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Compute and use generation numbers #5
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The in_commit_list() method does not check the parents of the candidate for containment in the list. Fix the comment that incorrectly states that it does. Reported-by: Jakub Narebski <jnareb@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The generation number of a commit is defined recursively as follows: * If a commit A has no parents, then the generation number of A is one. * If a commit A has parents, then the generation number of A is one more than the maximum generation number among the parents of A. Add a uint32_t generation field to struct commit so we can pass this information to revision walks. We use three special values to signal the generation number is invalid: GENERATION_NUMBER_INFINITY 0xFFFFFFFF GENERATION_NUMBER_MAX 0x3FFFFFFF GENERATION_NUMBER_ZERO 0 The first (_INFINITY) means the generation number has not been loaded or computed. The second (_MAX) means the generation number is too large to store in the commit-graph file. The third (_ZERO) means the generation number was loaded from a commit graph file that was written by a version of git that did not support generation numbers. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
While preparing commits to be written into a commit-graph file, compute the generation numbers using a depth-first strategy. The only commits that are walked in this depth-first search are those without a precomputed generation number. Thus, computation time will be relative to the number of new commits to the commit-graph file. If a computed generation number would exceed GENERATION_NUMBER_MAX, then use GENERATION_NUMBER_MAX instead. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Define compare_commits_by_gen_then_commit_date(), which uses generation numbers as a primary comparison and commit date to break ties (or as a comparison when both commits do not have computed generation numbers). Since the commit-graph file is closed under reachability, we know that all commits in the file have generation at most GENERATION_NUMBER_MAX which is less than GENERATION_NUMBER_INFINITY. This change does not affect the number of commits that are walked during the execution of paint_down_to_common(), only the order that those commits are inspected. In the case that commit dates violate topological order (i.e. a parent is "newer" than a child), the previous code could walk a commit twice: if a commit is reached with the PARENT1 bit, but later is re-visited with the PARENT2 bit, then that PARENT2 bit must be propagated to its parents. Using generation numbers avoids this extra effort, even if it is somewhat rare. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Most code paths load commits using lookup_commit() and then parse_commit(). In some cases, including some branch lookups, the commit is parsed using parse_object_buffer() which side-steps parse_commit() in favor of parse_commit_buffer(). With generation numbers in the commit-graph, we need to ensure that any commit that exists in the commit-graph file has its generation number loaded. Create new load_commit_graph_info() method to fill in the information for a commit that exists only in the commit-graph file. Call it from parse_commit_buffer() after loading the other commit information from the given buffer. Only fill this information when specified by the 'check_graph' parameter. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
A commit A can reach a commit B only if the generation number of A is strictly larger than the generation number of B. This condition allows significantly short-circuiting commit-graph walks. Use generation number for '--contains' type queries. On a copy of the Linux repository where HEAD is contained in v4.13 but no earlier tag, the command 'git tag --contains HEAD' had the following peformance improvement: Before: 0.81s After: 0.04s Rel %: -95% Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The containment algorithm for 'git branch --contains' is different from that for 'git tag --contains' in that it uses is_descendant_of() instead of contains_tag_algo(). The expensive portion of the branch algorithm is computing merge bases. When a commit-graph file exists with generation numbers computed, we can avoid this merge-base calculation when the target commit has a larger generation number than the initial commits. Performance tests were run on a copy of the Linux repository where HEAD is contained in v4.13 but no earlier tag. Also, all tags were copied to branches and 'git branch --contains' was tested: Before: 60.0s After: 0.4s Rel %: -99.3% Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
When running 'git branch --contains', the in_merge_bases_many() method calls paint_down_to_common() to discover if a specific commit is reachable from a set of branches. Commits with lower generation number are not needed to correctly answer the containment query of in_merge_bases_many(). Add a new parameter, min_generation, to paint_down_to_common() that prevents walking commits with generation number strictly less than min_generation. If 0 is given, then there is no functional change. For in_merge_bases_many(), we can pass commit->generation as the cutoff, and this saves time during 'git branch --contains' queries that would otherwise walk "around" the commit we are inspecting. For a copy of the Linux repository, where HEAD is checked out at v4.13~100, we get the following performance improvement for 'git branch --contains' over the previous commit: Before: 0.21s After: 0.13s Rel %: -38% Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
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The static remove_redundant() method is used to filter a list of commits by removing those that are reachable from another commit in the list. This is used to remove all possible merge- bases except a maximal, mutually independent set. To determine these commits are independent, we use a number of paint_down_to_common() walks and use the PARENT1, PARENT2 flags to determine reachability. Since we only care about reachability and not the full set of merge-bases between 'one' and 'twos', we can use the 'min_generation' parameter to short-circuit the walk. When no commit-graph exists, there is no change in behavior. For a copy of the Linux repository, we measured the following performance improvements: git merge-base v3.3 v4.5 Before: 234 ms After: 208 ms Rel %: -11% git merge-base v4.3 v4.5 Before: 102 ms After: 83 ms Rel %: -19% The experiments above were chosen to demonstrate that we are improving the filtering of the merge-base set. In the first example, more time is spent walking the history to find the set of merge bases before the remove_redundant() call. The starting commits are closer together in the second example, therefore more time is spent in remove_redundant(). The relative change in performance differs as expected. Reported-by: Jakub Narebski <jnareb@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Now that we use generation numbers from the commit-graph, we must ensure that all commits that exist in the commit-graph are loaded from that file instead of from the object database. Since the commit-graph file is only checked if core.commitGraph is true, we must check the default config before we load any commits. In the merge builtin, the config was checked after loading the HEAD commit. This was due to the use of the global 'branch' when checking merge-specific config settings. Move the config load to be between the initialization of 'branch' and the commit lookup. Without this change, a fast-forward merge would hit a BUG("bad generation skip") statement in commit.c during paint_down_to_common(). This is because the HEAD commit would be loaded with "infinite" generation but then reached by commits with "finite" generation numbers. Add a test to t5318-commit-graph.sh that exercises this code path to prevent a regression. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
We now calculate generation numbers in the commit-graph file and use them in paint_down_to_common(). Expand the section on generation numbers to discuss how the three special generation numbers GENERATION_NUMBER_INFINITY, _ZERO, and _MAX interact with other generation numbers. Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
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Ever since the split index feature was introduced [1], refreshing a split index is prone to a variant of the classic racy git problem. There are a couple of unrelated tests in the test suite that occasionally fail when run with 'GIT_TEST_SPLIT_INDEX=yes', but 't1700-split-index.sh', the only test script focusing solely on split index, has never noticed this issue, because it only cares about how the index is split under various circumstances and all the different ways to turn the split index feature on and off. Add a dedicated test script 't1701-racy-split-index.sh' to exercise the split index feature in racy situations as well; kind of a "t0010-racy-git.sh for split index" but with modern style (the tests do everything in &&-chained list of commands in 'test_expect_...' blocks, and use 'test_cmp' for more informative output on failure). The tests cover the following sequences of index splitting, updating, and racy file modifications, with the last two cases demonstrating the racy split index problem: 1. Split the index while adding a racily clean file: echo "cached content" >file git update-index --split-index --add file echo "dirty worktree" >file # size stays the same This case already works properly. Even though the cache entry's stat data matches with the modifid file in the worktree, subsequent git commands will notice that the (split) index and the file have the same mtime, and then will go on to check the file's content and notice its dirtiness. 2. Add a racily clean file to an already split index: git update-index --split-index echo "cached content" >file git update-index --add file echo "dirty worktree" >file This case already works properly. After the second 'git update-index' writes the newly added file's cache entry to the new split index, it basically works in the same way as case #1. 3. Split the index when it (i.e. the not yet splitted index) contains a racily clean cache entry, i.e. an entry whose cached stat data matches with the corresponding file in the worktree and the cached mtime matches that of the index: echo "cached content" >file git update-index --add file echo "dirty worktree" >file # ... wait ... git update-index --split-index --add other-file This case already works properly. The shared index is written by do_write_index(), i.e. the same function that is responsible for writing "regular" and split indexes as well. This function cleverly notices the racily clean cache entry, and writes the entry to the new shared index with smudged stat data, i.e. file size set to 0. When subsequent git commands read the index, they will notice that the smudged stat data doesn't match with the file in the worktree, and then go on to check the file's content and notice its dirtiness. 4. Update the split index when it contains a racily clean cache entry: git update-index --split-index echo "cached content" >file git update-index --add file echo "dirty worktree" >file # ... wait ... git update-index --add other-file This case already works properly. After the second 'git update-index' the newly added file's cache entry is only stored in the split index. If a cache entry is present in the split index (even if it is a replacement of an outdated entry in the shared index), then it will always be included in the new split index on subsequent split index updates (until the file is removed or a new shared index is written), independently from whether the entry is racily clean or not. When do_write_index() writes the new split index, it notices the racily clean cache entry, and smudges its stat date. Subsequent git commands reading the index will notice the smudged stat data and then go on to check the file's content and notice its dirtiness. 5. Update the split index when a racily clean cache entry is stored only in the shared index: echo "cached content" >file git update-index --split-index --add file echo "dirty worktree" >file # ... wait ... git update-index --add other-file This case fails due to the racy split index problem. In the second 'git update-index' prepare_to_write_split_index() decides, among other things, which cache entries stored only in the shared index should be replaced in the new split index. Alas, this function never looks out for racily clean cache entries, and since the file's stat data in the worktree hasn't changed since the shared index was written, the entry won't be replaced in the new split index. Consequently, do_write_index() doesn't even get this racily clean cache entry, and can't smudge its stat data. Subsequent git commands will then see that the index has more recent mtime than the file and that the (not smudged) cached stat data still matches with the file in the worktree, and, ultimately, will erroneously consider the file clean. 