7df6fce0
  000000cb7df6fce0 00000000ffffffff 000000000000002b 00000048ffffffff
  000003ff9b2dbc80 200000cb7df6fcd8 0000014bffffffc0 000000cb7df6fbc8
  Krnl Code: 0000014b75e7b5fc: a7840047            brc     8,0000014b75e7b68a
  0000014b75e7b600: 18b2                lr      %r11,%r2
  #0000014b75e7b602: a7f4000a            brc     15,0000014b75e7b616
  >0000014b75e7b606: eb22d00000e6        laog    %r2,%r2,0(%r13)
  0000014b75e7b60c: a7680001            lhi     %r6,1
  0000014b75e7b610: 187b                lr      %r7,%r11
  0000014b75e7b612: 84960021            brxh    %r9,%r6,0000014b75e7b654
  0000014b75e7b616: 18e9                lr      %r14,%r9
  Call Trace:
  [<0000014b75e7b606>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8
  ([<0000014b75e7b5dc>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0xe4/0x1f8)
  [<0000014b75e7b758>] apmask_store+0x68/0x140
  [<0000014b75679196>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x1e8
  [<0000014b75598524>] vfs_write+0x1b4/0x448
  [<0000014b7559894c>] ksys_write+0x74/0x100
  [<0000014b7618a440>] __do_syscall+0x268/0x328
  [<0000014b761a3558>] system_call+0x70/0x98
  INFO: lockdep is turned off.
  Last Breaking-Event-Address:
  [<0000014b75e7b636>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x13e/0x1f8
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops

occured when /sys/bus/ap/a[pq]mask was updated with a relative mask value
(like +0x10-0x12,+60,-90) with one of the numeric values exceeding INT_MAX.

The fix is simple: use unsigned long values for the internal variables. The
correct checks are already in place in the function but a simple int for
the internal variables was used with the possibility to overflow.

Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 5, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 16, 2024
commit d4f9d5a upstream.

A system crash like this

  Failing address: 200000cb7df6f000 TEID: 200000cb7df6f403
  Fault in home space mode while using kernel ASCE.
  AS:00000002d71bc007 R3:00000003fe5b8007 S:000000011a446000 P:000000015660c13d
  Oops: 0038 ilc:3 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
  Modules linked in: mlx5_ib ...
  CPU: 8 PID: 7556 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7 #8
  Hardware name: IBM 3931 A01 704 (LPAR)
  Krnl PSW : 0704e00180000000 0000014b75e7b606 (ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8)
  R:0 T:1 IO:1 EX:1 Key:0 M:1 W:0 P:0 AS:3 CC:2 PM:0 RI:0 EA:3
  Krnl GPRS: 0000000000000001 ffffffffffffffc0 0000000000000001 00000048f96b75d3
  000000cb00000100 ffffffffffffffff ffffffffffffffff 000000cb7df6fce0
  000000cb7df6fce0 00000000ffffffff 000000000000002b 00000048ffffffff
  000003ff9b2dbc80 200000cb7df6fcd8 0000014bffffffc0 000000cb7df6fbc8
  Krnl Code: 0000014b75e7b5fc: a7840047            brc     8,0000014b75e7b68a
  0000014b75e7b600: 18b2                lr      %r11,%r2
  #0000014b75e7b602: a7f4000a            brc     15,0000014b75e7b616
  >0000014b75e7b606: eb22d00000e6        laog    %r2,%r2,0(%r13)
  0000014b75e7b60c: a7680001            lhi     %r6,1
  0000014b75e7b610: 187b                lr      %r7,%r11
  0000014b75e7b612: 84960021            brxh    %r9,%r6,0000014b75e7b654
  0000014b75e7b616: 18e9                lr      %r14,%r9
  Call Trace:
  [<0000014b75e7b606>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x10e/0x1f8
  ([<0000014b75e7b5dc>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0xe4/0x1f8)
  [<0000014b75e7b758>] apmask_store+0x68/0x140
  [<0000014b75679196>] kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x14e/0x1e8
  [<0000014b75598524>] vfs_write+0x1b4/0x448
  [<0000014b7559894c>] ksys_write+0x74/0x100
  [<0000014b7618a440>] __do_syscall+0x268/0x328
  [<0000014b761a3558>] system_call+0x70/0x98
  INFO: lockdep is turned off.
  Last Breaking-Event-Address:
  [<0000014b75e7b636>] ap_parse_bitmap_str+0x13e/0x1f8
  Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception: panic_on_oops

occured when /sys/bus/ap/a[pq]mask was updated with a relative mask value
(like +0x10-0x12,+60,-90) with one of the numeric values exceeding INT_MAX.

The fix is simple: use unsigned long values for the internal variables. The
correct checks are already in place in the function but a simple int for
the internal variables was used with the possibility to overflow.

Reported-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Tested-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Heiko Carstens <hca@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 16, 2024
commit 9d274c1 upstream.

We have been seeing crashes on duplicate keys in
btrfs_set_item_key_safe():

  BTRFS critical (device vdb): slot 4 key (450 108 8192) new key (450 108 8192)
  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  kernel BUG at fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620!
  invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 PID: 3139 Comm: xfs_io Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0 #6
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-2.fc40 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:btrfs_set_item_key_safe+0x11f/0x290 [btrfs]

With the following stack trace:

  #0  btrfs_set_item_key_safe (fs/btrfs/ctree.c:2620:4)
  #1  btrfs_drop_extents (fs/btrfs/file.c:411:4)
  #2  log_one_extent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4732:9)
  #3  btrfs_log_changed_extents (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:4955:9)
  #4  btrfs_log_inode (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6626:9)
  #5  btrfs_log_inode_parent (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7070:8)
  #6  btrfs_log_dentry_safe (fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7171:8)
  #7  btrfs_sync_file (fs/btrfs/file.c:1933:8)
  #8  vfs_fsync_range (fs/sync.c:188:9)
  #9  vfs_fsync (fs/sync.c:202:9)
  #10 do_fsync (fs/sync.c:212:9)
  #11 __do_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:225:9)
  #12 __se_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #13 __x64_sys_fdatasync (fs/sync.c:223:1)
  #14 do_syscall_x64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:52:14)
  #15 do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/common.c:83:7)
  #16 entry_SYSCALL_64+0xaf/0x14c (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

So we're logging a changed extent from fsync, which is splitting an
extent in the log tree. But this split part already exists in the tree,
triggering the BUG().

This is the state of the log tree at the time of the crash, dumped with
drgn (https://github.com/osandov/drgn/blob/main/contrib/btrfs_tree.py)
to get more details than btrfs_print_leaf() gives us:

  >>> print_extent_buffer(prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[0]["eb"])
  leaf 33439744 level 0 items 72 generation 9 owner 18446744073709551610
  leaf 33439744 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
          item 0 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 16123 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 9 size 8192 nbytes 8473563889606862198
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 204 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  mtime 1716417704.983333333 (2024-05-22 15:41:44)
                  otime 17592186044416.000000000 (559444-03-08 01:40:16)
          item 1 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 16110 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 2 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 16073 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 3 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 16020 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 4096 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 4 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 4096) itemoff 15967 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 4096 nr 8192
          item 5 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 15914 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096
  ...

So the real problem happened earlier: notice that items 4 (4k-12k) and 5
(8k-12k) overlap. Both are prealloc extents. Item 4 straddles i_size and
item 5 starts at i_size.

Here is the state of the filesystem tree at the time of the crash:

  >>> root = prog.crashed_thread().stack_trace()[2]["inode"].root
  >>> ret, nodes, slots = btrfs_search_slot(root, BtrfsKey(450, 0, 0))
  >>> print_extent_buffer(nodes[0])
  leaf 30425088 level 0 items 184 generation 9 owner 5
  leaf 30425088 flags 0x100000000000000
  fs uuid e5bd3946-400c-4223-8923-190ef1f18677
  chunk uuid d58cb17e-6d02-494a-829a-18b7d8a399da
  	...
          item 179 key (450 INODE_ITEM 0) itemoff 4907 itemsize 160
                  generation 7 transid 7 size 4096 nbytes 12288
                  block group 0 mode 100600 links 1 uid 0 gid 0 rdev 0
                  sequence 6 flags 0x10(PREALLOC)
                  atime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  ctime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  mtime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
                  otime 1716417703.220000000 (2024-05-22 15:41:43)
          item 180 key (450 INODE_REF 256) itemoff 4894 itemsize 13
                  index 195 namelen 3 name: 193
          item 181 key (450 XATTR_ITEM 1640047104) itemoff 4857 itemsize 37
                  location key (0 UNKNOWN.0 0) type XATTR
                  transid 7 data_len 1 name_len 6
                  name: user.a
                  data a
          item 182 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 0) itemoff 4804 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 1 (regular)
                  extent data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  extent data offset 0 nr 8192 ram 12288
                  extent compression 0 (none)
          item 183 key (450 EXTENT_DATA 8192) itemoff 4751 itemsize 53
                  generation 9 type 2 (prealloc)
                  prealloc data disk byte 303144960 nr 12288
                  prealloc data offset 8192 nr 4096

Item 5 in the log tree corresponds to item 183 in the filesystem tree,
but nothing matches item 4. Furthermore, item 183 is the last item in
the leaf.

btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() is responsible for logging prealloc extents
beyond i_size. It first truncates any previously logged prealloc extents
that start beyond i_size. Then, it walks the filesystem tree and copies
the prealloc extent items to the log tree.

