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Longterm releases? #48

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nullchinchilla opened this issue Jul 17, 2017 · 1 comment
Closed

Longterm releases? #48

nullchinchilla opened this issue Jul 17, 2017 · 1 comment

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@nullchinchilla
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I feel like a hardened version of longterm kernel releases would be very useful, as it then allows easy usage on systems such as Debian and Ubuntu LTS with conservative update schedules. Hardened kernels would be very useful on public servers, which tend to run conservative distros. Besides, longterm releases like 4.9.x and 4.4.x change slowly and publicly available grsec patches, so it'll probably be easier to port various features compared to doing the same thing on the quickly moving target that is the stable version.

@thestinger
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It's not within the current scope and there's no way it would happen with kernel branches older than the project. It started with 4.11. If and when there's a substantial amount of development happening here, splitting up resources across multiple branches can be considered. It's currently not very active.

thestinger pushed a commit that referenced this issue Dec 18, 2017
[ Upstream commit 36b6f9f ]

Lockdep warns about a potential deadlock:

[   66.782842] ======================================================
[   66.782888] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[   66.782937] 4.14.0-rc2-test-test+ #48 Not tainted
[   66.782983] ------------------------------------------------------
[   66.783052] umount/336 is trying to acquire lock:
[   66.783117]  (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}, at: [<ffffffff81032395>] rdt_kill_sb+0x215/0x390
[   66.783193]
               but task is already holding lock:
[   66.783244]  (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810321b6>] rdt_kill_sb+0x36/0x390
[   66.783305]
               which lock already depends on the new lock.

[   66.783364]
               the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[   66.783419]
               -> #3 (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}:
[   66.783467]        __lock_acquire+0x1293/0x13f0
[   66.783509]        lock_acquire+0xaf/0x220
[   66.783543]        __mutex_lock+0x71/0x9b0
[   66.783575]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
[   66.783610]        intel_rdt_online_cpu+0x3b/0x430
[   66.783649]        cpuhp_invoke_callback+0xab/0x8e0
[   66.783687]        cpuhp_thread_fun+0x7a/0x150
[   66.783722]        smpboot_thread_fn+0x1cc/0x270
[   66.783764]        kthread+0x16e/0x190
[   66.783794]        ret_from_fork+0x27/0x40
[   66.783825]
               -> #2 (cpuhp_state){+.+.}:
[   66.783870]        __lock_acquire+0x1293/0x13f0
[   66.783906]        lock_acquire+0xaf/0x220
[   66.783938]        cpuhp_issue_call+0x102/0x170
[   66.783974]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x154/0x2a0
[   66.784023]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xc7/0x170
[   66.784061]        page_writeback_init+0x43/0x67
[   66.784097]        pagecache_init+0x43/0x4a
[   66.784131]        start_kernel+0x3ad/0x3f7
[   66.784165]        x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[   66.784204]        x86_64_start_kernel+0x72/0x75
[   66.784241]        verify_cpu+0x0/0xfb
[   66.784270]
               -> #1 (cpuhp_state_mutex){+.+.}:
[   66.784319]        __lock_acquire+0x1293/0x13f0
[   66.784355]        lock_acquire+0xaf/0x220
[   66.784387]        __mutex_lock+0x71/0x9b0
[   66.784419]        mutex_lock_nested+0x1b/0x20
[   66.784454]        __cpuhp_setup_state_cpuslocked+0x52/0x2a0
[   66.784497]        __cpuhp_setup_state+0xc7/0x170
[   66.784535]        page_alloc_init+0x28/0x30
[   66.784569]        start_kernel+0x148/0x3f7
[   66.784602]        x86_64_start_reservations+0x2a/0x2c
[   66.784642]        x86_64_start_kernel+0x72/0x75
[   66.784678]        verify_cpu+0x0/0xfb
[   66.784707]
               -> #0 (cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem){++++}:
[   66.784759]        check_prev_add+0x32f/0x6e0
[   66.784794]        __lock_acquire+0x1293/0x13f0
[   66.784830]        lock_acquire+0xaf/0x220
[   66.784863]        cpus_read_lock+0x3d/0xb0
[   66.784896]        rdt_kill_sb+0x215/0x390
[   66.784930]        deactivate_locked_super+0x3e/0x70
[   66.784968]        deactivate_super+0x40/0x60
[   66.785003]        cleanup_mnt+0x3f/0x80
[   66.785034]        __cleanup_mnt+0x12/0x20
[   66.785070]        task_work_run+0x8b/0xc0
[   66.785103]        exit_to_usermode_loop+0x94/0xa0
[   66.786804]        syscall_return_slowpath+0xe8/0x150
[   66.788502]        entry_SYSCALL_64_fastpath+0xab/0xad
[   66.790194]
               other info that might help us debug this:

[   66.795139] Chain exists of:
                 cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem --> cpuhp_state --> rdtgroup_mutex

[   66.800035]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[   66.803267]        CPU0                    CPU1
[   66.804867]        ----                    ----
[   66.806443]   lock(rdtgroup_mutex);
[   66.808002]                                lock(cpuhp_state);
[   66.809565]                                lock(rdtgroup_mutex);
[   66.811110]   lock(cpu_hotplug_lock.rw_sem);
[   66.812608]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[   66.816983] 2 locks held by umount/336:
[   66.818418]  #0:  (&type->s_umount_key#35){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff81229738>] deactivate_super+0x38/0x60
[   66.819922]  #1:  (rdtgroup_mutex){+.+.}, at: [<ffffffff810321b6>] rdt_kill_sb+0x36/0x390

When the resctrl filesystem is unmounted the locks should be obtain in the
locks in the same order as was done when the cpus came online:

      cpu_hotplug_lock before rdtgroup_mutex.