6. Update the split index after unpack_trees() copied a racily clean cache entry from the shared index: echo "cached content" >file git update-index --split-index --add file echo "dirty worktree" >file # ... wait ... git read-tree -m HEAD This case fails due to the racy split index problem. This basically fails for the same reason as case #5 above, but there is one important difference, which warrants the dedicated test. While that second 'git update-index' in case #5 updates index_state in place, in this case 'git read-tree -m' calls unpack_trees(), which throws out the entire index, and constructs a new one from the (potentially updated) copies of the original's cache entries. Consequently, when prepare_to_write_split_index() gets to work on this reconstructed index, it takes a different code path than in case #5 when deciding which cache entries in the shared index should be replaced. The result is the same, though: the racily clean cache entry goes unnoticed, it isn't added to the split index with smudged stat data, and subsequent git commands will then erroneously consider the file clean. Note that in the last two 'test_expect_failure' cases I omitted the '#' (as in nr. of trial) from the tests' description on purpose for now, as it breakes the TAP output [2]; it will be added at the end of the series, when those two tests will be flipped to 'test_expect_success'. [1] In the branch leading to the merge commit v2.1.0-rc0~45 (Merge branch 'nd/split-index', 2014-07-16). [2] In the TAP output a '#' should separate the test's description from the TODO directive emitted by 'test_expect_failure'. The additional '#' in "#$trial" interferes with this, the test harness won't recognize the TODO directive, and will report that those tests failed unexpectedly. Signed-off-by: SZEDER Gábor <szeder.dev@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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…sponse query_result can be be an empty strbuf (STRBUF_INIT) - in that case trying to read 3 bytes triggers a buffer overflow read (as query_result.buf = '\0'). Therefore we need to check query_result's length before trying to read 3 bytes. This overflow was introduced in: 940b94f (fsmonitor: log invocation of FSMonitor hook to trace2, 2021-02-03) It was found when running the test-suite against ASAN, and can be most easily reproduced with the following command: make GIT_TEST_OPTS="-v" DEFAULT_TEST_TARGET="t7519-status-fsmonitor.sh" \ SANITIZE=address DEVELOPER=1 test ==2235==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow on address 0x0000019e6e5e at pc 0x00000043745c bp 0x7fffd382c520 sp 0x7fffd382bcc8 READ of size 3 at 0x0000019e6e5e thread T0 #0 0x43745b in MemcmpInterceptorCommon(void*, int (*)(void const*, void const*, unsigned long), void const*, void const*, unsigned long) /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:842:7 #1 0x43786d in bcmp /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:887:10 #2 0x80b146 in fsmonitor_is_trivial_response /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:192:10 #3 0x80b146 in query_fsmonitor /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:175:7 #4 0x80a749 in refresh_fsmonitor /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:267:21 #5 0x80bad1 in tweak_fsmonitor /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/fsmonitor.c:429:4 #6 0x90f040 in read_index_from /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/read-cache.c:2321:3 #7 0x8e5d08 in repo_read_index_preload /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/preload-index.c:164:15 #8 0x52dd45 in prepare_index /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/commit.c:363:6 #9 0x52a188 in cmd_commit /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/commit.c:1588:15 #10 0x4ce77e in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #11 0x4ccb18 in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #14 0x6aca8d in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7fb027bf5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) #16 0x4206b9 in _start /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/glibc-2.26/csu/../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:120 0x0000019e6e5e is located 2 bytes to the left of global variable 'strbuf_slopbuf' defined in 'strbuf.c:51:6' (0x19e6e60) of size 1 'strbuf_slopbuf' is ascii string '' 0x0000019e6e5e is located 126 bytes to the right of global variable 'signals' defined in 'sigchain.c:11:31' (0x19e6be0) of size 512 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: global-buffer-overflow /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/../sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:842:7 in MemcmpInterceptorCommon(void*, int (*)(void const*, void const*, unsigned long), void const*, void const*, unsigned long) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x000080334d70: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x000080334d80: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x000080334d90: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x000080334da0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x000080334db0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 =>0x000080334dc0: f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9[f9]01 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334dd0: f9 f9 f9 f9 03 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 02 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334de0: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334df0: f9 f9 f9 f9 01 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 0x000080334e00: f9 f9 f9 f9 00 00 00 00 f9 f9 f9 f9 01 f9 f9 f9 0x000080334e10: f9 f9 f9 f9 04 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 f9 00 f9 f9 f9 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Acked-by: Jeff Hostetler <jeffhost@microsoft.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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shorten_unambiguous_ref() returns an allocated string. We have to track it separately from the const refname. This leak has existed since: 9ab55da (git symbolic-ref --delete $symref, 2012-10-21) This leak was found when running t0001 with LSAN, see also LSAN output below: Direct leak of 19 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486514 in strdup /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0x9ab048 in xstrdup /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x8b452f in refs_shorten_unambiguous_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/refs.c #3 0x8b47e8 in shorten_unambiguous_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/refs.c:1287:9 #4 0x679fce in check_symref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/symbolic-ref.c:28:14 #5 0x679ad8 in cmd_symbolic_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/symbolic-ref.c:70:9 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69cc6e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f98388a4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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dwim_ref() allocs a new string into ref. Instead of setting to NULL to discard it, we can FREE_AND_NULL. This leak appears to have been introduced in: 4cf76f6 (builtin/reset: compute checkout metadata for reset, 2020-03-16) This leak was found when running t0001 with LSAN, see also LSAN output below: Direct leak of 5 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486514 in strdup /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0x9a7108 in xstrdup /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x8add6b in expand_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/refs.c:670:12 #3 0x8ad777 in repo_dwim_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/refs.c:644:22 #4 0x6394af in dwim_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/./refs.h:162:9 #5 0x637e5c in cmd_reset /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/reset.c:426:4 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c5ce in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f57ebb9d349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Most of these pointers can safely be freed when cmd_clone() completes, therefore we make sure to free them. The one exception is that we have to UNLEAK(repo) because it can point either to argv[0], or a malloc'd string returned by absolute_pathdup(). We also have to free(path) in the middle of cmd_clone(): later during cmd_clone(), path is unconditionally overwritten with a different path, triggering a leak. Freeing the first path immediately after use (but only in the case where it contains data) seems like the cleanest solution, as opposed to freeing it unconditionally before path is reused for another path. This leak appears to have been introduced in: f38aa83 (use local cloning if insteadOf makes a local URL, 2014-07-17) These leaks were found when running t0001 with LSAN, see also an excerpt of the LSAN output below (the full list is omitted because it's far too long, and mostly consists of indirect leakage of members of the refs we are freeing). Direct leak of 178 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a53d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9a6ff4 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9a6fca in xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x8ce296 in copy_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:885:8 #4 0x8d2ebd in guess_remote_head /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:2215:10 #5 0x51d0c5 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1308:4 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 165 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a53d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9a6fc4 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9a6f9a in xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x8ce266 in copy_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:885:8 #4 0x51e9bd in wanted_peer_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:574:21 #5 0x51cfe1 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1284:17 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c42e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f8fef0c2349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 178 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a53d in malloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3 #1 0x9a6ff4 in do_xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x9a6fca in xmalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x8ce296 in copy_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:885:8 #4 0x8d2ebd in guess_remote_head /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:2215:10 #5 0x51d0c5 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1308:4 #6 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #7 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #8 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #9 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #10 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #11 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 165 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a6b2 in calloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3 #1 0x9a72f2 in xcalloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:140:8 #2 0x8ce203 in alloc_ref_with_prefix /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:867:20 #3 0x8ce1a2 in alloc_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/remote.c:875:9 #4 0x72f63e in process_ref_v2 /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/connect.c:426:8 #5 0x72f21a in get_remote_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/connect.c:525:8 #6 0x979ab7 in handshake /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:305:4 #7 0x97872d in get_refs_via_connect /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:339:9 #8 0x9774b5 in transport_get_remote_refs /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/transport.c:1388:4 #9 0x51cf80 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1271:9 #10 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #11 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #12 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #13 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #14 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #15 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Direct leak of 105 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a859 in realloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9a71f6 in xrealloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x93622d in strbuf_grow /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x937a73 in strbuf_addch /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/./strbuf.h:231:3 #4 0x939fcd in strbuf_add_absolute_path /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:911:4 #5 0x69d3ce in absolute_pathdup /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/abspath.c:261:2 #6 0x51c688 in cmd_clone /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/clone.c:1021:10 #7 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #8 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #9 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #10 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #11 0x69c45e in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #12 0x7f6a459d5349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Apr 10, 2021