If it hits the end of a leaf, then it calls btrfs_next_leaf(), which
unlocks the tree and does another search. However, while the filesystem
tree is unlocked, an ordered extent completion may modify the tree. In
particular, it may insert an extent item that overlaps with an extent
item that was already copied to the log tree.

This may manifest in several ways depending on the exact scenario,
including an EEXIST error that is silently translated to a full sync,
overlapping items in the log tree, or this crash. This particular crash
is triggered by the following sequence of events:

- Initially, the file has i_size=4k, a regular extent from 0-4k, and a
  prealloc extent beyond i_size from 4k-12k. The prealloc extent item is
  the last item in its B-tree leaf.
- The file is fsync'd, which copies its inode item and both extent items
  to the log tree.
- An xattr is set on the file, which sets the
  BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING flag.
- The range 4k-8k in the file is written using direct I/O. i_size is
  extended to 8k, but the ordered extent is still in flight.
- The file is fsync'd. Since BTRFS_INODE_COPY_EVERYTHING is set, this
  calls copy_inode_items_to_log(), which calls
  btrfs_log_prealloc_extents().
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() finds the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the
  filesystem tree. Since it starts before i_size, it skips it. Since it
  is the last item in its B-tree leaf, it calls btrfs_next_leaf().
- btrfs_next_leaf() unlocks the path.
- The ordered extent completion runs, which converts the 4k-8k part of
  the prealloc extent to written and inserts the remaining prealloc part
  from 8k-12k.
- btrfs_next_leaf() does a search and finds the new prealloc extent
  8k-12k.
- btrfs_log_prealloc_extents() copies the 8k-12k prealloc extent into
  the log tree. Note that it overlaps with the 4k-12k prealloc extent
  that was copied to the log tree by the first fsync.
- fsync calls btrfs_log_changed_extents(), which tries to log the 4k-8k
  extent that was written.
- This tries to drop the range 4k-8k in the log tree, which requires
  adjusting the start of the 4k-12k prealloc extent in the log tree to
  8k.
- btrfs_set_item_key_safe() sees that there is already an extent
  starting at 8k in the log tree and calls BUG().

Fix this by detecting when we're about to insert an overlapping file
extent item in the log tree and truncating the part that would overlap.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 6.1+
Reviewed-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Omar Sandoval <osandov@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
ts-kris pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 16, 2024
commit be346c1 upstream.

The code in ocfs2_dio_end_io_write() estimates number of necessary
transaction credits using ocfs2_calc_extend_credits().  This however does
not take into account that the IO could be arbitrarily large and can
contain arbitrary number of extents.

Extent tree manipulations do often extend the current transaction but not
in all of the cases.  For example if we have only single block extents in
the tree, ocfs2_mark_extent_written() will end up calling
ocfs2_replace_extent_rec() all the time and we will never extend the
current transaction and eventually exhaust all the transaction credits if
the IO contains many single block extents.  Once that happens a
WARN_ON(jbd2_handle_buffer_credits(handle) <= 0) is triggered in
jbd2_journal_dirty_metadata() and subsequently OCFS2 aborts in response to
this error.  This was actually triggered by one of our customers on a
heavily fragmented OCFS2 filesystem.

To fix the issue make sure the transaction always has enough credits for
one extent insert before each call of ocfs2_mark_extent_written().

Heming Zhao said:

------
PANIC: "Kernel panic - not syncing: OCFS2: (device dm-1): panic forced after error"

PID: xxx  TASK: xxxx  CPU: 5  COMMAND: "SubmitThread-CA"
  #0 machine_kexec at ffffffff8c069932
  #1 __crash_kexec at ffffffff8c1338fa
  #2 panic at ffffffff8c1d69b9
  #3 ocfs2_handle_error at ffffffffc0c86c0c [ocfs2]
  #4 __ocfs2_abort at ffffffffc0c88387 [ocfs2]
  #5 ocfs2_journal_dirty at ffffffffc0c51e98 [ocfs2]
  #6 ocfs2_split_extent at ffffffffc0c27ea3 [ocfs2]
  #7 ocfs2_change_extent_flag at ffffffffc0c28053 [ocfs2]
  #8 ocfs2_mark_extent_written at ffffffffc0c28347 [ocfs2]
  #9 ocfs2_dio_end_io_write at ffffffffc0c2bef9 [ocfs2]
#10 ocfs2_dio_end_io at ffffffffc0c2c0f5 [ocfs2]
#11 dio_complete at ffffffff8c2b9fa7
#12 do_blockdev_direct_IO at ffffffff8c2bc09f
#13 ocfs2_direct_IO at ffffffffc0c2b653 [ocfs2]
#14 generic_file_direct_write at ffffffff8c1dcf14
#15 __generic_file_write_iter at ffffffff8c1dd07b
#16 ocfs2_file_write_iter at ffffffffc0c49f1f [ocfs2]
#17 aio_write at ffffffff8c2cc72e
#18 kmem_cache_alloc at ffffffff8c248dde
#19 do_io_submit at ffffffff8c2ccada
#20 do_syscall_64 at ffffffff8c004984
#21 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff8c8000ba

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240617095543.6971-1-jack@suse.cz
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240614145243.8837-1-jack@suse.cz
Fixes: c15471f ("ocfs2: fix sparse file & data ordering issue in direct io")
Signed-off-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Reviewed-by: Joseph Qi <joseph.qi@linux.alibaba.com>
Reviewed-by: Heming Zhao <heming.zhao@suse.com>
Cc: Mark Fasheh <mark@fasheh.com>
Cc: Joel Becker <jlbec@evilplan.org>
Cc: Junxiao Bi <junxiao.bi@oracle.com>
Cc: Changwei Ge <gechangwei@live.cn>
Cc: Gang He <ghe@suse.com>
Cc: Jun Piao <piaojun@huawei.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 18, 2024
commit 1723f04 upstream.

Currently if we request a feature that is not set in the Kernel config we
fail silently and return all the available features.  However, the man
page indicates we should return an EINVAL.

We need to fix this issue since we can end up with a Kernel warning should
a program request the feature UFFD_FEATURE_WP_UNPOPULATED on a kernel with
the config not set with this feature.

 [  200.812896] WARNING: CPU: 91 PID: 13634 at mm/memory.c:1660 zap_pte_range+0x43d/0x660
 [  200.820738] Modules linked in:
 [  200.869387] CPU: 91 PID: 13634 Comm: userfaultfd Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.9.0-rc5+ #8
 [  200.877477] Hardware name: Dell Inc. PowerEdge R6525/0N7YGH, BIOS 2.7.3 03/30/2022
 [  200.885052] RIP: 0010:zap_pte_range+0x43d/0x660

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240626130513.120193-1-audra@redhat.com
Fixes: e06f1e1 ("userfaultfd: wp: enabled write protection in userfaultfd API")
Signed-off-by: Audra Mitchell <audra@redhat.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
Cc: Andrea Arcangeli <aarcange@redhat.com>
Cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
Cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Peter Xu <peterx@redhat.com>
Cc: Rafael Aquini <raquini@redhat.com>
Cc: Shaohua Li <shli@fb.com>
Cc: Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit 86a41ea9fd79ddb6145cb8ebf5aeafceabca6f7d ]

When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit
lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another
(unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp.

This issue was previously discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/87sfialu2n.fsf@cloudflare.com/

The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel
sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use
a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible.