This also requires to switch the static_branch_disable() calls to the
_cpulocked variant because now cpu hotplug lock is held already.

[ tglx: Switched to cpus_read_[un]lock ]

Signed-off-by: Reinette Chatre <reinette.chatre@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Tested-by: Sai Praneeth Prakhya <sai.praneeth.prakhya@intel.com>
Acked-by: Vikas Shivappa <vikas.shivappa@linux.intel.com>
Acked-by: Fenghua Yu <fenghua.yu@intel.com>
Acked-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/cc292e76be073f7260604651711c47b09fd0dc81.1508490116.git.reinette.chatre@intel.com
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@verizon.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Sep 6, 2018
[ Upstream commit 92a4728 ]

Dirk Gouders reported that two consecutive "make" invocations on an
already compiled tree will show alternating behaviors:

$ make
  CALL    scripts/checksyscalls.sh
  DESCEND  objtool
  CHK     include/generated/compile.h
  DATAREL arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux
Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#48)
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 165 modules

$ make
  CALL    scripts/checksyscalls.sh
  DESCEND  objtool
  CHK     include/generated/compile.h
  LD      arch/x86/boot/compressed/vmlinux
  ZOFFSET arch/x86/boot/zoffset.h
  AS      arch/x86/boot/header.o
  LD      arch/x86/boot/setup.elf
  OBJCOPY arch/x86/boot/setup.bin
  OBJCOPY arch/x86/boot/vmlinux.bin
  BUILD   arch/x86/boot/bzImage
Setup is 15644 bytes (padded to 15872 bytes).
System is 6663 kB
CRC 3eb90f40
Kernel: arch/x86/boot/bzImage is ready  (#48)
  Building modules, stage 2.
  MODPOST 165 modules

He bisected it back to:

    commit 98f7852 ("x86/boot: Refuse to build with data relocations")

The root cause was the use of the "if_changed" kbuild function multiple
times for the same target. It was designed to only be used once per
target, otherwise it will effectively always trigger, flipping back and
forth between the two commands getting recorded by "if_changed". Instead,
this patch merges the two commands into a single function to get stable
build artifacts (i.e. .vmlinux.cmd), and a single build behavior.

Bisected-and-Reported-by: Dirk Gouders <dirk@gouders.net>
Fix-Suggested-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>
Reviewed-by: Masahiro Yamada <yamada.masahiro@socionext.com>
Cc: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
Cc: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Cc: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20180724230827.GA37823@beast
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <alexander.levin@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Nov 9, 2018
Increase kasan instrumented kernel stack size from 32k to 64k. Other
architectures seems to get away with just doubling kernel stack size under
kasan, but on s390 this appears to be not enough due to bigger frame size.
The particular pain point is kasan inlined checks (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE
vs CONFIG_KASAN_OUTLINE). With inlined checks one particular case hitting
stack overflow is fs sync on xfs filesystem:

 #0 [9a0681e8]  704 bytes  check_usage at 34b1fc
 GrapheneOS#1 [9a0684a8]  432 bytes  check_usage at 34c710
 GrapheneOS#2 [9a068658]  1048 bytes  validate_chain at 35044a
 GrapheneOS#3 [9a068a70]  312 bytes  __lock_acquire at 3559fe
 GrapheneOS#4 [9a068ba8]  440 bytes  lock_acquire at 3576ee
 GrapheneOS#5 [9a068d60]  104 bytes  _raw_spin_lock at 21b44e0
 GrapheneOS#6 [9a068dc8]  1992 bytes  enqueue_entity at 2dbf72
 GrapheneOS#7 [9a069590]  1496 bytes  enqueue_task_fair at 2df5f0
 GrapheneOS#8 [9a069b68]  64 bytes  ttwu_do_activate at 28f438
 GrapheneOS#9 [9a069ba8]  552 bytes  try_to_wake_up at 298c4c
 GrapheneOS#10 [9a069dd0]  168 bytes  wake_up_worker at 23f97c
 GrapheneOS#11 [9a069e78]  200 bytes  insert_work at 23fc2e
 GrapheneOS#12 [9a069f40]  648 bytes  __queue_work at 2487c0
 GrapheneOS#13 [9a06a1c8]  200 bytes  __queue_delayed_work at 24db28
 GrapheneOS#14 [9a06a290]  248 bytes  mod_delayed_work_on at 24de84
 GrapheneOS#15 [9a06a388]  24 bytes  kblockd_mod_delayed_work_on at 153e2a0
 GrapheneOS#16 [9a06a3a0]  288 bytes  __blk_mq_delay_run_hw_queue at 158168c
 GrapheneOS#17 [9a06a4c0]  192 bytes  blk_mq_run_hw_queue at 1581a3c
 GrapheneOS#18 [9a06a580]  184 bytes  blk_mq_sched_insert_requests at 15a2192
 GrapheneOS#19 [9a06a638]  1024 bytes  blk_mq_flush_plug_list at 1590f3a
 GrapheneOS#20 [9a06aa38]  704 bytes  blk_flush_plug_list at 1555028
 GrapheneOS#21 [9a06acf8]  320 bytes  schedule at 219e476
 GrapheneOS#22 [9a06ae38]  760 bytes  schedule_timeout at 21b0aac
 GrapheneOS#23 [9a06b130]  408 bytes  wait_for_common at 21a1706
 GrapheneOS#24 [9a06b2c8]  360 bytes  xfs_buf_iowait at fa1540
 GrapheneOS#25 [9a06b430]  256 bytes  __xfs_buf_submit at fadae6
 GrapheneOS#26 [9a06b530]  264 bytes  xfs_buf_read_map at fae3f6
 GrapheneOS#27 [9a06b638]  656 bytes  xfs_trans_read_buf_map at 10ac9a8
 GrapheneOS#28 [9a06b8c8]  304 bytes  xfs_btree_kill_root at e72426
 GrapheneOS#29 [9a06b9f8]  288 bytes  xfs_btree_lookup_get_block at e7bc5e
 GrapheneOS#30 [9a06bb18]  624 bytes  xfs_btree_lookup at e7e1a6
 GrapheneOS#31 [9a06bd88]  2664 bytes  xfs_alloc_ag_vextent_near at dfa070
 GrapheneOS#32 [9a06c7f0]  144 bytes  xfs_alloc_ag_vextent at dff3ca
 GrapheneOS#33 [9a06c880]  1128 bytes  xfs_alloc_vextent at e05fce
 GrapheneOS#34 [9a06cce8]  584 bytes  xfs_bmap_btalloc at e58342
 GrapheneOS#35 [9a06cf30]  1336 bytes  xfs_bmapi_write at e618de
 GrapheneOS#36 [9a06d468]  776 bytes  xfs_iomap_write_allocate at ff678e
 GrapheneOS#37 [9a06d770]  720 bytes  xfs_map_blocks at f82af8
 GrapheneOS#38 [9a06da40]  928 bytes  xfs_writepage_map at f83cd6
 GrapheneOS#39 [9a06dde0]  320 bytes  xfs_do_writepage at f85872
 GrapheneOS#40 [9a06df20]  1320 bytes  write_cache_pages at 73dfe8
 GrapheneOS#41 [9a06e448]  208 bytes  xfs_vm_writepages at f7f892
 GrapheneOS#42 [9a06e518]  88 bytes  do_writepages at 73fe6a
 GrapheneOS#43 [9a06e570]  872 bytes  __writeback_single_inode at a20cb6
 GrapheneOS#44 [9a06e8d8]  664 bytes  writeback_sb_inodes at a23be2
 GrapheneOS#45 [9a06eb70]  296 bytes  __writeback_inodes_wb at a242e0
 GrapheneOS#46 [9a06ec98]  928 bytes  wb_writeback at a2500e
 GrapheneOS#47 [9a06f038]  848 bytes  wb_do_writeback at a260ae
 GrapheneOS#48 [9a06f388]  536 bytes  wb_workfn at a28228
 GrapheneOS#49 [9a06f5a0]  1088 bytes  process_one_work at 24a234
 GrapheneOS#50 [9a06f9e0]  1120 bytes  worker_thread at 24ba26
 GrapheneOS#51 [9a06fe40]  104 bytes  kthread at 26545a
 GrapheneOS#52 [9a06fea8]             kernel_thread_starter at 21b6b62

To be able to increase the stack size to 64k reuse LLILL instruction
in __switch_to function to load 64k - STACK_FRAME_OVERHEAD - __PT_SIZE
(65192) value as unsigned.

Reported-by: Benjamin Block <bblock@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Heiko Carstens <heiko.carstens@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Vasily Gorbik <gor@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Martin Schwidefsky <schwidefsky@de.ibm.com>
randomhydrosol pushed a commit to randomhydrosol/linux-hardened that referenced this issue Nov 26, 2018
After commit 3c83dd5 ("wlcore: Add support for optional
wakeirq") landed upstream, I started seeing the following oops
on my HiKey board:

[    1.870279] Unable to handle kernel read from unreadable memory at virtual address 0000000000000010
[    1.870283] Mem abort info:
[    1.870287]   ESR = 0x96000005
[    1.870292]   Exception class = DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[    1.870296]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[    1.870299]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[    1.870302] Data abort info:
[    1.870306]   ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005
[    1.870309]   CM = 0, WnR = 0
[    1.870312] [0000000000000010] user address but active_mm is swapper
[    1.870318] Internal error: Oops: 96000005 [GrapheneOS#1] PREEMPT SMP
[    1.870327] CPU: 0 PID: 5 Comm: kworker/0:0 Not tainted 4.19.0-05129-gb3d1e8e GrapheneOS#48
[    1.870331] Hardware name: HiKey Development Board (DT)
[    1.870350] Workqueue: events_freezable mmc_rescan
[    1.870358] pstate: 60400005 (nZCv daif +PAN -UAO)
[    1.870366] pc : wl1271_probe+0x210/0x350
[    1.870371] lr : wl1271_probe+0x210/0x350
[    1.870374] sp : ffffff80080739b0
[    1.870377] x29: ffffff80080739b0 x28: 0000000000000000
[    1.870384] x27: 0000000000000000 x26: 0000000000000000
[    1.870391] x25: 0000000000000036 x24: ffffffc074ecb598
[    1.870398] x23: ffffffc07ffdce78 x22: ffffffc0744ed808
[    1.870404] x21: ffffffc074ecbb98 x20: ffffff8008ff9000
[    1.870411] x19: ffffffc0744ed800 x18: ffffff8008ff9a48
[    1.870418] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[    1.870425] x15: ffffffc074ecb503 x14: ffffffffffffffff
[    1.870431] x13: ffffffc074ecb502 x12: 0000000000000030
[    1.870438] x11: 0101010101010101 x10: 0000000000000040
[    1.870444] x9 : ffffffc075400248 x8 : ffffffc075400270
[    1.870451] x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
[    1.870457] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000000
[    1.870463] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000000
[    1.870469] x1 : 0000000000000028 x0 : 0000000000000000
[    1.870477] Process kworker/0:0 (pid: 5, stack limit = 0x(____ptrval____))
[    1.870480] Call trace:
[    1.870485]  wl1271_probe+0x210/0x350
[    1.870491]  sdio_bus_probe+0x100/0x128
[    1.870500]  really_probe+0x1a8/0x2b8
[    1.870506]  driver_probe_device+0x58/0x100
[    1.870511]  __device_attach_driver+0x94/0xd8
[    1.870517]  bus_for_each_drv+0x70/0xc8
[    1.870522]  __device_attach+0xe0/0x140
[    1.870527]  device_initial_probe+0x10/0x18
[    1.870532]  bus_probe_device+0x94/0xa0
[    1.870537]  device_add+0x374/0x5b8
[    1.870542]  sdio_add_func+0x60/0x88
[    1.870546]  mmc_attach_sdio+0x1b0/0x358
[    1.870551]  mmc_rescan+0x2cc/0x390
[    1.870558]  process_one_work+0x12c/0x320
[    1.870563]  worker_thread+0x48/0x458
[    1.870569]  kthread+0xf8/0x128
[    1.870575]  ret_from_fork+0x10/0x18
[    1.870583] Code: 92400c21 b2760021 a90687a2 97e95bf9 (f9400803)
[    1.870587] ---[ end trace 1e15f81d3c139ca9 ]---