Make sure that we release the temporary strbuf during dwim_branch() for all codepaths (and not just for the early return). This leak appears to have been introduced in: f60a7b7 (worktree: teach "add" to check out existing branches, 2018-04-24) Note that UNLEAK(branchname) is still needed: the returned result is used in add(), and is stored in a pointer which is used to point at one of: - a string literal ("HEAD") - member of argv (whatever the user specified in their invocation) - or our newly allocated string returned from dwim_branch() Fixing the branchname leak isn't impossible, but does not seem worthwhile given that add() is called directly from cmd_main(), and cmd_main() returns immediately thereafter - UNLEAK is good enough. This leak was found when running t0001 with LSAN, see also LSAN output below: Direct leak of 60 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a859 in realloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9ab076 in xrealloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x939fcd in strbuf_grow /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x93af53 in strbuf_splice /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:239:3 #4 0x83559a in strbuf_check_branch_ref /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/object-name.c:1593:2 #5 0x6988b9 in dwim_branch /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/worktree.c:454:20 #6 0x695f8f in add /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/worktree.c:525:19 #7 0x694a04 in cmd_worktree /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/worktree.c:1036:10 #8 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #9 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #10 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #11 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #12 0x69caee in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #13 0x7f7b7dd10349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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The primary goal of this change is to stop leaking init_db_template_dir. This leak can happen because: 1. git_init_db_config() allocates new memory into init_db_template_dir without first freeing the existing value. 2. init_db_template_dir might already contain data, either because: 2.1 git_config() can be invoked twice with this callback in a single process - at least 2 allocations are likely. 2.2 A single git_config() allocation can invoke the callback multiple times for a given key (see further explanation in the function docs) - each of those calls will trigger another leak. The simplest fix for the leak would be to free(init_db_template_dir) before overwriting it. Instead we choose to convert to fetching init.templatedir via git_config_get_value() as that is more explicit, more efficient, and avoids allocations (the returned result is owned by the config cache, so we aren't responsible for freeing it). If we remove init_db_template_dir, git_init_db_config() ends up being responsible only for forwarding core.* config values to platform_core_config(). However platform_core_config() already ignores non-core.* config values, so we can safely remove git_init_db_config() and invoke git_config() directly with platform_core_config() as the callback. The platform_core_config forwarding was originally added in: 2878533 (mingw: respect core.hidedotfiles = false in git-init again, 2019-03-11 And I suspect the potential for a leak existed since the original implementation of git_init_db_config in: 90b4518 (Add `init.templatedir` configuration variable., 2010-02-17) LSAN output from t0001: Direct leak of 73 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49a859 in realloc /home/abuild/rpmbuild/BUILD/llvm-11.0.0.src/build/../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0x9a7276 in xrealloc /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9362ad in strbuf_grow /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x936eaa in strbuf_add /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/strbuf.c:295:2 #4 0x868112 in strbuf_addstr /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/./strbuf.h:304:2 #5 0x86a8ad in expand_user_path /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/path.c:758:2 #6 0x720bb1 in git_config_pathname /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:1287:10 #7 0x5960e2 in git_init_db_config /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:161:11 #8 0x7255b8 in configset_iter /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:1982:7 #9 0x7253fc in repo_config /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:2311:2 #10 0x725ca7 in git_config /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/config.c:2399:2 #11 0x593e8d in create_default_files /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:225:2 #12 0x5935c6 in init_db /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:449:11 #13 0x59588e in cmd_init_db /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/builtin/init-db.c:714:9 #14 0x4cd60d in run_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:453:11 #15 0x4cb2da in handle_builtin /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:704:3 #16 0x4ccc37 in run_argv /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:771:4 #17 0x4cac29 in cmd_main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/git.c:902:19 #18 0x69c4de in main /home/ahunt/oss-fuzz/git/common-main.c:52:11 #19 0x7f23552d6349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <ajrhunt@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Aug 10, 2021
- cmd_rebase populates rebase_options.strategy with newly allocated strings, hence we need to free those strings at the end of cmd_rebase to avoid a leak. - In some cases: get_replay_opts() is called, which prepares replay_opts using data from rebase_options. We used to simply copy the pointer from rebase_options.strategy, however that would now result in a double-free because sequencer_remove_state() is eventually used to free replay_opts.strategy. To avoid this we xstrdup() strategy when adding it to replay_opts. The original leak happens because we always populate rebase_options.strategy, but we don't always enter the path that calls get_replay_opts() and later sequencer_remove_state() - in other words we'd always allocate a new string into rebase_options.strategy but only sometimes did we free it. We now make sure that rebase_options and replay_opts both own their own copies of strategy, and each copy is free'd independently. This was first seen when running t0021 with LSAN, but t2012 helped catch the fact that we can't just free(options.strategy) at the end of cmd_rebase (as that can cause a double-free). LSAN output from t0021: LSAN output from t0021: Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x486804 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3 #1 0xa71eb8 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x61b1cc in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1779:22 #3 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #4 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #5 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #6 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #7 0x6b3fad in main common-main.c:52:11 #8 0x7f267b512349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Aug 10, 2021
setup_unpack_trees_porcelain() populates various fields on unpack_tree_opts, we need to call clear_unpack_trees_porcelain() to avoid leaking them. Specifically, we used to leak unpack_tree_opts.msgs_to_free. We have to do this in leave_reset_head because there are multiple scenarios where unpack_tree_opts has already been configured, followed by a 'goto leave_reset_head'. But we can also 'goto leave_reset_head' prior to having initialised unpack_tree_opts via memset(..., 0, ...). Therefore we also move unpack_tree_opts initialisation to the start of reset_head(), and convert it to use brace initialisation - which guarantees that we can never clear an uninitialised unpack_tree_opts. clear_unpack_tree_opts() is always safe to call as long as unpack_tree_opts is at least zero-initialised, i.e. it does not depend on a previous call to setup_unpack_trees_porcelain(). LSAN output from t0021: Direct leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9f7861 in strvec_push_nodup strvec.c:19:2 #3 0x9f7861 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:39:2 #4 0xa43e14 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:129:3 #5 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2 #6 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9 #7 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #8 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #9 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #10 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #11 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11 #12 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 147 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:401:3 #4 0x9f7774 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:36:2 #5 0xa43e14 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:129:3 #6 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2 #7 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9 #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #12 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11 #13 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 134 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:401:3 #4 0x9f7774 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:36:2 #5 0xa43fe4 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:168:3 #6 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2 #7 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9 #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #12 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11 #13 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) Indirect leak of 130 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3 #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2 #3 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:401:3 #4 0x9f7774 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:36:2 #5 0xa43f20 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:150:3 #6 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2 #7 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9 #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11 #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3 #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4 #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19 #12 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11 #13 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 603 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s). Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Oct 7, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that is being verified. Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe and Derick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem. ==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080 READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0 #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863 #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d) 0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127 #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35 #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310 #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588 #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850 #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140 #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17 #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763 #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779 #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85 #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Oct 7, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that is being verified. Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe and Derrick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem. ==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080 READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0 #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863 #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d) 0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127 #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35 #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310 #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588 #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850 #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140 #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17 #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763 #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779 #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85 #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee
pushed a commit
that referenced
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Oct 26, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that is being verified. Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe and Derrick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem. ==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080 READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0 #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863 #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d) 0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127 #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35 #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31 #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310 #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588 #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850 #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840 #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910 #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250 #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87 #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140 #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17 #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763 #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764 #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779 #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85 #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074 #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461 #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714 #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781 #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912 #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52 #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24) Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
added a commit
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Nov 2, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee
added a commit
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Nov 8, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee
added a commit
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Nov 10, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee
added a commit
that referenced
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Nov 16, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region! It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger: ``` #0 ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404 #1 0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386 #2 0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244 #3 read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426 #4 0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286 #5 0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850 #6 0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947 #7 repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603 #8 0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650 #9 0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638 #10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800 #11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999 #12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528 #13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785 #14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857 #15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993 #16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52 ``` The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee
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Feb 23, 2022
When trying to write a MIDX, we already prevent the case where there weren't any packs present, and thus we would have written an empty MIDX. But there is another "empty" case, which is more interesting, and we don't yet handle. If we try to write a MIDX which has at least one pack, but those packs together don't contain any objects, we will encounter a BUG() when trying to use the bitmap corresponding to that MIDX, like so: $ git rev-parse HEAD | git pack-objects --revs --use-bitmap-index --stdout >/dev/null BUG: pack-revindex.c:394: pack_pos_to_midx: out-of-bounds object at 0 (note that in the above reproduction, both `--use-bitmap-index` and `--stdout` are important, since without the former we won't even both to load the .bitmap, and without the latter we wont attempt pack reuse). The problem occurs when we try to discover the identity of the preferred pack to determine which range if any of existing packs we can reuse verbatim. This path is: `reuse_packfile_objects()` -> `reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap()` -> `midx_preferred_pack()`. #4 0x000055555575401f in pack_pos_to_midx (m=0x555555997160, pos=0) at pack-revindex.c:394 #5 0x00005555557502c8 in midx_preferred_pack (bitmap_git=0x55555599c280) at pack-bitmap.c:1431 #6 0x000055555575036c in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap (bitmap_git=0x55555599c280, packfile_out=0x5555559666b0 <reuse_packfile>, entries=0x5555559666b8 <reuse_packfile_objects>, reuse_out=0x5555559666c0 <reuse_packfile_bitmap>) at pack-bitmap.c:1452 #7 0x00005555556041f6 in get_object_list_from_bitmap (revs=0x7fffffffcbf0) at builtin/pack-objects.c:3658 #8 0x000055555560465c in get_object_list (ac=2, av=0x555555997050) at builtin/pack-objects.c:3765 #9 0x0000555555605e4e in cmd_pack_objects (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe920, prefix=0x0) at builtin/pack-objects.c:4154 Since neither the .bitmap or MIDX stores the identity of the preferred pack, we infer it by trying to load the first object in pseudo-pack order, and then asking the MIDX which pack was chosen to represent that object. But this fails our bounds check, since there are zero objects in the MIDX to begin with, which results in the BUG(). We could catch this more carefully in `midx_preferred_pack()`, but signaling the absence of a preferred pack out to all of its callers is somewhat awkward. Instead, let's avoid writing a MIDX .bitmap without any objects altogether. We catch this case in `write_midx_internal()`, and emit a warning if the caller indicated they wanted to write a bitmap before clearing out the relevant flags. If we somehow got to write_midx_bitmap(), then we will call BUG(), but this should now be an unreachable path. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Mar 15, 2022
The fix is short (~30 lines), but the description is not. Sorry. There is a set of problems caused by files in what I'll refer to as the "present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE" state. This commit aims to not just fix these problems, but remove the entire class as a possibility -- for those using sparse checkouts. But first, we need to understand the problems this class presents. A quick outline: * Problems * User facing issues * Problem space complexity * Maintenance and code correctness challenges * SKIP_WORKTREE expectations in Git * Suggested solution * Pros/Cons of suggested solution * Notes on testcase modifications === User facing issues === There are various ways for users to get files to be present in the working copy despite having the SKIP_WORKTREE bit set for that file in the index. This may come from: * various git commands not really supporting the SKIP_WORKTREE bit[1,2] * users grabbing files from elsewhere and writing them to the worktree (perhaps even cached in their editor) * users attempting to "abort" a sparse-checkout operation with a not-so-early Ctrl+C (updating $GIT_DIR/info/sparse-checkout and the working tree is not atomic)[3]. Once users have present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE files, any modifications users make to these files will be ignored, possibly to users' confusion. Further: * these files will degrade performance for the sparse-index case due to requiring the index to be expanded (see commit 55dfcf9 ("sparse-checkout: clear tracked sparse dirs", 2021-09-08) for why we try to delete entire directories outside the sparse cone). * these files will not be updated by by standard commands (switch/checkout/pull/merge/rebase will leave them alone unless conflicts happen -- and even then, the conflicted file may be written somewhere else to avoid overwriting the SKIP_WORKTREE file that is present and in the way) * there is nothing in Git that users can use to discover such files (status, diff, grep, etc. all ignore it) * there is no reasonable mechanism to "recover" from such a condition (neither `git sparse-checkout reapply` nor `git reset --hard` will correct it). So, not only are users modifications ignored, but the files get progressively more stale over time. At some point in the future, they may change their sparseness specification or disable sparse-checkouts. At that time, all present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE files will show up as having lots of modifications because they represent a version from a different branch or commit. These might include user-made local changes from days before, but the only way to tell is to have users look through them all closely. If these users come to others for help, there will be no logs that explain the issue; it's just a mysterious list of changes. Users might adamantly claim (correctly, as it turns out) that they didn't modify these files, while others presume they did. [1] https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqqbmb1a7ga.fsf@gitster-ct.c.googlers.com/ [2] https://lore.kernel.org/git/CABPp-BH9tju7WVm=QZDOvaMDdZbpNXrVWQdN-jmfN8wC6YVhmw@mail.gmail.com/ [3] https://lore.kernel.org/git/CABPp-BFnFpzwGC11TLoLs8YK5yiisA5D5-fFjXnJsbESVDwZsA@mail.gmail.com/ === Problem space complexity === SKIP_WORKTREE has been part of Git for over a decade. Duy did lots of work on it initially, and several others have since come along and put lots of work into it. Stolee spent most of 2021 on the sparse-index, with lots of bugfixes along the way including to non-sparse-index cases as we are still trying to get sparse checkouts to behave reasonably. Basically every codepath throughout the treat needs to be aware of an additional type of file: tracked-but-not-present. The extra type results in lots of extra testcases and lots of extra code everywhere. But, the sad thing is that we actually have more than one extra type. We have tracked, tracked-but-not-present (SKIP_WORKTREE), and tracked-but-promised-to-not-be-present-but-is-present-anyway (present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE). Two types is a monumental amount of effort to support, and adding a third feels a bit like insanity[4]. [4] Some examples of which can be seen at https://lore.kernel.org/git/CABPp-BGJ_Nvi5TmgriD9Bh6eNXE2EDq2f8e8QKXAeYG3BxZafA@mail.gmail.com/ === Maintenance and code correctness challenges === Matheus' patches to grep stalled for nearly a year, in part because of complications of how to handle sparse-checkouts appropriately in all cases[5][6] (with trying to sanely figure out how to sanely handle present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE files being one of