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.10.0+ #34 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  10 locks held by iperf3/771:
   #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40
   #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260
   #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10
   #6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450
   #9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
   dump_stack+0xc/0x20
   __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540
   _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420
   sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340
   tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30
   __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260
   ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0
   ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0
   ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0
   __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280
   net_rx_action+0x332/0x670
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0
   ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190
   tcp_push+0x117/0x310
   tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740
   tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40
   inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90
   sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0
   vfs_write+0x68d/0x800
   ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
   ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0
   __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50
   x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50
   do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992
  Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992
  RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc
  R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0
   </TASK>

Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4
CC: gnault@redhat.com
CC: cong.wang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240806160626.1248317-1-jchapman@katalix.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 19, 2024
[ Upstream commit 86a41ea9fd79ddb6145cb8ebf5aeafceabca6f7d ]

When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit
lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another
(unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp.

This issue was previously discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/87sfialu2n.fsf@cloudflare.com/

The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel
sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use
a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible.

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.10.0+ #34 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  10 locks held by iperf3/771:
   #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40
   #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260
   #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10
   #6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450
   #9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
   dump_stack+0xc/0x20
   __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540
   _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420
   sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340
   tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30
   __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260
   ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0
   ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0
   ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0
   __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280
   net_rx_action+0x332/0x670
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0
   ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190
   tcp_push+0x117/0x310
   tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740
   tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40
   inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90
   sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0
   vfs_write+0x68d/0x800
   ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
   ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0
   __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50
   x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50
   do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992
  Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992
  RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc
  R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0
   </TASK>

Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4
CC: gnault@redhat.com
CC: cong.wang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240806160626.1248317-1-jchapman@katalix.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit a699781c79ecf6cfe67fb00a0331b4088c7c8466 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 4, 2024
[ Upstream commit a699781c79ecf6cfe67fb00a0331b4088c7c8466 ]

A sysfs reader can race with a device reset or removal, attempting to
read device state when the device is not actually present. eg:

     [exception RIP: qed_get_current_link+17]
  #8 [ffffb9e4f2907c48] qede_get_link_ksettings at ffffffffc07a994a [qede]
  #9 [ffffb9e4f2907cd8] __rh_call_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b01a3
 #10 [ffffb9e4f2907d38] __ethtool_get_link_ksettings at ffffffff992b04e4
 #11 [ffffb9e4f2907d90] duplex_show at ffffffff99260300
 #12 [ffffb9e4f2907e38] dev_attr_show at ffffffff9905a01c
 #13 [ffffb9e4f2907e50] sysfs_kf_seq_show at ffffffff98e0145b
 #14 [ffffb9e4f2907e68] seq_read at ffffffff98d902e3
 #15 [ffffb9e4f2907ec8] vfs_read at ffffffff98d657d1
 #16 [ffffb9e4f2907f00] ksys_read at ffffffff98d65c3f
 #17 [ffffb9e4f2907f38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff98a052fb

 crash> struct net_device.state ffff9a9d21336000
    state = 5,

state 5 is __LINK_STATE_START (0b1) and __LINK_STATE_NOCARRIER (0b100).
The device is not present, note lack of __LINK_STATE_PRESENT (0b10).

This is the same sort of panic as observed in commit 4224cfd
("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show").

There are many other callers of __ethtool_get_link_ksettings() which
don't have a device presence check.

Move this check into ethtool to protect all callers.

Fixes: d519e17 ("net: export device speed and duplex via sysfs")
Fixes: 4224cfd ("net-sysfs: add check for netdevice being present to speed_show")
Signed-off-by: Jamie Bainbridge <jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/8bae218864beaa44ed01628140475b9bf641c5b0.1724393671.git.jamie.bainbridge@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 12, 2024
[ Upstream commit 54624acf8843375a6de3717ac18df3b5104c39c5 ]

The test thread will start N benchmark kthreads and then schedule out
until the test time finished and notify the benchmark kthreads to stop.
The benchmark kthreads will keep running until notified to stop.
There's a problem with current implementation when the benchmark
kthreads number is equal to the CPUs on a non-preemptible kernel:
since the scheduler will balance the kthreads across the CPUs and
when the test time's out the test thread won't get a chance to be
scheduled on any CPU then cannot notify the benchmark kthreads to stop.

This can be easily reproduced on a VM (simulated with 16 CPUs) with
PREEMPT_VOLUNTARY:
estuary:/mnt$ ./dma_map_benchmark -t 16 -s 1
 rcu: INFO: rcu_sched self-detected stall on CPU
 rcu:     10-...!: (5221 ticks this GP) idle=ed24/1/0x4000000000000000 softirq=142/142 fqs=0
 rcu:     (t=5254 jiffies g=-559 q=45 ncpus=16)
 rcu: rcu_sched kthread starved for 5255 jiffies! g-559 f0x0 RCU_GP_WAIT_FQS(5) ->state=0x0 ->cpu=12
 rcu:     Unless rcu_sched kthread gets sufficient CPU time, OOM is now expected behavior.
 rcu: RCU grace-period kthread stack dump:
 task:rcu_sched       state:R  running task     stack:0     pid:16    tgid:16    ppid:2      flags:0x00000008
 Call trace
  __switch_to+0xec/0x138
  __schedule+0x2f8/0x1080
  schedule+0x30/0x130
  schedule_timeout+0xa0/0x188
  rcu_gp_fqs_loop+0x128/0x528
  rcu_gp_kthread+0x1c8/0x208
  kthread+0xec/0xf8
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
 Sending NMI from CPU 10 to CPUs 0:
 NMI backtrace for cpu 0
 CPU: 0 PID: 332 Comm: dma-map-benchma Not tainted 6.10.0-rc1-vanilla-LSE #8
 Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
 pstate: 20400005 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
 pc : arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x218/0x730
 lr : arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x488/0x730
 sp : ffff80008748b630
 x29: ffff80008748b630 x28: 0000000000000000 x27: ffff80008748b780
 x26: 0000000000000000 x25: 000000000000bc70 x24: 000000000001bc70
 x23: ffff0000c12af080 x22: 0000000000010000 x21: 000000000000ffff
 x20: ffff80008748b700 x19: ffff0000c12af0c0 x18: 0000000000010000
 x17: 0000000000000001 x16: 0000000000000040 x15: ffffffffffffffff
 x14: 0001ffffffffffff x13: 000000000000ffff x12: 00000000000002f1
 x11: 000000000001ffff x10: 0000000000000031 x9 : ffff800080b6b0b8
 x8 : ffff0000c2a48000 x7 : 000000000001bc71 x6 : 0001800000000000
 x5 : 00000000000002f1 x4 : 01ffffffffffffff x3 : 000000000009aaf1
 x2 : 0000000000000018 x1 : 000000000000000f x0 : ffff0000c12af18c
 Call trace:
  arm_smmu_cmdq_issue_cmdlist+0x218/0x730
  __arm_smmu_tlb_inv_range+0xe0/0x1a8
  arm_smmu_iotlb_sync+0xc0/0x128
  __iommu_dma_unmap+0x248/0x320
  iommu_dma_unmap_page+0x5c/0xe8
  dma_unmap_page_attrs+0x38/0x1d0
  map_benchmark_thread+0x118/0x2c0
  kthread+0xec/0xf8
  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20

Solve this by adding scheduling point in the kthread loop,
so if there're other threads in the system they may have
a chance to run, especially the thread to notify the test
end. However this may degrade the test concurrency so it's
recommended to run this on an idle system.

Signed-off-by: Yicong Yang <yangyicong@hisilicon.com>
Acked-by: Barry Song <baohua@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Christoph Hellwig <hch@lst.de>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 4, 2024
commit 44d17459626052a2390457e550a12cb973506b2f upstream.

Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock
on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations.  Translating the
below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on
CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the
fairness of r/w semaphores).

    CPU0                     CPU1                     CPU2
1   lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
2                                                     lock(&vcpu->mutex);
3                                                     lock(&kvm->srcu);
4                            lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
5                            lock(kvm_lock);
6                            lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
7                                                     lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
8   sync(&kvm->srcu);

Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same
pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with
__kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier():

  cpuhp_cpufreq_online()
  |
  -> cpufreq_online()
     |
     -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits()
        |
        -> __cpufreq_driver_target()
           |
           -> __target_index()
              |
              -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin()
                 |
                 -> cpufreq_notify_transition()
                    |
                    -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier()

But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the
combination of dependencies and timings involved.  E.g. the cpufreq
notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with
the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and
doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate
contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual.

The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely
to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq
notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock.  For now, settle for fixing the most
blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more
involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care
needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list.

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S         O
  ------------------------------------------------------
  tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock:
  ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm]

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
         cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0
         static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30
         kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm]
         vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel]
         __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm]
         kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm]
         kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
         __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0
         synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30
         kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm]
         __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30
         lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]
         param_attr_store+0x93/0x100
         module_attr_store+0x22/0x40
         sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0
         kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0
         vfs_write+0x28d/0x380
         ksys_write+0x70/0xe0
         __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240830043600.127750-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2024
commit ac01c8c4246546fd8340a232f3ada1921dc0ee48 upstream.