It seems since we don't have a wakeirq value in the dts, the wakeirq
value in wl1271_probe() is zero, which then causes trouble in
irqd_get_trigger_type(irq_get_irq_data(wakeirq)).

This patch tries to address this by checking if wakeirq is zero,
and not trying to add it to the resources if that is the case.

Fixes: 3c83dd5 ("wlcore: Add support for optional wakeirq")
Cc: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Cc: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
Cc: Eyal Reizer <eyalr@ti.com>
Cc: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Cc: linux-wireless@vger.kernel.org
Acked-by: Tony Lindgren <tony@atomide.com>
Signed-off-by: John Stultz <john.stultz@linaro.org>
Tested-by: Anders Roxell <anders.roxell@linaro.org>
Signed-off-by: Kalle Valo <kvalo@codeaurora.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit dd09fad ]

Commit:

  3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures")

moved the call to efi_memattr_init() from ARM specific to the generic
EFI init code, in order to be able to apply the restricted permissions
described in that table on x86 as well.

We never enabled this feature fully on i386, and so mapping and
reserving this table is pointless. However, due to the early call to
memblock_reserve(), the memory bookkeeping gets confused to the point
where it produces the splat below when we try to map the memory later
on:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ioremap on RAM at 0x3f251000 - 0x3fa1afff
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:166 __ioremap_caller ...
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0 #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  EIP: __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x249/0x260
  Code: 90 0f b7 05 4e 38 40 de 09 45 e0 e9 09 ff ff ff 90 8d 45 ec c6 05 ...
  EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00000000 ECX: de59c228 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 3f250fff EDI: 00000000 EBP: de3edf20 ESP: de3edee0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00200296
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: ffd17000 CR3: 1e58c000 CR4: 00040690
  Call Trace:
   ioremap_cache+0xd/0x10
   ? old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   efi_map_region+0x8/0xa
   efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x260/0x43b
   start_kernel+0x329/0x3aa
   i386_start_kernel+0xa7/0xab
   startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168
  ---[ end trace e15ccf6b9f356833 ]---

Let's work around this by disregarding the memory attributes table
altogether on i386, which does not result in a loss of functionality
or protection, given that we never consumed the contents.

Fixes: 3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE ... ")
Tested-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304165917.5893-1-ardb@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-21-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit dd09fad ]

Commit:

  3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures")

moved the call to efi_memattr_init() from ARM specific to the generic
EFI init code, in order to be able to apply the restricted permissions
described in that table on x86 as well.

We never enabled this feature fully on i386, and so mapping and
reserving this table is pointless. However, due to the early call to
memblock_reserve(), the memory bookkeeping gets confused to the point
where it produces the splat below when we try to map the memory later
on:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ioremap on RAM at 0x3f251000 - 0x3fa1afff
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:166 __ioremap_caller ...
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0 #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  EIP: __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x249/0x260
  Code: 90 0f b7 05 4e 38 40 de 09 45 e0 e9 09 ff ff ff 90 8d 45 ec c6 05 ...
  EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00000000 ECX: de59c228 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 3f250fff EDI: 00000000 EBP: de3edf20 ESP: de3edee0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00200296
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: ffd17000 CR3: 1e58c000 CR4: 00040690
  Call Trace:
   ioremap_cache+0xd/0x10
   ? old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   efi_map_region+0x8/0xa
   efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x260/0x43b
   start_kernel+0x329/0x3aa
   i386_start_kernel+0xa7/0xab
   startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168
  ---[ end trace e15ccf6b9f356833 ]---

Let's work around this by disregarding the memory attributes table
altogether on i386, which does not result in a loss of functionality
or protection, given that we never consumed the contents.

Fixes: 3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE ... ")
Tested-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304165917.5893-1-ardb@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-21-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit dd09fad ]

Commit:

  3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures")

moved the call to efi_memattr_init() from ARM specific to the generic
EFI init code, in order to be able to apply the restricted permissions
described in that table on x86 as well.