the complications). His rm/add follow-ups also took months because of those kinds of issues[7]. The corner cases with things like submodules and SKIP_WORKTREE with the addition of present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE start becoming really complex[8]. We've had to add ugly logic to merge-ort to attempt to handle present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE files[9], and basically just been forced to give up in merge-recursive knowing full well that we'll sometimes silently discard user modifications. Despite stash essentially being a merge, it needed extra code (beyond what was in merge-ort and merge-recursive) to manually tweak SKIP_WORKTREE bits in order to avoid a few different bugs that'd result in an early abort with a partial stash application[10]. [5] See https://lore.kernel.org/git/5f3f7ac77039d41d1692ceae4b0c5df3bb45b74a.1612901326.git.matheus.bernardino@usp.br/#t and the dates on the thread; also Matheus and I had several conversations off-list trying to resolve the issues over that time [6] ...it finally kind of got unstuck after https://lore.kernel.org/git/CABPp-BGJ_Nvi5TmgriD9Bh6eNXE2EDq2f8e8QKXAeYG3BxZafA@mail.gmail.com/ [7] See for example https://lore.kernel.org/git/CABPp-BHwNoVnooqDFPAsZxBT9aR5Dwk5D9sDRCvYSb8akxAJgA@mail.gmail.com/#t and quotes like "The core functionality of sparse-checkout has always been only partially implemented", a statement I still believe is true today. [8] https://lore.kernel.org/git/pull.809.git.git.1592356884310.gitgitgadget@gmail.com/ [9] See commit 66b209b ("merge-ort: implement CE_SKIP_WORKTREE handling with conflicted entries", 2021-03-20) [10] See commit ba359fd ("stash: fix stash application in sparse-checkouts", 2020-12-01) === SKIP_WORKTREE expectations in Git === A couple quotes: * From [11] (before the "sparse-checkout" command existed): If it needs too many special cases, hacks, and conditionals, then it is not worth the complexity---if it is easier to write a correct code by allowing Git to populate working tree files, it is perfectly fine to do so. In a sense, the sparse checkout "feature" itself is a hack by itself, and that is why I think this part should be "best effort" as well. * From the git-sparse-checkout manual (still present today): THIS COMMAND IS EXPERIMENTAL. ITS BEHAVIOR, AND THE BEHAVIOR OF OTHER COMMANDS IN THE PRESENCE OF SPARSE-CHECKOUTS, WILL LIKELY CHANGE IN THE FUTURE. [11] https://lore.kernel.org/git/xmqqbmb1a7ga.fsf@gitster-ct.c.googlers.com/ === Suggested solution === SKIP_WORKTREE was written to allow sparse-checkouts, in particular, as the name of the option implies, to allow the file to NOT be in the worktree but consider it to be unchanged rather than deleted. The suggests a simple solution: present-despite-SKIP_WORKTREE files should not exist, for those using sparse-checkouts. Enforce this at index loading time by checking if core.sparseCheckout is true; if so, check files in the index with the SKIP_WORKTREE bit set to verify that they are absent from the working tree. If they are present, unset the bit (in memory, though any commands that write to the index will record the update). Users can, of course, can get the SKIP_WORKTREE bit back such as by running `git sparse-checkout reapply` (if they have ensured the file is unmodified and doesn't match the specified sparsity patterns). === Pros/Cons of suggested solution === Pros: * Solves the user visible problems reported above, which I've been complaining about for nearly a year but couldn't find a solution to. * Helps prevent slow performance degradation with a sparse-index. * Much easier behavior in sparse-checkouts for users to reason about * Very simple, ~30 lines of code. * Significantly simplifies some ugly testcases, and obviates the need to test an entire class of potential issues. * Reduces code complexity, reasoning, and maintenance. Avoids disagreements about weird corner cases[12]. * It has been reported that some users might be (ab)using SKIP_WORKTREE as a let-me-modify-but-keep-the-file-in-the-worktree mechanism[13, and a few other similar references]. These users know of multiple caveats and shortcomings in doing so; perhaps not surprising given the "SKIP_WORKTREE expecations" section above. However, these users use `git update-index --skip-worktree`, and not `git sparse-checkout` or core.sparseCheckout=true. As such, these users would be unaffected by this change and can continue abusing the system as before. [12] https://lore.kernel.org/git/CABPp-BH9tju7WVm=QZDOvaMDdZbpNXrVWQdN-jmfN8wC6YVhmw@mail.gmail.com/ [13] https://stackoverflow.com/questions/13630849/git-difference-between-assume-unchanged-and-skip-worktree Cons: * When core.sparseCheckout is enabled, this adds a performance cost to reading the index. I'll defer discussion of this cost to a subsequent patch, since I have some optimizations to add. === Notes on testcase modifications === The good: * t1011: Compare to two cases above it ('read-tree will not throw away dirty changes, non-sparse'); since the file is present, it should match the non-sparse case now * t1092: sparse-index & sparse-checkout now match full-worktree behavior in more cases! Yaay for consistency! * t6428, t7012: look at how much simpler the tests become! Merge and stash can just fail early telling the user there's a file in the way, instead of not noticing until it's about to write a file and then have to implement sudden crash avoidance. Hurray for sanity! * t7817: sparse behavior better matches full tree behavior. Hurray for sanity! The confusing: * t3705: These changes were ONLY needed on Windows, but they don't hurt other platforms. Let's discuss each individually: * core.sparseCheckout should be false by default. Nothing in this testcase toggles that until many, many tests later. However, early tests (#5 in particular) were testing `update-index --skip-worktree` behavior in a non-sparse-checkout, but the Windows tests in CI were behaving as if core.sparseCheckout=true had been specified somewhere. I do not have access to a Windows machine. But I just manually did what should have been a no-op and turned the config off. And it fixed the test. * I have no idea why the leftover .gitattributes file from this test was causing failures for test #18 on Windows, but only with these changes of mine. Test #18 was checking for empty stderr, and specifically wanted to know that some error completely unrelated to file endings did not appear. The leftover .gitattributes file thus caused some spurious stderr unrelated to the thing being checked. Since other tests did not intend to test normalization, just proactively remove the .gitattributes file. I'm certain this is cleaner and better, I'm just unsure why/how this didn't trigger problems before. Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Mar 15, 2022
Add "fast_unwind_on_malloc=0" to LSAN_OPTIONS to get more meaningful stack traces from LSAN. This isn't required under ASAN which will emit traces such as this one for a leak in "t/t0006-date.sh": $ ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=1 ./t0006-date.sh -vixd [...] Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x488b94 in strdup (t/helper/test-tool+0x488b94) #1 0x9444a4 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #2 0x5995fa in parse_date_format date.c:991:24 #3 0x4d2056 in show_dates t/helper/test-date.c:39:2 #4 0x4d174a in cmd__date t/helper/test-date.c:116:3 #5 0x4cce89 in cmd_main t/helper/test-tool.c:127:11 #6 0x4cd1e3 in main common-main.c:52:11 #7 0x7fef3c695e49 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:314:16 #8 0x422b09 in _start (t/helper/test-tool+0x422b09) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 3 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted Whereas LSAN would emit this instead: $ ./t0006-date.sh -vixd [...] Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4323b8 in malloc (t/helper/test-tool+0x4323b8) #1 0x7f2be1d614aa in strdup string/strdup.c:42:15 SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 3 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted Now we'll instead git this sensible stack trace under LSAN. I.e. almost the same one (but starting with "malloc", as is usual for LSAN) as under ASAN: Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x4323b8 in malloc (t/helper/test-tool+0x4323b8) #1 0x7f012af5c4aa in strdup string/strdup.c:42:15 #2 0x5cb164 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14 #3 0x495ee9 in parse_date_format date.c:991:24 #4 0x453aac in show_dates t/helper/test-date.c:39:2 #5 0x453782 in cmd__date t/helper/test-date.c:116:3 #6 0x451d95 in cmd_main t/helper/test-tool.c:127:11 #7 0x451f1e in main common-main.c:52:11 #8 0x7f012aef5e49 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:314:16 #9 0x42e0a9 in _start (t/helper/test-tool+0x42e0a9) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 3 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted As the option name suggests this does make things slower, e.g. for t0001-init.sh we're around 10% slower: $ hyperfine -L v 0,1 'LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc={v} make T=t0001-init.sh' -r 3 Benchmark 1: LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0 make T=t0001-init.sh Time (mean ± σ): 2.135 s ± 0.015 s [User: 1.951 s, System: 0.554 s] Range (min … max): 2.122 s … 2.152 s 3 runs Benchmark 2: LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=1 make T=t0001-init.sh Time (mean ± σ): 1.981 s ± 0.055 s [User: 1.769 s, System: 0.488 s] Range (min … max): 1.941 s … 2.044 s 3 runs Summary 'LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=1 make T=t0001-init.sh' ran 1.08 ± 0.03 times faster than 'LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0 make T=t0001-init.sh' I think that's more than worth it to get the more meaningful stack traces, we can always provide LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0 for one-off "fast" runs. Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Mar 24, 2022
Add a failing test which demonstrates a regression in a18d66c ("diff.c: free "buf" in diff_words_flush()", 2022-03-04), the regression is discussed in detail in the subsequent commit. With it running `git show --word-diff --color-moved` with SANITIZE=address would emit: ==31191==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: attempting double-free on 0x617000021100 in thread T0: #0 0x49f0a2 in free (git+0x49f0a2) #1 0x9b0e4d in diff_words_flush diff.c:2153:3 #2 0x9aed5d in fn_out_consume diff.c:2354:3 #3 0xe092ab in consume_one xdiff-interface.c:43:9 #4 0xe072eb in xdiff_outf xdiff-interface.c:76:10 #5 0xec7014 in xdl_emit_diffrec xdiff/xutils.c:53:6 [...] 0x617000021100 is located 0 bytes inside of 768-byte region [0x617000021100,0x617000021400) freed by thread T0 here: #0 0x49f0a2 in free (git+0x49f0a2) [...(same stacktrace)...] previously allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x49f603 in __interceptor_realloc (git+0x49f603) #1 0xde4da4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8 #2 0x995dc5 in append_emitted_diff_symbol diff.c:794:2 #3 0x96c44a in emit_diff_symbol diff.c:1527:3 [...] This was not caught by the test suite because we test `diff --word-diff --color-moved` only so far. Therefore, add a test for `show`, too. Signed-off-by: Michael J Gruber <git@grubix.eu> Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Apr 7, 2022