AddressSanitizer found a use-after-free bug in the symbol code which
manifested as 'perf top' segfaulting.

  ==1238389==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x60b00c48844b at pc 0x5650d8035961 bp 0x7f751aaecc90 sp 0x7f751aaecc80
  READ of size 1 at 0x60b00c48844b thread T193
      #0 0x5650d8035960 in _sort__sym_cmp util/sort.c:310
      #1 0x5650d8043744 in hist_entry__cmp util/hist.c:1286
      #2 0x5650d8043951 in hists__findnew_entry util/hist.c:614
      #3 0x5650d804568f in __hists__add_entry util/hist.c:754
      #4 0x5650d8045bf9 in hists__add_entry util/hist.c:772
      #5 0x5650d8045df1 in iter_add_single_normal_entry util/hist.c:997
      #6 0x5650d8043326 in hist_entry_iter__add util/hist.c:1242
      #7 0x5650d7ceeefe in perf_event__process_sample /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:845
      #8 0x5650d7ceeefe in deliver_event /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1208
      #9 0x5650d7fdb51b in do_flush util/ordered-events.c:245
      #10 0x5650d7fdb51b in __ordered_events__flush util/ordered-events.c:324
      #11 0x5650d7ced743 in process_thread /home/matt/src/linux/tools/perf/builtin-top.c:1120
      #12 0x7f757ef1f133 in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:442
      #13 0x7f757ef9f7db in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

When updating hist maps it's also necessary to update the hist symbol
reference because the old one gets freed in map__put().

While this bug was probably introduced with 5c24b67 ("perf
tools: Replace map->referenced & maps->removed_maps with map->refcnt"),
the symbol objects were leaked until c087e94 ("perf machine:
Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL") was merged so
the bug was masked.

Fixes: c087e94 ("perf machine: Fix refcount usage when processing PERF_RECORD_KSYMBOL")
Reported-by: Yunzhao Li <yunzhao@cloudflare.com>
Signed-off-by: Matt Fleming (Cloudflare) <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: kernel-team@cloudflare.com
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # v5.13+
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815142212.3834625-1-matt@readmodwrite.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 10, 2024
commit 9af2efee41b27a0f386fb5aa95d8d0b4b5d9fede upstream.

The fields in the hist_entry are filled on-demand which means they only
have meaningful values when relevant sort keys are used.

So if neither of 'dso' nor 'sym' sort keys are used, the map/symbols in
the hist entry can be garbage.  So it shouldn't access it
unconditionally.

I got a segfault, when I wanted to see cgroup profiles.

  $ sudo perf record -a --all-cgroups --synth=cgroup true

  $ sudo perf report -s cgroup

  Program received signal SIGSEGV, Segmentation fault.
  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  48		return RC_CHK_ACCESS(map)->dso;
  (gdb) bt
  #0  0x00005555557a8d90 in map__dso (map=0x0) at util/map.h:48
  #1  0x00005555557aa39b in map__load (map=0x0) at util/map.c:344
  #2  0x00005555557aa592 in map__find_symbol (map=0x0, addr=140736115941088) at util/map.c:385
  #3  0x00005555557ef000 in hists__findnew_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, entry=0x7fffffffa4c0, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sample_self=true)
      at util/hist.c:644
  #4  0x00005555557ef61c in __hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      block_info=0x0, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true, ops=0x0) at util/hist.c:761
  #5  0x00005555557ef71f in hists__add_entry (hists=0x555556039d60, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, sym_parent=0x0, bi=0x0, mi=0x0, ki=0x0,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, sample_self=true) at util/hist.c:779
  #6  0x00005555557f00fb in iter_add_single_normal_entry (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0) at util/hist.c:1015
  #7  0x00005555557f09a7 in hist_entry_iter__add (iter=0x7fffffffa900, al=0x7fffffffa8c0, max_stack_depth=127, arg=0x7fffffffbce0)
      at util/hist.c:1260
  #8  0x00005555555ba7ce in process_sample_event (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0,
      machine=0x5555560388e8) at builtin-report.c:334
  #9  0x00005555557b30c8 in evlist__deliver_sample (evlist=0x555556039010, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, evsel=0x555556039ad0, machine=0x5555560388e8) at util/session.c:1232
  #10 0x00005555557b32bc in machines__deliver_event (machines=0x5555560388e8, evlist=0x555556039010, event=0x7ffff7c14128,
      sample=0x7fffffffaa90, tool=0x7fffffffbce0, file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1271
  #11 0x00005555557b3848 in perf_session__deliver_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c14128, tool=0x7fffffffbce0,
      file_offset=110888, file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1354
  #12 0x00005555557affaf in ordered_events__deliver_event (oe=0x555556038e60, event=0x555556135aa0) at util/session.c:132
  #13 0x00005555557bb605 in do_flush (oe=0x555556038e60, show_progress=false) at util/ordered-events.c:245
  #14 0x00005555557bb95c in __ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND, timestamp=0) at util/ordered-events.c:324
  #15 0x00005555557bba46 in ordered_events__flush (oe=0x555556038e60, how=OE_FLUSH__ROUND) at util/ordered-events.c:342
  #16 0x00005555557b1b3b in perf_event__process_finished_round (tool=0x7fffffffbce0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, oe=0x555556038e60)
      at util/session.c:780
  #17 0x00005555557b3b27 in perf_session__process_user_event (session=0x5555560386d0, event=0x7ffff7c15bb8, file_offset=117688,
      file_path=0x555556038ff0 "perf.data") at util/session.c:1406

As you can see the entry->ms.map was NULL even if he->ms.map has a
value.  This is because 'sym' sort key is not given, so it cannot assume
whether he->ms.sym and entry->ms.sym is the same.  I only checked the
'sym' sort key here as it implies 'dso' behavior (so maps are the same).

Fixes: ac01c8c4246546fd ("perf hist: Update hist symbol when updating maps")
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Matt Fleming <matt@readmodwrite.com>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Stephane Eranian <eranian@google.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240826221045.1202305-2-namhyung@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 17, 2024
[ Upstream commit a848c29e3486189aaabd5663bc11aea50c5bd144 ]

On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the
NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server.
Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference
crash with the following syslog:

[232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058
[232066.588586] Mem abort info:
[232066.588701]   ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[232066.588862]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[232066.589084]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[232066.589216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[232066.589340]   FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[232066.589559] Data abort info:
[232066.589683]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[232066.589842]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400
[232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000
[232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2
[232066.591052]  vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs
[232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1
[232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06
[232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70
[232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000
[232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001
[232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050
[232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000
[232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000
[232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6
[232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828
[232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a
[232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058
[232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000
[232066.601636] Call trace:
[232066.601749]  nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.601998]  nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4]
[232066.602218]  nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602455]  nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602690]  kthread+0x110/0x114
[232066.602830]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00)
[232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel...
[232066.607146] Bye!

Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination
nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(),
and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as:
PID: 3511963  TASK: ffff710028b47e00  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "cp"
 #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4
 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650
 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00
 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0
 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c
 #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898
 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4]
 #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4]
 #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4]
 #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4]

The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed
the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state.
So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and
the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally,
the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or
open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state().
When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED
and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state
may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting
in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head
nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially.

Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot")
Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <zhangyanjun@cestc.cn>
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 17, 2024
…tion to perf_sched__replay()

[ Upstream commit c690786 ]

The start_work_mutex and work_done_wait_mutex are used only for the
'perf sched replay'. Put their initialization in perf_sched__replay () to
reduce unnecessary actions in other commands.