We never enabled this feature fully on i386, and so mapping and
reserving this table is pointless. However, due to the early call to
memblock_reserve(), the memory bookkeeping gets confused to the point
where it produces the splat below when we try to map the memory later
on:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ioremap on RAM at 0x3f251000 - 0x3fa1afff
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:166 __ioremap_caller ...
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0 #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  EIP: __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x249/0x260
  Code: 90 0f b7 05 4e 38 40 de 09 45 e0 e9 09 ff ff ff 90 8d 45 ec c6 05 ...
  EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00000000 ECX: de59c228 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 3f250fff EDI: 00000000 EBP: de3edf20 ESP: de3edee0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00200296
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: ffd17000 CR3: 1e58c000 CR4: 00040690
  Call Trace:
   ioremap_cache+0xd/0x10
   ? old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   efi_map_region+0x8/0xa
   efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x260/0x43b
   start_kernel+0x329/0x3aa
   i386_start_kernel+0xa7/0xab
   startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168
  ---[ end trace e15ccf6b9f356833 ]---

Let's work around this by disregarding the memory attributes table
altogether on i386, which does not result in a loss of functionality
or protection, given that we never consumed the contents.

Fixes: 3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE ... ")
Tested-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304165917.5893-1-ardb@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-21-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 18, 2020
[ Upstream commit dd09fad ]

Commit:

  3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures")

moved the call to efi_memattr_init() from ARM specific to the generic
EFI init code, in order to be able to apply the restricted permissions
described in that table on x86 as well.

We never enabled this feature fully on i386, and so mapping and
reserving this table is pointless. However, due to the early call to
memblock_reserve(), the memory bookkeeping gets confused to the point
where it produces the splat below when we try to map the memory later
on:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ioremap on RAM at 0x3f251000 - 0x3fa1afff
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:166 __ioremap_caller ...
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0 #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  EIP: __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x249/0x260
  Code: 90 0f b7 05 4e 38 40 de 09 45 e0 e9 09 ff ff ff 90 8d 45 ec c6 05 ...
  EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00000000 ECX: de59c228 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 3f250fff EDI: 00000000 EBP: de3edf20 ESP: de3edee0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00200296
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: ffd17000 CR3: 1e58c000 CR4: 00040690
  Call Trace:
   ioremap_cache+0xd/0x10
   ? old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   efi_map_region+0x8/0xa
   efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x260/0x43b
   start_kernel+0x329/0x3aa
   i386_start_kernel+0xa7/0xab
   startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168
  ---[ end trace e15ccf6b9f356833 ]---

Let's work around this by disregarding the memory attributes table
altogether on i386, which does not result in a loss of functionality
or protection, given that we never consumed the contents.

Fixes: 3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE ... ")
Tested-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304165917.5893-1-ardb@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-21-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Apr 25, 2020
[ Upstream commit dd09fad ]

Commit:

  3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE initialization common across all architectures")

moved the call to efi_memattr_init() from ARM specific to the generic
EFI init code, in order to be able to apply the restricted permissions
described in that table on x86 as well.

We never enabled this feature fully on i386, and so mapping and
reserving this table is pointless. However, due to the early call to
memblock_reserve(), the memory bookkeeping gets confused to the point
where it produces the splat below when we try to map the memory later
on:

  ------------[ cut here ]------------
  ioremap on RAM at 0x3f251000 - 0x3fa1afff
  WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 0 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:166 __ioremap_caller ...
  Modules linked in:
  CPU: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/0 Not tainted 4.20.0 #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  EIP: __ioremap_caller.constprop.0+0x249/0x260
  Code: 90 0f b7 05 4e 38 40 de 09 45 e0 e9 09 ff ff ff 90 8d 45 ec c6 05 ...
  EAX: 00000029 EBX: 00000000 ECX: de59c228 EDX: 00000001
  ESI: 3f250fff EDI: 00000000 EBP: de3edf20 ESP: de3edee0
  DS: 007b ES: 007b FS: 00d8 GS: 00e0 SS: 0068 EFLAGS: 00200296
  CR0: 80050033 CR2: ffd17000 CR3: 1e58c000 CR4: 00040690
  Call Trace:
   ioremap_cache+0xd/0x10
   ? old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   old_map_region+0x72/0x9d
   efi_map_region+0x8/0xa
   efi_enter_virtual_mode+0x260/0x43b
   start_kernel+0x329/0x3aa
   i386_start_kernel+0xa7/0xab
   startup_32_smp+0x164/0x168
  ---[ end trace e15ccf6b9f356833 ]---

Let's work around this by disregarding the memory attributes table
altogether on i386, which does not result in a loss of functionality
or protection, given that we never consumed the contents.

Fixes: 3a6b6c6 ("efi: Make EFI_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES_TABLE ... ")
Tested-by: Arvind Sankar <nivedita@alum.mit.edu>
Signed-off-by: Ard Biesheuvel <ardb@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200304165917.5893-1-ardb@kernel.org
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200308080859.21568-21-ardb@kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Sasha Levin <sashal@kernel.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 7, 2020
…f fs_info::journal_info

commit fcc9973 upstream.

[BUG]
One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning:
  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(sb_internal#2);
    lock(sb_internal#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7:
   #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a
   __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214
   lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210
   __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290
   start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs]
   btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x632/0xb80
   worker_thread+0x80/0x690
   kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far.

[CAUSE]
This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using
the current running one:

btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()		<<< Call #1
   |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
      |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
	 |- btrfs_join_transaction()	<<< Call #2

Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing
one, without trying to re-start a transaction.

But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call
btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info.

And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on
current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock.

[FIX]
Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized
current::journal_info.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 7, 2020
…f fs_info::journal_info

commit fcc9973 upstream.