In the preceding [1] (pack-objects: move revs out of get_object_list(), 2022-03-22) the "repo_init_revisions()" was moved to cmd_pack_objects() so that it unconditionally took place for all invocations of "git pack-objects". We'd thus start leaking memory, which is easily reproduced in e.g. git.git by feeding e83c516 (Initial revision of "git", the information manager from hell, 2005-04-07) to "git pack-objects"; $ echo e83c516 | ./git pack-objects initial [...] ==19130==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 7120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x455308 in __interceptor_malloc (/home/avar/g/git/git+0x455308) #1 0x75b399 in do_xmalloc /home/avar/g/git/wrapper.c:41:8 #2 0x75b356 in xmalloc /home/avar/g/git/wrapper.c:62:9 #3 0x5d7609 in prep_parse_options /home/avar/g/git/diff.c:5647:2 #4 0x5d415a in repo_diff_setup /home/avar/g/git/diff.c:4621:2 #5 0x6dffbb in repo_init_revisions /home/avar/g/git/revision.c:1853:2 #6 0x4f599d in cmd_pack_objects /home/avar/g/git/builtin/pack-objects.c:3980:2 #7 0x4592ca in run_builtin /home/avar/g/git/git.c:465:11 #8 0x457d81 in handle_builtin /home/avar/g/git/git.c:718:3 #9 0x458ca5 in run_argv /home/avar/g/git/git.c:785:4 #10 0x457b40 in cmd_main /home/avar/g/git/git.c:916:19 #11 0x562259 in main /home/avar/g/git/common-main.c:56:11 #12 0x7fce792ac7ec in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16 #13 0x4300f9 in _start (/home/avar/g/git/git+0x4300f9) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 7120 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted Narrowly fixing that commit would have been easy, just add call repo_init_revisions() right before get_object_list(), which is effectively what was done before that commit. But an unstated constraint when setting it up early is that it was needed for the subsequent [2] (pack-objects: parse --filter directly into revs.filter, 2022-03-22), i.e. we might have a --filter command-line option, and need to either have the "struct rev_info" setup when we encounter that option, or later. Let's just change the control flow so that we'll instead set up the "struct rev_info" only when we need it. Doing so leads to a bit more verbosity, but it's a lot clearer what we're doing and why. An earlier version of this commit[3] went behind opt_parse_list_objects_filter()'s back by faking up a "struct option" before calling it. Let's avoid that and instead create a blessed API for this pattern. We could furthermore combine the two get_object_list() invocations here by having repo_init_revisions() invoked on &pfd.revs, but I think clearly separating the two makes the flow clearer. Likewise redundantly but explicitly (i.e. redundant v.s. a "{ 0 }") "0" to "have_revs" early in cmd_pack_objects(). While we're at it add parentheses around the arguments to the OPT_* macros in in list-objects-filter-options.h, as we need to change those lines anyway. It doesn't matter in this case, but is good general practice. 1. https://lore.kernel.org/git/619b757d98465dbc4995bdc11a5282fbfcbd3daa.1647970119.git.gitgitgadget@gmail.com 2. https://lore.kernel.org/git/97de926904988b89b5663bd4c59c011a1723a8f5.1647970119.git.gitgitgadget@gmail.com 3. https://lore.kernel.org/git/patch-1.1-193534b0f07-20220325T121715Z-avarab@gmail.com/ Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Sep 19, 2022
Since commit fcc07e9 (is_promisor_object(): free tree buffer after parsing, 2021-04-13), we'll always free the buffers attached to a "struct tree" after searching them for promisor links. But there's an important case where we don't want to do so: if somebody else is already using the tree! This can happen during a "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor" traversal in a partial clone that is missing one or more trees or blobs. The backtrace for the free looks like this: #1 free_tree_buffer tree.c:147 #2 add_promisor_object packfile.c:2250 #3 for_each_object_in_pack packfile.c:2190 #4 for_each_packed_object packfile.c:2215 #5 is_promisor_object packfile.c:2272 #6 finish_object__ma builtin/rev-list.c:245 #7 finish_object builtin/rev-list.c:261 #8 show_object builtin/rev-list.c:274 #9 process_blob list-objects.c:63 #10 process_tree_contents list-objects.c:145 #11 process_tree list-objects.c:201 #12 traverse_trees_and_blobs list-objects.c:344 [...] We're in the middle of walking through the entries of a tree object via process_tree_contents(). We see a blob (or it could even be another tree entry) that we don't have, so we call is_promisor_object() to check it. That function loops over all of the objects in the promisor packfile, including the tree we're currently walking. When we're done with it there, we free the tree buffer. But as we return to the walk in process_tree_contents(), it's still holding on to a pointer to that buffer, via its tree_desc iterator, and it accesses the freed memory. Even a trivial use of "--missing=allow-promisor" triggers this problem, as the included test demonstrates (it's just a vanilla --blob:none clone). We can detect this case by only freeing the tree buffer if it was allocated on our behalf. This is a little tricky since that happens inside parse_object(), and it doesn't tell us whether the object was already parsed, or whether it allocated the buffer itself. But by checking for an already-parsed tree beforehand, we can distinguish the two cases. That feels a little hacky, and does incur an extra lookup in the object-hash table. But that cost is fairly minimal compared to actually loading objects (and since we're iterating the whole pack here, we're likely to be loading most objects, rather than reusing cached results). It may also be a good direction for this function in general, as there are other possible optimizations that rely on doing some analysis before parsing: - we could detect blobs and avoid reading their contents; they can't link to other objects, but parse_object() doesn't know that we don't care about checking their hashes. - we could avoid allocating object structs entirely for most objects (since we really only need them in the oidset), which would save some memory. - promisor commits could use the commit-graph rather than loading the object from disk This commit doesn't do any of those optimizations, but I think it argues that this direction is reasonable, rather than relying on parse_object() and trying to teach it to give us more information about whether it parsed. The included test fails reliably under SANITIZE=address just when running "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor". Checking the output isn't strictly necessary to detect the bug, but it seems like a reasonable addition given the general lack of coverage for "allow-promisor" in the test suite. Reported-by: Andrew Olsen <andrew.olsen@koordinates.com> Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Sep 19, 2022
Fix a memory leak occuring in case of pathspec copy in preload_index. Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7f0a353ead47 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/11.3.0/libasan.so.6+0xb5d47) #1 0x55750995e840 in do_xmalloc /home/anthony/src/c/git/wrapper.c:51 #2 0x55750995e840 in xmalloc /home/anthony/src/c/git/wrapper.c:72 #3 0x55750970f824 in copy_pathspec /home/anthony/src/c/git/pathspec.c:684 #4 0x557509717278 in preload_index /home/anthony/src/c/git/preload-index.c:135 #5 0x55750975f21e in refresh_index /home/anthony/src/c/git/read-cache.c:1633 #6 0x55750915b926 in cmd_status builtin/commit.c:1547 #7 0x5575090e1680 in run_builtin /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:466 #8 0x5575090e1680 in handle_builtin /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:720 #9 0x5575090e284a in run_argv /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:787 #10 0x5575090e284a in cmd_main /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:920 #11 0x5575090dbf82 in main /home/anthony/src/c/git/common-main.c:56 #12 0x7f0a348230ab (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x290ab) Signed-off-by: Anthony Delannoy <anthony.2lannoy@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Oct 24, 2022
In the tmp-objdir api, tmp_objdir_create will create a temporary directory but also register signal handlers responsible for removing the directory's contents and the directory itself. However, the function responsible for recursively removing the contents and directory, remove_dir_recurse() calls opendir(3) and closedir(3). This can be problematic because these functions allocate and free memory, which are not async-signal-safe functions. This can lead to deadlocks. One place we call tmp_objdir_create() is in git-receive-pack, where we create a temporary quarantine directory "incoming". Incoming objects will be written to this directory before they get moved to the object directory. We have observed this code leading to a deadlock: Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f621ba0b200 (LWP 326305)): #0 __lll_lock_wait_private (futex=futex@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80 <main_arena>) at ./lowlevellock.c:35 #1 0x00007f621baa635b in __GI___libc_malloc (bytes=bytes@entry=32816) at malloc.c:3064 #2 0x00007f621bae9f49 in __alloc_dir (statp=0x7fff2ea7ed60, flags=0, close_fd=true, fd=5) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:118 #3 opendir_tail (fd=5) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:69 #4 __opendir (name=<optimized out>) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:92 #5 0x0000557c19c77de1 in remove_dir_recurse () git#6 0x0000557c19d81a4f in remove_tmp_objdir_on_signal () #7 <signal handler called> git#8 _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80 <main_arena>, bytes=bytes@entry=7160) at malloc.c:4116 git#9 0x00007f621baa62c9 in __GI___libc_malloc (bytes=7160) at malloc.c:3066 git#10 0x00007f621bd1e987 in inflateInit2_ () from /opt/gitlab/embedded/lib/libz.so.1 git#11 0x0000557c19dbe5f4 in git_inflate_init () git#12 0x0000557c19cee02a in unpack_compressed_entry () git#13 0x0000557c19cf08cb in unpack_entry () git#14 0x0000557c19cf0f32 in packed_object_info () git#15 0x0000557c19cd68cd in do_oid_object_info_extended () git#16 0x0000557c19cd6e2b in read_object_file_extended () git#17 0x0000557c19cdec2f in parse_object () git#18 0x0000557c19c34977 in lookup_commit_reference_gently () git#19 0x0000557c19d69309 in mark_uninteresting () git#20 0x0000557c19d2d180 in do_for_each_repo_ref_iterator () git#21 0x0000557c19d21678 in for_each_ref () git#22 0x0000557c19d6a94f in assign_shallow_commits_to_refs () git#23 0x0000557c19bc02b2 in cmd_receive_pack () git#24 0x0000557c19b29fdd in handle_builtin () git#25 0x0000557c19b2a526 in cmd_main () git#26 0x0000557c19b28ea2 in main () Since we can't do the cleanup in a portable and signal-safe way, skip the cleanup when we're handling a signal. This means that when signal handling, the temporary directory may not get cleaned up properly. This is mitigated by b3cecf4 (tmp-objdir: new API for creating temporary writable databases, 2021-12-06) which changed the default name and allows gc to clean up these temporary directories. In the event of a normal exit, we should still be cleaning up via the atexit() handler. Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: John Cai <johncai86@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Jan 17, 2023
There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`, where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue: blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git check-attr --all file AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0) ==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x7f94f1f8f082 (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) #1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752 #2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375 #3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f94f1e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info. SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082) ==8451==ABORTING Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Jan 17, 2023
It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes: blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin) git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes git attr-check --all file ================================================================= ==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0) #0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 #1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769 #5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797 #6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867 #7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902 #8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097 #9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128 #10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67 #11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183 #12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926 #16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7fd3ef82228f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) ==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc ==1022==ABORTING Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array: perl -e ' print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x2000000000; print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n" ' >.gitattributes git add .gitattributes git commit -am "evil attributes" $ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo ================================================================= ==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58 WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0 #0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393 #1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 #22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39) 0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154 #1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150 #2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384 #3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660 #4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784 #5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747 #6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800 #7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882 #8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917 #9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112 #10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126 #11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311 #12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553 #13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42 #14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480 #15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040 #16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724 #17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384 #18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466 #19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721 #20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788 #21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926 #22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57 #23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa 0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03 =>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Shadow gap: cc ==15062==ABORTING Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of memory before already. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1) we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P): ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588 WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0 #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762 #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327 #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761 #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57 #19 0x7f2127c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa] 0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==8340==ABORTING The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the `export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an archive of user supplied Git repositories. Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is compiled with the address sanitizer. Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com> Modified-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttalorr.com> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds read. Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with `SANITIZE=address`: ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10 READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0 #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712 #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences. Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start. Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %< and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL` pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check doesn't do anything anymore. The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute. ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78 READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0 #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417 #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439 #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39 #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40 #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173 #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456 #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850 #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269 #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348 #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882 #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788 #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57 #14 0x7f0355e3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01 0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==10888==ABORTING Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte. Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message. Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Jan 17, 2023
The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is `int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type `size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we will overflow and thus return a negative result. This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B` and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long: ================================================================= ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8 WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0 #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763 #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801 #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429 #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349) #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115 0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85 #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136 #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99 #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298 #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418 #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869 #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161 #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781 #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117 #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508 #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549 #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883 #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466 #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721 #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788 #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923 #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57 #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa 0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd 0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa 0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa 0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==26009==ABORTING Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die in case we see an overflow. Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash. Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Sep 27, 2023
When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7 (push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free. In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583: fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a failure at t5583.8: ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140 #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42 #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917 #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518 #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665 #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378 #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401 #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458 #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702 #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452 #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706 #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770 #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905 #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60 #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453) SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583 leak-free. But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20). At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly. Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Acked-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee
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Apr 4, 2024
It is tempting to think of "files and directories" of the current directory as valid inputs to the add and set subcommands of git sparse-checkout. However, in non-cone mode, they often aren't and using them as potential completions leads to *many* forms of confusion: Issue #1. It provides the *wrong* files and directories. For git sparse-checkout add we always want to add files and directories not currently in our sparse checkout, which means we want file and directories not currently present in the current working tree. Providing the files and directories currently present is thus always wrong. For git sparse-checkout set we have a similar problem except in the subset of cases where we are trying to narrow our checkout to a strict subset of what we already have. That is not a very common scenario, especially since it often does not even happen to be true for the first use of the command; for years we required users to create a sparse-checkout via git sparse-checkout init git sparse-checkout set <args...> (or use a clone option that did the init step for you at clone time). The init command creates a minimal sparse-checkout with just the top-level directory present, meaning the set command has to be used to expand the checkout. Thus, only in a special and perhaps unusual cases would any of the suggestions from normal file and directory completion be appropriate. Issue #2: Suggesting patterns that lead to warnings is unfriendly. If the user specifies any regular file and omits the leading '/', then the sparse-checkout command will warn the user that their command is problematic and suggest they use a leading slash instead. Issue #3: Completion gets confused by leading '/', and provides wrong paths. Users often want to anchor their patterns to the toplevel of the repository, especially when listing individual files. There are a number of reasons for this, but notably even sparse-checkout encourages them to do so (as noted above). However, if users do so (via adding a leading '/' to their pattern), then bash completion will interpret the leading slash not as a request for a path at the toplevel of the repository, but as a request for a path at the root of the filesytem. That means at best that completion cannot help with such paths, and if it does find any completions, they are almost guaranteed to be wrong. Issue #4: Suggesting invalid patterns from subdirectories is unfriendly. There is no per-directory equivalent to .gitignore with sparse-checkouts. There is only a single worktree-global $GIT_DIR/info/sparse-checkout file. As such, paths to files must be specified relative to the toplevel of a repository. Providing suggestions of paths that are relative to the current working directory, as bash completion defaults to, is wrong when the current working directory is not the worktree toplevel directory. Issue #5: Paths with special characters will be interpreted incorrectly The entries in the sparse-checkout file are patterns, not paths. While most paths also qualify as patterns (though even in such cases it would be better for users to not use them directly but prefix them with a leading '/'), there are a variety of special characters that would need special escaping beyond the normal shell escaping: '*', '?', '\', '[', ']', and any leading '#' or '!'. If completion suggests any such paths, users will likely expect them to be treated as an exact path rather than as a pattern that might match some number of files other than 1. However, despite the first four issues, we can note that _if_ users are using tab completion, then they are probably trying to specify a path in the index. As such, we transform their argument into a top-level-rooted pattern that matches such a file. For example, if they type: git sparse-checkout add Make<TAB> we could "complete" to git sparse-checkout add /Makefile or, if they ran from the Documentation/technical/ subdirectory: git sparse-checkout add m<TAB> we could "complete" it to: git sparse-checkout add /Documentation/technical/multi-pack-index.txt Note in both cases I use "complete" in quotes, because we actually add characters both before and after the argument in question, so we are kind of abusing "bash completions" to be "bash completions AND beginnings". The fifth issue is a bit stickier, especially when you consider that we not only need to deal with escaping issues because of special meanings of patterns in sparse-checkout & gitignore files, but also that we need to consider escaping issues due to ls-files needing to sometimes quote or escape characters, and because the shell needs to escape some characters. The multiple interacting forms of escaping could get ugly; this patch makes no attempt to do so and simply documents that we decided to not deal with those corner cases for now but at least get the common cases right. Signed-off-by: Elijah Newren <newren@gmail.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Apr 4, 2024