Simple functional testing:

  # perf sched record perf bench sched messaging
  # Running 'sched/messaging' benchmark:
  # 20 sender and receiver processes per group
  # 10 groups == 400 processes run

       Total time: 0.197 [sec]
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  [ perf record: Captured and wrote 14.952 MB perf.data (134165 samples) ]

  # perf sched replay
  run measurement overhead: 108 nsecs
  sleep measurement overhead: 65658 nsecs
  the run test took 999991 nsecs
  the sleep test took 1079324 nsecs
  nr_run_events:        42378
  nr_sleep_events:      43102
  nr_wakeup_events:     31852
  target-less wakeups:  17
  multi-target wakeups: 712
  task      0 (             swapper:         0), nr_events: 10451
  task      1 (             swapper:         1), nr_events: 3
  task      2 (             swapper:         2), nr_events: 1
  <SNIP>
  task    717 (     sched-messaging:     74483), nr_events: 152
  task    718 (     sched-messaging:     74484), nr_events: 1944
  task    719 (     sched-messaging:     74485), nr_events: 73
  task    720 (     sched-messaging:     74486), nr_events: 163
  task    721 (     sched-messaging:     74487), nr_events: 942
  task    722 (     sched-messaging:     74488), nr_events: 78
  task    723 (     sched-messaging:     74489), nr_events: 1090
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  #1  : 1366.507, ravg: 1366.51, cpu: 7682.70 / 7682.70
  #2  : 1410.072, ravg: 1370.86, cpu: 7723.88 / 7686.82
  #3  : 1396.296, ravg: 1373.41, cpu: 7568.20 / 7674.96
  #4  : 1381.019, ravg: 1374.17, cpu: 7531.81 / 7660.64
  #5  : 1393.826, ravg: 1376.13, cpu: 7725.25 / 7667.11
  #6  : 1401.581, ravg: 1378.68, cpu: 7594.82 / 7659.88
  #7  : 1381.337, ravg: 1378.94, cpu: 7371.22 / 7631.01
  #8  : 1373.842, ravg: 1378.43, cpu: 7894.92 / 7657.40
  #9  : 1364.697, ravg: 1377.06, cpu: 7324.91 / 7624.15
  #10 : 1363.613, ravg: 1375.72, cpu: 7209.55 / 7582.69
  # echo $?
  0

Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206083228.172607-2-yangjihong1@huawei.com
Stable-dep-of: 1a5efc9e13f3 ("libsubcmd: Don't free the usage string")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 17, 2024
…f_sched__{lat|map|replay}()

[ Upstream commit bd2cdf2 ]

The curr_pid and cpu_last_switched are used only for the
'perf sched replay/latency/map'. Put their initialization in
perf_sched__{lat|map|replay () to reduce unnecessary actions in other
commands.

Simple functional testing:

  # perf sched record perf bench sched messaging
  # Running 'sched/messaging' benchmark:
  # 20 sender and receiver processes per group
  # 10 groups == 400 processes run

       Total time: 0.209 [sec]
  [ perf record: Woken up 1 times to write data ]
  [ perf record: Captured and wrote 16.456 MB perf.data (147907 samples) ]

  # perf sched lat

   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Task                  |   Runtime ms  | Switches | Avg delay ms    | Max delay ms    | Max delay start           | Max delay end          |
   -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    sched-messaging:(401) |   2990.699 ms |    38705 | avg:   0.661 ms | max:  67.046 ms | max start: 456532.624830 s | max end: 456532.691876 s
    qemu-system-x86:(7)   |    179.764 ms |     2191 | avg:   0.152 ms | max:  21.857 ms | max start: 456532.576434 s | max end: 456532.598291 s
    sshd:48125            |      0.522 ms |        2 | avg:   0.037 ms | max:   0.046 ms | max start: 456532.514610 s | max end: 456532.514656 s
  <SNIP>
    ksoftirqd/11:82       |      0.063 ms |        1 | avg:   0.005 ms | max:   0.005 ms | max start: 456532.769366 s | max end: 456532.769371 s
    kworker/9:0-mm_:34624 |      0.233 ms |       20 | avg:   0.004 ms | max:   0.007 ms | max start: 456532.690804 s | max end: 456532.690812 s
    migration/13:93       |      0.000 ms |        1 | avg:   0.004 ms | max:   0.004 ms | max start: 456532.512669 s | max end: 456532.512674 s
   -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    TOTAL:                |   3180.750 ms |    41368 |
   ---------------------------------------------------

  # echo $?
  0

  # perf sched map
    *A0                                                               456532.510141 secs A0 => migration/0:15
    *.                                                                456532.510171 secs .  => swapper:0
     .  *B0                                                           456532.510261 secs B0 => migration/1:21
     .  *.                                                            456532.510279 secs
  <SNIP>
     L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7 *L7  .   .   .   .    456532.785979 secs
     L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7 *L7  .   .   .    456532.786054 secs
     L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7 *L7  .   .    456532.786127 secs
     L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7 *L7  .    456532.786197 secs
     L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7  L7 *L7   456532.786270 secs
  # echo $?
  0

  # perf sched replay
  run measurement overhead: 108 nsecs
  sleep measurement overhead: 66473 nsecs
  the run test took 1000002 nsecs
  the sleep test took 1082686 nsecs
  nr_run_events:        49334
  nr_sleep_events:      50054
  nr_wakeup_events:     34701
  target-less wakeups:  165
  multi-target wakeups: 766
  task      0 (             swapper:         0), nr_events: 15419
  task      1 (             swapper:         1), nr_events: 1
  task      2 (             swapper:         2), nr_events: 1
  <SNIP>
  task    715 (     sched-messaging:    110248), nr_events: 1438
  task    716 (     sched-messaging:    110249), nr_events: 512
  task    717 (     sched-messaging:    110250), nr_events: 500
  task    718 (     sched-messaging:    110251), nr_events: 537
  task    719 (     sched-messaging:    110252), nr_events: 823
  ------------------------------------------------------------
  #1  : 1325.288, ravg: 1325.29, cpu: 7823.35 / 7823.35
  #2  : 1363.606, ravg: 1329.12, cpu: 7655.53 / 7806.56
  #3  : 1349.494, ravg: 1331.16, cpu: 7544.80 / 7780.39
  #4  : 1311.488, ravg: 1329.19, cpu: 7495.13 / 7751.86
  #5  : 1309.902, ravg: 1327.26, cpu: 7266.65 / 7703.34
  #6  : 1309.535, ravg: 1325.49, cpu: 7843.86 / 7717.39
  #7  : 1316.482, ravg: 1324.59, cpu: 7854.41 / 7731.09
  #8  : 1366.604, ravg: 1328.79, cpu: 7955.81 / 7753.57
  #9  : 1326.286, ravg: 1328.54, cpu: 7466.86 / 7724.90
  #10 : 1356.653, ravg: 1331.35, cpu: 7566.60 / 7709.07
  # echo $?
  0

Signed-off-by: Yang Jihong <yangjihong1@huawei.com>
Signed-off-by: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240206083228.172607-5-yangjihong1@huawei.com
Stable-dep-of: 1a5efc9e13f3 ("libsubcmd: Don't free the usage string")
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 17, 2024
[ Upstream commit a848c29e3486189aaabd5663bc11aea50c5bd144 ]

On the node of an NFS client, some files saved in the mountpoint of the
NFS server were copied to another location of the same NFS server.
Accidentally, the nfs42_complete_copies() got a NULL-pointer dereference
crash with the following syslog:

[232064.838881] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232064.839360] NFSv4: state recovery failed for open file nfs/pvc-12b5200d-cd0f-46a3-b9f0-af8f4fe0ef64.qcow2, error = -116
[232066.588183] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000058
[232066.588586] Mem abort info:
[232066.588701]   ESR = 0x0000000096000007
[232066.588862]   EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[232066.589084]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[232066.589216]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[232066.589340]   FSC = 0x07: level 3 translation fault
[232066.589559] Data abort info:
[232066.589683]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000007
[232066.589842]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[232066.589967] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00002000956ff400
[232066.590231] [0000000000000058] pgd=08001100ae100003, p4d=08001100ae100003, pud=08001100ae100003, pmd=08001100b3c00003, pte=0000000000000000
[232066.590757] Internal error: Oops: 96000007 [#1] SMP
[232066.590958] Modules linked in: rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss nfsv4 dns_resolver nfs lockd grace fscache netfs ocfs2_dlmfs ocfs2_stack_o2cb ocfs2_dlm vhost_net vhost vhost_iotlb tap tun ipt_rpfilter xt_multiport ip_set_hash_ip ip_set_hash_net xfrm_interface xfrm6_tunnel tunnel4 tunnel6 esp4 ah4 wireguard libcurve25519_generic veth xt_addrtype xt_set nf_conntrack_netlink ip_set_hash_ipportnet ip_set_hash_ipportip ip_set_bitmap_port ip_set_hash_ipport dummy ip_set ip_vs_sh ip_vs_wrr ip_vs_rr ip_vs iptable_filter sch_ingress nfnetlink_cttimeout vport_gre ip_gre ip_tunnel gre vport_geneve geneve vport_vxlan vxlan ip6_udp_tunnel udp_tunnel openvswitch nf_conncount dm_round_robin dm_service_time dm_multipath xt_nat xt_MASQUERADE nft_chain_nat nf_nat xt_mark xt_conntrack xt_comment nft_compat nft_counter nf_tables nfnetlink ocfs2 ocfs2_nodemanager ocfs2_stackglue iscsi_tcp libiscsi_tcp libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ipmi_ssif nbd overlay 8021q garp mrp bonding tls rfkill sunrpc ext4 mbcache jbd2
[232066.591052]  vfat fat cas_cache cas_disk ses enclosure scsi_transport_sas sg acpi_ipmi ipmi_si ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler ip_tables vfio_pci vfio_pci_core vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio dm_mirror dm_region_hash dm_log dm_mod nf_conntrack nf_defrag_ipv6 nf_defrag_ipv4 br_netfilter bridge stp llc fuse xfs libcrc32c ast drm_vram_helper qla2xxx drm_kms_helper syscopyarea crct10dif_ce sysfillrect ghash_ce sysimgblt sha2_ce fb_sys_fops cec sha256_arm64 sha1_ce drm_ttm_helper ttm nvme_fc igb sbsa_gwdt nvme_fabrics drm nvme_core i2c_algo_bit i40e scsi_transport_fc megaraid_sas aes_neon_bs
[232066.596953] CPU: 6 PID: 4124696 Comm: 10.253.166.125- Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.15.131-9.cl9_ocfs2.aarch64 #1
[232066.597356] Hardware name: Great Wall .\x93\x8e...RF6260 V5/GWMSSE2GL1T, BIOS T656FBE_V3.0.18 2024-01-06
[232066.597721] pstate: 20400009 (nzCv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[232066.598034] pc : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598327] lr : nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x12c/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.598595] sp : ffff8000f568fc70
[232066.598731] x29: ffff8000f568fc70 x28: 0000000000001000 x27: ffff21003db33000
[232066.599030] x26: ffff800005521ae0 x25: ffff0100f98fa3f0 x24: 0000000000000001
[232066.599319] x23: ffff800009920008 x22: ffff21003db33040 x21: ffff21003db33050
[232066.599628] x20: ffff410172fe9e40 x19: ffff410172fe9e00 x18: 0000000000000000
[232066.599914] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000004 x15: 0000000000000000
[232066.600195] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: ffff800008e685a8 x12: 00000000eac0c6e6
[232066.600498] x11: 0000000000000000 x10: 0000000000000008 x9 : ffff8000054e5828
[232066.600784] x8 : 00000000ffffffbf x7 : 0000000000000001 x6 : 000000000a9eb14a
[232066.601062] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : ffff70ff8a14a800 x3 : 0000000000000058
[232066.601348] x2 : 0000000000000001 x1 : 54dce46366daa6c6 x0 : 0000000000000000
[232066.601636] Call trace:
[232066.601749]  nfs4_reclaim_open_state+0x220/0x800 [nfsv4]
[232066.601998]  nfs4_do_reclaim+0x1b8/0x28c [nfsv4]
[232066.602218]  nfs4_state_manager+0x928/0x10f0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602455]  nfs4_run_state_manager+0x78/0x1b0 [nfsv4]
[232066.602690]  kthread+0x110/0x114
[232066.602830]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[232066.602985] Code: 1400000d f9403f20 f9402e61 91016003 (f9402c00)
[232066.603284] SMP: stopping secondary CPUs
[232066.606936] Starting crashdump kernel...
[232066.607146] Bye!

Analysing the vmcore, we know that nfs4_copy_state listed by destination
nfs_server->ss_copies was added by the field copies in handle_async_copy(),
and we found a waiting copy process with the stack as:
PID: 3511963  TASK: ffff710028b47e00  CPU: 0   COMMAND: "cp"
 #0 [ffff8001116ef740] __switch_to at ffff8000081b92f4
 #1 [ffff8001116ef760] __schedule at ffff800008dd0650
 #2 [ffff8001116ef7c0] schedule at ffff800008dd0a00
 #3 [ffff8001116ef7e0] schedule_timeout at ffff800008dd6aa0
 #4 [ffff8001116ef860] __wait_for_common at ffff800008dd166c
 #5 [ffff8001116ef8e0] wait_for_completion_interruptible at ffff800008dd1898
 #6 [ffff8001116ef8f0] handle_async_copy at ffff8000055142f4 [nfsv4]
 #7 [ffff8001116ef970] _nfs42_proc_copy at ffff8000055147c8 [nfsv4]
 #8 [ffff8001116efa80] nfs42_proc_copy at ffff800005514cf0 [nfsv4]
 #9 [ffff8001116efc50] __nfs4_copy_file_range.constprop.0 at ffff8000054ed694 [nfsv4]

The NULL-pointer dereference was due to nfs42_complete_copies() listed
the nfs_server->ss_copies by the field ss_copies of nfs4_copy_state.
So the nfs4_copy_state address ffff0100f98fa3f0 was offset by 0x10 and
the data accessed through this pointer was also incorrect. Generally,
the ordered list nfs4_state_owner->so_states indicate open(O_RDWR) or
open(O_WRITE) states are reclaimed firstly by nfs4_reclaim_open_state().
When destination state reclaim is failed with NFS_STATE_RECOVERY_FAILED
and copies are not deleted in nfs_server->ss_copies, the source state
may be passed to the nfs42_complete_copies() process earlier, resulting
in this crash scene finally. To solve this issue, we add a list_head
nfs_server->ss_src_copies for a server-to-server copy specially.

Fixes: 0e65a32 ("NFS: handle source server reboot")
Signed-off-by: Yanjun Zhang <zhangyanjun@cestc.cn>
Reviewed-by: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@hammerspace.com>
Signed-off-by: Anna Schumaker <anna.schumaker@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 1, 2024
[ Upstream commit 73f35080477e893aa6f4c8d388352b871b288fbc ]

When creating a trace_probe we would set nr_args prior to truncating the
arguments to MAX_TRACE_ARGS. However, we would only initialize arguments
up to the limit.

This caused invalid memory access when attempting to set up probes with
more than 128 fetchargs.

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000020
  #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
  PGD 0 P4D 0
  Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP PTI
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 1769 Comm: cat Not tainted 6.11.0-rc7+ #8
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.16.3-1.fc39 04/01/2014
  RIP: 0010:__set_print_fmt+0x134/0x330

Resolve the issue by applying the MAX_TRACE_ARGS limit earlier. Return
an error when there are too many arguments instead of silently
truncating.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/20240930202656.292869-1-mikel@mikelr.com/

Fixes: 035ba76 ("tracing/probes: cleanup: Set trace_probe::nr_args at trace_probe_init")
Signed-off-by: Mikel Rychliski <mikel@mikelr.com>
Signed-off-by: Masami Hiramatsu (Google) <mhiramat@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 17, 2024
commit cf96b8e upstream.

ASan reports a memory leak caused by evlist not being deleted on exit in
perf-report, perf-script and perf-data.
The problem is caused by evlist->session not being deleted, which is
allocated in perf_session__read_header, called in perf_session__new if
perf_data is in read mode.
In case of write mode, the session->evlist is filled by the caller.
This patch solves the problem by calling evlist__delete in
perf_session__delete if perf_data is in read mode.

Changes in v2:
 - call evlist__delete from within perf_session__delete

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210621234317.235545-1-rickyman7@gmail.com/

ASan report follows:

$ ./perf script report flamegraph
=================================================================
==227640==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

<SNIP unrelated>

Indirect leak of 2704 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0x7f999e in evlist__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/evlist.c:77:26
    #3 0x8ad938 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3797:20
    #4 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #5 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #6 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #7 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #8 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #9 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #10 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #11 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 568 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0x80ce88 in evsel__new_idx /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.c:268:24
    #3 0x8aed93 in evsel__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/evsel.h:210:9
    #4 0x8ae07e in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3853:11
    #5 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #6 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #7 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #8 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #9 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #10 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #11 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #12 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 264 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0xbe3e70 in xyarray__new /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/xyarray.c:10:23
    #3 0xbd7754 in perf_evsel__alloc_id /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/evsel.c:361:21
    #4 0x8ae201 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3871:7
    #5 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #6 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #7 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #8 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #9 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #10 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #11 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #12 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4f4137 in calloc (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4f4137)
    #1 0xbe3d56 in zalloc /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/../../lib/zalloc.c:8:9
    #2 0xbd77e0 in perf_evsel__alloc_id /home/user/linux/tools/lib/perf/evsel.c:365:14
    #3 0x8ae201 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3871:7
    #4 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #5 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #6 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #7 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #8 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #9 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #10 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #11 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