[BUG]
One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning:
  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(sb_internal#2);
    lock(sb_internal#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7:
   #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a
   __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214
   lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210
   __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290
   start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs]
   btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x632/0xb80
   worker_thread+0x80/0x690
   kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far.

[CAUSE]
This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using
the current running one:

btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()		<<< Call #1
   |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
      |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
	 |- btrfs_join_transaction()	<<< Call #2

Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing
one, without trying to re-start a transaction.

But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call
btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info.

And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on
current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock.

[FIX]
Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized
current::journal_info.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 7, 2020
…f fs_info::journal_info

commit fcc9973 upstream.

[BUG]
One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning:
  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(sb_internal#2);
    lock(sb_internal#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7:
   #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a
   __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214
   lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210
   __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290
   start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs]
   btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x632/0xb80
   worker_thread+0x80/0x690
   kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far.

[CAUSE]
This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using
the current running one:

btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()		<<< Call #1
   |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
      |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
	 |- btrfs_join_transaction()	<<< Call #2

Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing
one, without trying to re-start a transaction.

But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call
btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info.

And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on
current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock.

[FIX]
Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized
current::journal_info.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened May 7, 2020
…f fs_info::journal_info

[BUG]
One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning:
  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(sb_internal#2);
    lock(sb_internal#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7:
   #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a
   __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214
   lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210
   __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290
   start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs]
   btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x632/0xb80
   worker_thread+0x80/0x690
   kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far.

[CAUSE]
This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using
the current running one:

btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()		<<< Call #1
   |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
      |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
	 |- btrfs_join_transaction()	<<< Call #2

Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing
one, without trying to re-start a transaction.

But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call
btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info.

And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on
current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock.

[FIX]
Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized
current::journal_info.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jul 29, 2020
commit f4c23a1 upstream.

I got null-ptr-deref in serial8250_start_tx():

[   78.114630] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[   78.123778] Mem abort info:
[   78.126560]   ESR = 0x86000007
[   78.129603]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   78.134891]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   78.137933]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   78.141064] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000027d41a8600
[   78.147562] [0000000000000000] pgd=00000027893f0003, p4d=00000027893f0003, pud=00000027893f0003, pmd=00000027c9a20003, pte=0000000000000000
[   78.160029] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] SMP
[   78.164886] Modules linked in: sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce ses enclosure sg sbsa_gwdt ipmi_ssif spi_dw_mmio sch_fq_codel vhost_net tun vhost vhost_iotlb tap ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 ahci hisi_sas_v3_hw libahci hisi_sas_main libsas hns3 scsi_transport_sas hclge libata megaraid_sas ipmi_si hnae3 ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvme nvme_core xt_sctp sctp libcrc32c dm_mod nbd
[   78.207383] CPU: 11 PID: 23258 Comm: null-ptr Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #48
[   78.214056] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V3.B210.01 03/12/2020
[   78.222888] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[   78.228435] pc : 0x0
[   78.230618] lr : serial8250_start_tx+0x160/0x260
[   78.235215] sp : ffff800062eefb80
[   78.238517] x29: ffff800062eefb80 x28: 0000000000000fff
[   78.243807] x27: ffff800062eefd80 x26: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.249098] x25: ffff800062eefd80 x24: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.254388] x23: ffff002fc5e50be8 x22: 0000000000000002
[   78.259679] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 0000000000000000
[   78.264969] x19: ffffa688827eecc8 x18: 0000000000000000
[   78.270259] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[   78.275550] x15: ffffa68881bc67a8 x14: 00000000000002e6
[   78.280841] x13: ffffa68881bc67a8 x12: 000000000000c539
[   78.286131] x11: d37a6f4de9bd37a7 x10: ffffa68881cccff0
[   78.291421] x9 : ffffa68881bc6000 x8 : ffffa688819daa88
[   78.296711] x7 : ffffa688822a0f20 x6 : ffffa688819e0000
[   78.302002] x5 : ffff800062eef9d0 x4 : ffffa68881e707a8
[   78.307292] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000002
[   78.312582] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffa688827eecc8
[   78.317873] Call trace:
[   78.320312]  0x0
[   78.322147]  __uart_start.isra.9+0x64/0x78
[   78.326229]  uart_start+0xb8/0x1c8
[   78.329620]  uart_flush_chars+0x24/0x30
[   78.333442]  n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x7b0/0xc30
[   78.338128]  n_tty_receive_buf+0x44/0x2c8
[   78.342122]  tty_ioctl+0x348/0x11f8
[   78.345599]  ksys_ioctl+0xd8/0xf8
[   78.348903]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x2c/0xc8
[   78.352812]  el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x88/0x1b0
[   78.357583]  do_el0_svc+0x44/0xd0
[   78.360887]  el0_sync_handler+0x14c/0x1d0
[   78.364880]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[   78.368185] Code: bad PC value

SERIAL_PORT_DFNS is not defined on each arch, if it's not defined,
serial8250_set_defaults() won't be called in serial8250_isa_init_ports(),
so the p->serial_in pointer won't be initialized, and it leads a null-ptr-deref.
Fix this problem by calling serial8250_set_defaults() after init uart port.

Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721143852.4058352-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jul 29, 2020
commit f4c23a1 upstream.