The t5309 script triggers a racy false positive with SANITIZE=leak on a multi-core system. Running with "--stress --run=6" usually fails within 10 seconds or so for me, complaining with something like: + git index-pack --fix-thin --stdin fatal: REF_DELTA at offset 46 already resolved (duplicate base 01d7713666f4de822776c7622c10f1b07de280dc?) ================================================================= ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from: #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98 #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180 #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150 #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598 #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51 #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440 #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444 #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81 SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s). Aborted What happens is this: 0. We construct a bogus pack with a duplicate object in it and trigger index-pack. 1. We spawn a bunch of worker threads to resolve deltas (on my system it is 16 threads). 2. One of the threads sees the duplicate object and bails by calling exit(), taking down all of the threads. This is expected and is the point of the test. 3. At the time exit() is called, we may still be spawning threads from the main process via pthread_create(). LSan hooks thread creation to update its book-keeping; it has to know where each thread's stack is (so it can find entry points for reachable memory). So it calls pthread_getattr_np() to get information about the new thread. That may allocate memory that must be freed with a matching call to pthread_attr_destroy(). Probably LSan does that immediately, but if you're unlucky enough, the exit() will happen while it's between those two calls, and the allocated pthread_attr_t appears as a leak. This isn't a real leak. It's not even in our code, but rather in the LSan instrumentation code. So we could just ignore it. But the false positive can cause people to waste time tracking it down. It's possibly something that LSan could protect against (e.g., cover the getattr/destroy pair with a mutex, and then in the final post-exit() check for leaks try to take the same mutex). But I don't know enough about LSan to say if that's a reasonable approach or not (or if my analysis is even completely correct). In the meantime, it's pretty easy to avoid the race by making creation of the worker threads "atomic". That is, we'll spawn all of them before letting any of them start to work. That's easy to do because we already have a work_lock() mutex for handing out that work. If the main process takes it, then all of the threads will immediately block until we've finished spawning and released it. This shouldn't make any practical difference for non-LSan runs. The thread spawning is quick, and could happen before any worker thread gets scheduled anyway. Probably other spots that use threads are subject to the same issues. But since we have to manually insert locking (and since this really is kind of a hack), let's not bother with them unless somebody experiences a similar racy false-positive in practice. Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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When performing multi-pack reuse, reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap() is responsible for generating an array of bitmapped_pack structs from which to perform reuse. In the multi-pack case, we loop over the MIDXs packs and copy the result of calling `nth_bitmapped_pack()` to construct the list of reusable paths. But we may also want to do pack-reuse over a single pack, either because we only had one pack to perform reuse over (in the case of single-pack bitmaps), or because we explicitly asked to do single pack reuse even with a MIDX[^1]. When this is the case, the array we generate of reusable packs contains only a single element, which is either (a) the pack attached to the single-pack bitmap, or (b) the MIDX's preferred pack. In 795006f (pack-bitmap: gracefully handle missing BTMP chunks, 2024-04-15), we refactored the reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap() function and stopped assigning the pack_int_id field when reusing only the MIDX's preferred pack. This results in an uninitialized read down in try_partial_reuse() like so: ==7474==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x55c5cd191dde in try_partial_reuse pack-bitmap.c:1887:8 #1 0x55c5cd191dde in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap_1 pack-bitmap.c:2001:8 #2 0x55c5cd191dde in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap pack-bitmap.c:2105:3 #3 0x55c5cce0bd0e in get_object_list_from_bitmap builtin/pack-objects.c:4043:3 #4 0x55c5cce0bd0e in get_object_list builtin/pack-objects.c:4156:27 #5 0x55c5cce0bd0e in cmd_pack_objects builtin/pack-objects.c:4596:3 #6 0x55c5ccc8fac8 in run_builtin git.c:474:11 which happens when try_partial_reuse() tries to call midx_pair_to_pack_pos() when it tries to reject cross-pack deltas. Avoid the uninitialized read by ensuring that the pack_int_id field is set in the single-pack reuse case by setting it to either the MIDX preferred pack's pack_int_id, or '-1', in the case of single-pack bitmaps. In the latter case, we never read the pack_int_id field, so the choice of '-1' is intentional as a "garbage in, garbage out" measure. Guard against further regressions in this area by adding a test which ensures that we do not throw out deltas from the preferred pack as "cross-pack" due to an uninitialized pack_int_id. [^1]: This can happen for a couple of reasons, either because the repository is configured with 'pack.allowPackReuse=(true|single)', or because the MIDX was generated prior to the introduction of the BTMP chunk, which contains information necessary to perform multi-pack reuse. Reported-by: Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com> Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Memory sanitizer (msan) is detecting a use of an uninitialized variable (`size`) in `read_attr_from_index`: ==2268==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value #0 0x5651f3416504 in read_attr_from_index git/attr.c:868:11 #1 0x5651f3415530 in read_attr git/attr.c #2 0x5651f3413d74 in bootstrap_attr_stack git/attr.c:968:6 #3 0x5651f3413d74 in prepare_attr_stack git/attr.c:1004:2 #4 0x5651f3413d74 in collect_some_attrs git/attr.c:1199:2 #5 0x5651f3413144 in git_check_attr git/attr.c:1345:2 #6 0x5651f34728da in convert_attrs git/convert.c:1320:2 #7 0x5651f3473425 in would_convert_to_git_filter_fd git/convert.c:1373:2 #8 0x5651f357a35e in index_fd git/object-file.c:2630:34 #9 0x5651f357aa15 in index_path git/object-file.c:2657:7 #10 0x5651f35db9d9 in add_to_index git/read-cache.c:766:7 #11 0x5651f35dc170 in add_file_to_index git/read-cache.c:799:9 #12 0x5651f321f9b2 in add_files git/builtin/add.c:346:7 #13 0x5651f321f9b2 in cmd_add git/builtin/add.c:565:18 #14 0x5651f321d327 in run_builtin git/git.c:474:11 #15 0x5651f321bc9e in handle_builtin git/git.c:729:3 #16 0x5651f321a792 in run_argv git/git.c:793:4 #17 0x5651f321a792 in cmd_main git/git.c:928:19 #18 0x5651f33dde1f in main git/common-main.c:62:11 The issue exists because `size` is an output parameter from `read_blob_data_from_index`, but it's only modified if `read_blob_data_from_index` returns non-NULL. The read of `size` when calling `read_attr_from_buf` unconditionally may read from an uninitialized value. `read_attr_from_buf` checks that `buf` is non-NULL before reading from `size`, but by then it's already too late: the uninitialized read will have happened already. Furthermore, there's no guarantee that the compiler won't reorder things so that it checks `size` before checking `!buf`. Make the call to `read_attr_from_buf` conditional on `buf` being non-NULL, ensuring that `size` is not read if it's never set. Signed-off-by: Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Sep 5, 2024
It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads. Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator. The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory, which of course segfaults. One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack traces like the following one: + git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL ================================================================= ==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0) ==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access. #0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29 #1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170 #2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194 #3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398 #4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240 #5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355 #6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339 #7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69 #8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123 #9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172 #10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175 #11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464 #12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13 #13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452 #14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623 #15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659 #16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133 #17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432 #18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484 #19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741 #20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805 #21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000 #22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64 #23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58 #24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360 #25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27) While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't. The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore. Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted. Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net> Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im> Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
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Oct 9, 2024
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the failing process and discovered the following stacktrace: ``` #0 0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125 #1 0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247 #2 0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122 #3 0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638 #4 0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255 #5 0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570) at sparse-index.c:307 #6 0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46 #7 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #8 0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0, fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80 #9 0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422 #10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456 #11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0, search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556 #12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566 #13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756 #14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860 #15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063 #16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548 #17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808 #18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877 #19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017 #20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 ``` The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from `hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault. The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in `t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
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