Indirect leak of 7 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x4b8207 in strdup (/home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf+0x4b8207)
    #1 0x8b4459 in evlist__set_event_name /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:2292:16
    #2 0x89d862 in process_event_desc /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:2313:3
    #3 0x8af319 in perf_file_section__process /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3651:9
    #4 0x8aa6e9 in perf_header__process_sections /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3427:9
    #5 0x8ae3e7 in perf_session__read_header /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/header.c:3886:2
    #6 0x8ec714 in perf_session__open /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:109:6
    #7 0x8ebe83 in perf_session__new /home/user/linux/tools/perf/util/session.c:213:10
    #8 0x60c6de in cmd_script /home/user/linux/tools/perf/builtin-script.c:3856:12
    #9 0x7b2930 in run_builtin /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:313:11
    #10 0x7b120f in handle_internal_command /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:365:8
    #11 0x7b2493 in run_argv /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:409:2
    #12 0x7b0c89 in main /home/user/linux/tools/perf/perf.c:539:3
    #13 0x7f5260654b74  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x27b74)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 3728 byte(s) leaked in 7 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Riccardo Mancini <rickyman7@gmail.com>
Acked-by: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Acked-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@redhat.com>
Cc: Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>
Cc: Alexander Shishkin <alexander.shishkin@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Leo Yan <leo.yan@linaro.org>
Cc: Mark Rutland <mark.rutland@arm.com>
Cc: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: http://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20210624231926.212208-1-rickyman7@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org # 5.10.228
Signed-off-by: Shuai Xue <xueshuai@linux.alibaba.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 22, 2024
[ Upstream commit 9ca314419930f9135727e39d77e66262d5f7bef6 ]

The referenced commits introduced a two-step process for deleting FTEs:

- Lock the FTE, delete it from hardware, set the hardware deletion function
  to NULL and unlock the FTE.
- Lock the parent flow group, delete the software copy of the FTE, and
  remove it from the xarray.

However, this approach encounters a race condition if a rule with the same
match value is added simultaneously. In this scenario, fs_core may set the
hardware deletion function to NULL prematurely, causing a panic during
subsequent rule deletions.

To prevent this, ensure the active flag of the FTE is checked under a lock,
which will prevent the fs_core layer from attaching a new steering rule to
an FTE that is in the process of deletion.

[  438.967589] MOSHE: 2496 mlx5_del_flow_rules del_hw_func
[  438.968205] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  438.968654] refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
[  438.969249] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8957 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.970054] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_flower act_gact sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: cls_flower]
[  438.973288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8957 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #8
[  438.973888] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  438.974874] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.975363] Code: 40 66 3b 82 c6 05 16 e9 4d 01 01 e8 1f 7c a0 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 10 66 3b 82 c6 05 fd e8 4d 01 01 e8 05 7c a0 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90
[  438.976947] RSP: 0018:ffff888124a53610 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  438.977446] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888119d56de0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  438.978090] RDX: ffff88852c828700 RSI: ffff88852c81b3c0 RDI: ffff88852c81b3c0
[  438.978721] RBP: ffff888120fa0e88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888124a534b0
[  438.979353] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888119d56de0
[  438.979979] R13: ffff888120fa0ec0 R14: ffff888120fa0ee8 R15: ffff888119d56de0
[  438.980607] FS:  00007fe6dcc0f800(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  438.983984] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  438.984544] CR2: 00000000004275e0 CR3: 0000000186982001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
[  438.985205] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  438.985842] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  438.986507] Call Trace:
[  438.986799]  <TASK>
[  438.987070]  ? __warn+0x7d/0x110
[  438.987426]  ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.987877]  ? report_bug+0x17d/0x190
[  438.988261]  ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
[  438.988659]  ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
[  438.989054]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  438.989458]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  438.989883]  ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.990348]  mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x2f7/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[  438.990932]  __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0x49/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[  438.991519]  ? mlx5_lag_is_sriov+0x3c/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[  438.992054]  ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
[  438.992407]  mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x45/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[  438.993037]  mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x2a6/0x2e0 [mlx5_core]
[  438.993623]  mlx5e_flow_put+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[  438.994161]  mlx5e_delete_flower+0x261/0x390 [mlx5_core]
[  438.994728]  tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xb9/0x190
[  438.995150]  fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower]
[  438.995650]  fl_change+0x11a4/0x13c0 [cls_flower]
[  438.996105]  tc_new_tfilter+0x347/0xbc0
[  438.996503]  ? ___slab_alloc+0x70/0x8c0
[  438.996929]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xf9/0x3e0
[  438.997339]  ? __netlink_sendskb+0x4c/0x70
[  438.997751]  ? netlink_unicast+0x286/0x2d0
[  438.998171]  ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[  438.998625]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
[  438.999020]  netlink_unicast+0x203/0x2d0
[  438.999421]  netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x420
[  438.999820]  __sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb0
[  439.000203]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x207/0x2a0
[  439.000600]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0
[  439.001072]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0
[  439.001459]  ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8b/0xc0
[  439.001848]  ? generic_update_time+0x4d/0x60
[  439.002282]  __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[  439.002658]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110
[  439.003040]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Fixes: 718ce4d ("net/mlx5: Consolidate update FTE for all removal changes")
Fixes: cefc235 ("net/mlx5: Fix FTE cleanup")
Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107183527.676877-4-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Dec 14, 2024
[ Upstream commit 9ca314419930f9135727e39d77e66262d5f7bef6 ]

The referenced commits introduced a two-step process for deleting FTEs:

- Lock the FTE, delete it from hardware, set the hardware deletion function
  to NULL and unlock the FTE.
- Lock the parent flow group, delete the software copy of the FTE, and
  remove it from the xarray.

However, this approach encounters a race condition if a rule with the same
match value is added simultaneously. In this scenario, fs_core may set the
hardware deletion function to NULL prematurely, causing a panic during
subsequent rule deletions.

To prevent this, ensure the active flag of the FTE is checked under a lock,
which will prevent the fs_core layer from attaching a new steering rule to
an FTE that is in the process of deletion.

[  438.967589] MOSHE: 2496 mlx5_del_flow_rules del_hw_func
[  438.968205] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[  438.968654] refcount_t: decrement hit 0; leaking memory.
[  438.969249] WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8957 at lib/refcount.c:31 refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.970054] Modules linked in: act_mirred cls_flower act_gact sch_ingress openvswitch nsh mlx5_vdpa vringh vhost_iotlb vdpa mlx5_ib mlx5_core xt_conntrack xt_MASQUERADE nf_conntrack_netlink nfnetlink xt_addrtype iptable_nat nf_nat br_netfilter rpcsec_gss_krb5 auth_rpcgss oid_registry overlay rpcrdma rdma_ucm ib_iser libiscsi scsi_transport_iscsi ib_umad rdma_cm ib_ipoib iw_cm ib_cm ib_uverbs ib_core zram zsmalloc fuse [last unloaded: cls_flower]
[  438.973288] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 8957 Comm: tc Not tainted 6.12.0-rc1+ #8
[  438.973888] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS rel-1.13.0-0-gf21b5a4aeb02-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  438.974874] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.975363] Code: 40 66 3b 82 c6 05 16 e9 4d 01 01 e8 1f 7c a0 ff 0f 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 48 c7 c7 10 66 3b 82 c6 05 fd e8 4d 01 01 e8 05 7c a0 ff <0f> 0b c3 cc cc cc cc 66 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 00 90
[  438.976947] RSP: 0018:ffff888124a53610 EFLAGS: 00010286
[  438.977446] RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff888119d56de0 RCX: 0000000000000000
[  438.978090] RDX: ffff88852c828700 RSI: ffff88852c81b3c0 RDI: ffff88852c81b3c0
[  438.978721] RBP: ffff888120fa0e88 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff888124a534b0
[  438.979353] R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 0000000000000001 R12: ffff888119d56de0
[  438.979979] R13: ffff888120fa0ec0 R14: ffff888120fa0ee8 R15: ffff888119d56de0
[  438.980607] FS:  00007fe6dcc0f800(0000) GS:ffff88852c800000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[  438.983984] CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[  438.984544] CR2: 00000000004275e0 CR3: 0000000186982001 CR4: 0000000000372eb0
[  438.985205] DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
[  438.985842] DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
[  438.986507] Call Trace:
[  438.986799]  <TASK>
[  438.987070]  ? __warn+0x7d/0x110
[  438.987426]  ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.987877]  ? report_bug+0x17d/0x190
[  438.988261]  ? prb_read_valid+0x17/0x20
[  438.988659]  ? handle_bug+0x53/0x90
[  438.989054]  ? exc_invalid_op+0x14/0x70
[  438.989458]  ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x16/0x20
[  438.989883]  ? refcount_warn_saturate+0xfb/0x110
[  438.990348]  mlx5_del_flow_rules+0x2f7/0x340 [mlx5_core]
[  438.990932]  __mlx5_eswitch_del_rule+0x49/0x170 [mlx5_core]
[  438.991519]  ? mlx5_lag_is_sriov+0x3c/0x50 [mlx5_core]
[  438.992054]  ? xas_load+0x9/0xb0
[  438.992407]  mlx5e_tc_rule_unoffload+0x45/0xe0 [mlx5_core]
[  438.993037]  mlx5e_tc_del_fdb_flow+0x2a6/0x2e0 [mlx5_core]
[  438.993623]  mlx5e_flow_put+0x29/0x60 [mlx5_core]
[  438.994161]  mlx5e_delete_flower+0x261/0x390 [mlx5_core]
[  438.994728]  tc_setup_cb_destroy+0xb9/0x190
[  438.995150]  fl_hw_destroy_filter+0x94/0xc0 [cls_flower]
[  438.995650]  fl_change+0x11a4/0x13c0 [cls_flower]
[  438.996105]  tc_new_tfilter+0x347/0xbc0
[  438.996503]  ? ___slab_alloc+0x70/0x8c0
[  438.996929]  rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0xf9/0x3e0
[  438.997339]  ? __netlink_sendskb+0x4c/0x70
[  438.997751]  ? netlink_unicast+0x286/0x2d0
[  438.998171]  ? __pfx_rtnetlink_rcv_msg+0x10/0x10
[  438.998625]  netlink_rcv_skb+0x54/0x100
[  438.999020]  netlink_unicast+0x203/0x2d0
[  438.999421]  netlink_sendmsg+0x1e4/0x420
[  438.999820]  __sock_sendmsg+0xa1/0xb0
[  439.000203]  ____sys_sendmsg+0x207/0x2a0
[  439.000600]  ? copy_msghdr_from_user+0x6d/0xa0
[  439.001072]  ___sys_sendmsg+0x80/0xc0
[  439.001459]  ? ___sys_recvmsg+0x8b/0xc0
[  439.001848]  ? generic_update_time+0x4d/0x60
[  439.002282]  __sys_sendmsg+0x51/0x90
[  439.002658]  do_syscall_64+0x50/0x110
[  439.003040]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Fixes: 718ce4d ("net/mlx5: Consolidate update FTE for all removal changes")
Fixes: cefc235 ("net/mlx5: Fix FTE cleanup")
Signed-off-by: Mark Bloch <mbloch@nvidia.com>
Reviewed-by: Maor Gottlieb <maorg@nvidia.com>
Signed-off-by: Tariq Toukan <tariqt@nvidia.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241107183527.676877-4-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim()