I got null-ptr-deref in serial8250_start_tx():

[   78.114630] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[   78.123778] Mem abort info:
[   78.126560]   ESR = 0x86000007
[   78.129603]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   78.134891]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   78.137933]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   78.141064] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000027d41a8600
[   78.147562] [0000000000000000] pgd=00000027893f0003, p4d=00000027893f0003, pud=00000027893f0003, pmd=00000027c9a20003, pte=0000000000000000
[   78.160029] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] SMP
[   78.164886] Modules linked in: sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce ses enclosure sg sbsa_gwdt ipmi_ssif spi_dw_mmio sch_fq_codel vhost_net tun vhost vhost_iotlb tap ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 ahci hisi_sas_v3_hw libahci hisi_sas_main libsas hns3 scsi_transport_sas hclge libata megaraid_sas ipmi_si hnae3 ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvme nvme_core xt_sctp sctp libcrc32c dm_mod nbd
[   78.207383] CPU: 11 PID: 23258 Comm: null-ptr Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #48
[   78.214056] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V3.B210.01 03/12/2020
[   78.222888] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[   78.228435] pc : 0x0
[   78.230618] lr : serial8250_start_tx+0x160/0x260
[   78.235215] sp : ffff800062eefb80
[   78.238517] x29: ffff800062eefb80 x28: 0000000000000fff
[   78.243807] x27: ffff800062eefd80 x26: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.249098] x25: ffff800062eefd80 x24: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.254388] x23: ffff002fc5e50be8 x22: 0000000000000002
[   78.259679] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 0000000000000000
[   78.264969] x19: ffffa688827eecc8 x18: 0000000000000000
[   78.270259] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[   78.275550] x15: ffffa68881bc67a8 x14: 00000000000002e6
[   78.280841] x13: ffffa68881bc67a8 x12: 000000000000c539
[   78.286131] x11: d37a6f4de9bd37a7 x10: ffffa68881cccff0
[   78.291421] x9 : ffffa68881bc6000 x8 : ffffa688819daa88
[   78.296711] x7 : ffffa688822a0f20 x6 : ffffa688819e0000
[   78.302002] x5 : ffff800062eef9d0 x4 : ffffa68881e707a8
[   78.307292] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000002
[   78.312582] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffa688827eecc8
[   78.317873] Call trace:
[   78.320312]  0x0
[   78.322147]  __uart_start.isra.9+0x64/0x78
[   78.326229]  uart_start+0xb8/0x1c8
[   78.329620]  uart_flush_chars+0x24/0x30
[   78.333442]  n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x7b0/0xc30
[   78.338128]  n_tty_receive_buf+0x44/0x2c8
[   78.342122]  tty_ioctl+0x348/0x11f8
[   78.345599]  ksys_ioctl+0xd8/0xf8
[   78.348903]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x2c/0xc8
[   78.352812]  el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x88/0x1b0
[   78.357583]  do_el0_svc+0x44/0xd0
[   78.360887]  el0_sync_handler+0x14c/0x1d0
[   78.364880]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[   78.368185] Code: bad PC value

SERIAL_PORT_DFNS is not defined on each arch, if it's not defined,
serial8250_set_defaults() won't be called in serial8250_isa_init_ports(),
so the p->serial_in pointer won't be initialized, and it leads a null-ptr-deref.
Fix this problem by calling serial8250_set_defaults() after init uart port.

Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721143852.4058352-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jul 29, 2020
commit f4c23a1 upstream.

I got null-ptr-deref in serial8250_start_tx():

[   78.114630] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[   78.123778] Mem abort info:
[   78.126560]   ESR = 0x86000007
[   78.129603]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   78.134891]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   78.137933]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   78.141064] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000027d41a8600
[   78.147562] [0000000000000000] pgd=00000027893f0003, p4d=00000027893f0003, pud=00000027893f0003, pmd=00000027c9a20003, pte=0000000000000000
[   78.160029] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] SMP
[   78.164886] Modules linked in: sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce ses enclosure sg sbsa_gwdt ipmi_ssif spi_dw_mmio sch_fq_codel vhost_net tun vhost vhost_iotlb tap ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 ahci hisi_sas_v3_hw libahci hisi_sas_main libsas hns3 scsi_transport_sas hclge libata megaraid_sas ipmi_si hnae3 ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvme nvme_core xt_sctp sctp libcrc32c dm_mod nbd
[   78.207383] CPU: 11 PID: 23258 Comm: null-ptr Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #48
[   78.214056] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V3.B210.01 03/12/2020
[   78.222888] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[   78.228435] pc : 0x0
[   78.230618] lr : serial8250_start_tx+0x160/0x260
[   78.235215] sp : ffff800062eefb80
[   78.238517] x29: ffff800062eefb80 x28: 0000000000000fff
[   78.243807] x27: ffff800062eefd80 x26: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.249098] x25: ffff800062eefd80 x24: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.254388] x23: ffff002fc5e50be8 x22: 0000000000000002
[   78.259679] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 0000000000000000
[   78.264969] x19: ffffa688827eecc8 x18: 0000000000000000
[   78.270259] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[   78.275550] x15: ffffa68881bc67a8 x14: 00000000000002e6
[   78.280841] x13: ffffa68881bc67a8 x12: 000000000000c539
[   78.286131] x11: d37a6f4de9bd37a7 x10: ffffa68881cccff0
[   78.291421] x9 : ffffa68881bc6000 x8 : ffffa688819daa88
[   78.296711] x7 : ffffa688822a0f20 x6 : ffffa688819e0000
[   78.302002] x5 : ffff800062eef9d0 x4 : ffffa68881e707a8
[   78.307292] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000002
[   78.312582] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffa688827eecc8
[   78.317873] Call trace:
[   78.320312]  0x0
[   78.322147]  __uart_start.isra.9+0x64/0x78
[   78.326229]  uart_start+0xb8/0x1c8
[   78.329620]  uart_flush_chars+0x24/0x30
[   78.333442]  n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x7b0/0xc30
[   78.338128]  n_tty_receive_buf+0x44/0x2c8
[   78.342122]  tty_ioctl+0x348/0x11f8
[   78.345599]  ksys_ioctl+0xd8/0xf8
[   78.348903]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x2c/0xc8
[   78.352812]  el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x88/0x1b0
[   78.357583]  do_el0_svc+0x44/0xd0
[   78.360887]  el0_sync_handler+0x14c/0x1d0
[   78.364880]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[   78.368185] Code: bad PC value

SERIAL_PORT_DFNS is not defined on each arch, if it's not defined,
serial8250_set_defaults() won't be called in serial8250_isa_init_ports(),
so the p->serial_in pointer won't be initialized, and it leads a null-ptr-deref.
Fix this problem by calling serial8250_set_defaults() after init uart port.

Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721143852.4058352-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
anthraxx referenced this issue in anthraxx/linux-hardened Jul 29, 2020
commit f4c23a1 upstream.

I got null-ptr-deref in serial8250_start_tx():

[   78.114630] Unable to handle kernel NULL pointer dereference at virtual address 0000000000000000
[   78.123778] Mem abort info:
[   78.126560]   ESR = 0x86000007
[   78.129603]   EC = 0x21: IABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
[   78.134891]   SET = 0, FnV = 0
[   78.137933]   EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
[   78.141064] user pgtable: 64k pages, 48-bit VAs, pgdp=00000027d41a8600
[   78.147562] [0000000000000000] pgd=00000027893f0003, p4d=00000027893f0003, pud=00000027893f0003, pmd=00000027c9a20003, pte=0000000000000000
[   78.160029] Internal error: Oops: 86000007 [#1] SMP
[   78.164886] Modules linked in: sunrpc vfat fat aes_ce_blk crypto_simd cryptd aes_ce_cipher crct10dif_ce ghash_ce sha2_ce sha256_arm64 sha1_ce ses enclosure sg sbsa_gwdt ipmi_ssif spi_dw_mmio sch_fq_codel vhost_net tun vhost vhost_iotlb tap ip_tables ext4 mbcache jbd2 ahci hisi_sas_v3_hw libahci hisi_sas_main libsas hns3 scsi_transport_sas hclge libata megaraid_sas ipmi_si hnae3 ipmi_devintf ipmi_msghandler br_netfilter bridge stp llc nvme nvme_core xt_sctp sctp libcrc32c dm_mod nbd
[   78.207383] CPU: 11 PID: 23258 Comm: null-ptr Not tainted 5.8.0-rc6+ #48
[   78.214056] Hardware name: Huawei TaiShan 2280 V2/BC82AMDC, BIOS 2280-V2 CS V3.B210.01 03/12/2020
[   78.222888] pstate: 80400089 (Nzcv daIf +PAN -UAO BTYPE=--)
[   78.228435] pc : 0x0
[   78.230618] lr : serial8250_start_tx+0x160/0x260
[   78.235215] sp : ffff800062eefb80
[   78.238517] x29: ffff800062eefb80 x28: 0000000000000fff
[   78.243807] x27: ffff800062eefd80 x26: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.249098] x25: ffff800062eefd80 x24: ffff202fd83b3000
[   78.254388] x23: ffff002fc5e50be8 x22: 0000000000000002
[   78.259679] x21: 0000000000000001 x20: 0000000000000000
[   78.264969] x19: ffffa688827eecc8 x18: 0000000000000000
[   78.270259] x17: 0000000000000000 x16: 0000000000000000
[   78.275550] x15: ffffa68881bc67a8 x14: 00000000000002e6
[   78.280841] x13: ffffa68881bc67a8 x12: 000000000000c539
[   78.286131] x11: d37a6f4de9bd37a7 x10: ffffa68881cccff0
[   78.291421] x9 : ffffa68881bc6000 x8 : ffffa688819daa88
[   78.296711] x7 : ffffa688822a0f20 x6 : ffffa688819e0000
[   78.302002] x5 : ffff800062eef9d0 x4 : ffffa68881e707a8
[   78.307292] x3 : 0000000000000000 x2 : 0000000000000002
[   78.312582] x1 : 0000000000000001 x0 : ffffa688827eecc8
[   78.317873] Call trace:
[   78.320312]  0x0
[   78.322147]  __uart_start.isra.9+0x64/0x78
[   78.326229]  uart_start+0xb8/0x1c8
[   78.329620]  uart_flush_chars+0x24/0x30
[   78.333442]  n_tty_receive_buf_common+0x7b0/0xc30
[   78.338128]  n_tty_receive_buf+0x44/0x2c8
[   78.342122]  tty_ioctl+0x348/0x11f8
[   78.345599]  ksys_ioctl+0xd8/0xf8
[   78.348903]  __arm64_sys_ioctl+0x2c/0xc8
[   78.352812]  el0_svc_common.constprop.2+0x88/0x1b0
[   78.357583]  do_el0_svc+0x44/0xd0
[   78.360887]  el0_sync_handler+0x14c/0x1d0
[   78.364880]  el0_sync+0x140/0x180
[   78.368185] Code: bad PC value

SERIAL_PORT_DFNS is not defined on each arch, if it's not defined,
serial8250_set_defaults() won't be called in serial8250_isa_init_ports(),
so the p->serial_in pointer won't be initialized, and it leads a null-ptr-deref.
Fix this problem by calling serial8250_set_defaults() after init uart port.

Signed-off-by: Yang Yingliang <yangyingliang@huawei.com>
Cc: stable <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200721143852.4058352-1-yangyingliang@huawei.com
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>
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