commit 6aaced5abd32e2a57cd94fd64f824514d0361da8 upstream.

The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.

 #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
 #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
 #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
 #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4

At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 0  ADDR: ffff00817fffe540  NAME: "DMA32"
          SIZE: 20480  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 1  ADDR: ffff00817fffec00  NAME: "Normal"
          SIZE: 8454144  PRESENT: 98304  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.

Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.

        crash> p nr_swap_pages
        nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
          counter = 0
        }

As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.

The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.

        crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
        $1935 = 0x0

This is because the node deemed balanced.  The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively.  If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced.  This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.


The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages).  This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable.  By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.


The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL.  This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file-
backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient
free pages to be skipped.

The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored
during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones.  Consequently,
pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback
mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an
infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim().

This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist.  This ensures zones
with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and
reclaim behavior.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com
Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations")
Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
markfeathers pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 9, 2025
…le_direct_reclaim()

commit 6aaced5abd32e2a57cd94fd64f824514d0361da8 upstream.

The task sometimes continues looping in throttle_direct_reclaim() because
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) keeps returning false.

 #0 [ffff80002cb6f8d0] __switch_to at ffff8000080095ac
 #1 [ffff80002cb6f900] __schedule at ffff800008abbd1c
 #2 [ffff80002cb6f990] schedule at ffff800008abc50c
 #3 [ffff80002cb6f9b0] throttle_direct_reclaim at ffff800008273550
 #4 [ffff80002cb6fa20] try_to_free_pages at ffff800008277b68
 #5 [ffff80002cb6fae0] __alloc_pages_nodemask at ffff8000082c4660
 #6 [ffff80002cb6fc50] alloc_pages_vma at ffff8000082e4a98
 #7 [ffff80002cb6fca0] do_anonymous_page at ffff80000829f5a8
 #8 [ffff80002cb6fce0] __handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5974
 #9 [ffff80002cb6fd90] handle_mm_fault at ffff8000082a5bd4

At this point, the pgdat contains the following two zones:

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 0  ADDR: ffff00817fffe540  NAME: "DMA32"
          SIZE: 20480  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 11/28/45
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 359
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 18813
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 0
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 50
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 0
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

        NODE: 4  ZONE: 1  ADDR: ffff00817fffec00  NAME: "Normal"
          SIZE: 8454144  PRESENT: 98304  MIN/LOW/HIGH: 68/166/264
          VM_STAT:
                NR_FREE_PAGES: 146
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_ANON: 94668
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_ANON: 3
        NR_ZONE_INACTIVE_FILE: 735
          NR_ZONE_ACTIVE_FILE: 78
          NR_ZONE_UNEVICTABLE: 0
        NR_ZONE_WRITE_PENDING: 0
                     NR_MLOCK: 0
                    NR_BOUNCE: 0
                   NR_ZSPAGES: 0
            NR_FREE_CMA_PAGES: 0

In allow_direct_reclaim(), while processing ZONE_DMA32, the sum of
inactive/active file-backed pages calculated in zone_reclaimable_pages()
based on the result of zone_page_state_snapshot() is zero.

Additionally, since this system lacks swap, the calculation of inactive/
active anonymous pages is skipped.

        crash> p nr_swap_pages
        nr_swap_pages = $1937 = {
          counter = 0
        }

As a result, ZONE_DMA32 is deemed unreclaimable and skipped, moving on to
the processing of the next zone, ZONE_NORMAL, despite ZONE_DMA32 having
free pages significantly exceeding the high watermark.

The problem is that the pgdat->kswapd_failures hasn't been incremented.

        crash> px ((struct pglist_data *) 0xffff00817fffe540)->kswapd_failures
        $1935 = 0x0

This is because the node deemed balanced.  The node balancing logic in
balance_pgdat() evaluates all zones collectively.  If one or more zones
(e.g., ZONE_DMA32) have enough free pages to meet their watermarks, the
entire node is deemed balanced.  This causes balance_pgdat() to exit early
before incrementing the kswapd_failures, as it considers the overall
memory state acceptable, even though some zones (like ZONE_NORMAL) remain
under significant pressure.


The patch ensures that zone_reclaimable_pages() includes free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) in its calculation when no other reclaimable pages are
available (e.g., file-backed or anonymous pages).  This change prevents
zones like ZONE_DMA32, which have sufficient free pages, from being
mistakenly deemed unreclaimable.  By doing so, the patch ensures proper
node balancing, avoids masking pressure on other zones like ZONE_NORMAL,
and prevents infinite loops in throttle_direct_reclaim() caused by
allow_direct_reclaim(pgdat) repeatedly returning false.


The kernel hangs due to a task stuck in throttle_direct_reclaim(), caused
by a node being incorrectly deemed balanced despite pressure in certain
zones, such as ZONE_NORMAL.  This issue arises from
zone_reclaimable_pages() returning 0 for zones without reclaimable file-
backed or anonymous pages, causing zones like ZONE_DMA32 with sufficient
free pages to be skipped.

The lack of swap or reclaimable pages results in ZONE_DMA32 being ignored
during reclaim, masking pressure in other zones.  Consequently,
pgdat->kswapd_failures remains 0 in balance_pgdat(), preventing fallback
mechanisms in allow_direct_reclaim() from being triggered, leading to an
infinite loop in throttle_direct_reclaim().

This patch modifies zone_reclaimable_pages() to account for free pages
(NR_FREE_PAGES) when no other reclaimable pages exist.  This ensures zones
with sufficient free pages are not skipped, enabling proper balancing and
reclaim behavior.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: coding-style cleanups]
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130164346.436469-1-snishika@redhat.com
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20241130161236.433747-2-snishika@redhat.com
Fixes: 5a1c84b ("mm: remove reclaim and compaction retry approximations")
Signed-off-by: Seiji Nishikawa <snishika@redhat.com>
Cc: Mel Gorman <mgorman@techsingularity.net>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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4 participants