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Multi-pack-index (MIDX) #7

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Multi-pack-index (MIDX) #7

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derrickstolee
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This patch series includes a rewrite of the previous
multi-pack-index RFC [1] using the feedback from the
commit-graph feature.

I based this series on 'next' as it requires the
recent object-store patches.

The multi-pack-index (MIDX) is explained fully in
the design document 'Documentation/technical/midx.txt'.
The short description is that the MIDX stores the
information from all of the IDX files in a pack
directory. The crucial design decision is that the
IDX files still exist, so we can fall back to the IDX
files if there is any issue with the MIDX (or core.midx
is set to false, or a user downgrades Git, etc.)

The MIDX feature has been part of our GVFS releases
for a few months (since the RFC). It has behaved well,
indexing over 31 million commits and trees across up
to 250 packfiles. These MIDX files are nearly 1GB in
size and take ~20 seconds to rewrite when adding new
IDX information. This ~20s mark is something I'd like
to improve, and I mention how to make the file
incremental (similar to split-index) in the design
document. I also want to make the commit-graph file
incremental, so I'd like to do that at the same time
after both the MIDX and commit-graph are stable.

Lookup Speedups

When looking for an object, Git uses an most-recently-
used (MRU) cache of packfiles. This does pretty well to
minimize the number of misses when searching through
packfiles for an object, especially if there is one
"big" packfile that contains most of the objets (so it
will rarely miss and is usually one of the first two
packfiles in the list). The MIDX does provide a way
to remove these misses, improving lookup time. However,
this lookup time greatly depends on the arrangement of
the packfiles.

For instance, if you take the Linux repository and repack
using git repack -adfF --max-pack-size=128m then all
commits will be in one packfile, all trees will be in
a small set of packfiles and organized well so 'git
rev-list --objects HEAD^{tree}' only inspects one or two
packfiles.

GVFS has the notion of a "prefetch packfile". These are
packfiles that are precomputed by cache servers to
contain the commits and trees introduced to the remote
each day. GVFS downloads these packfiles and places them
in an alternate. Since these are organized by "first
time introduced" and the working directory is so large,
the MRU misses are significant when performing a checkout
and updating the .git/index file.

To test the performance in this situation, I created a
script that organizes the Linux repository in a similar
fashion. I split the commit history into 50 parts by
creating branches on every 10,000 commits of the first-
parent history. Then, git rev-list --objects A ^B
provides the list of objects reachable from A but not B,
so I could send that to git pack-objects to create
these "time-based" packfiles. With these 50 packfiles
(deleting the old one from my fresh clone, and deleting
all tags as they were no longer on-disk) I could then
test 'git rev-list --objects HEAD^{tree}' and see:

    Before: 0.17s
    After:  0.13s
    % Diff: -23.5%

By adding logic to count hits and misses to bsearch_pack,
I was able to see that the command above calls that
method 266,930 times with a hit rate of 33%. The MIDX
has the same number of calls with a 100% hit rate.

Abbreviation Speedups

To fully disambiguate an abbreviation, we must iterate
through all packfiles to ensure no collision exists in
any packfile. This requires O(P log N) time. With the
MIDX, this is only O(log N) time. Our standard test [2]
is 'git log --oneline --parents --raw' because it writes
many abbreviations while also doing a lot of other work
(walking commits and trees to compute the raw diff).

For a copy of the Linux repository with 50 packfiles
split by time, we observed the following:

    Before: 100.5 s
    After:   58.2 s
    % Diff: -59.7%

Request for Review Attention

I tried my best to take the feedback from the commit-graph
feature and apply it to this feature. I also worked to
follow the object-store refactoring as I could. I also have
some local commits that create a 'verify' subcommand and
integrate with 'fsck' similar to the commit-graph, but I'll
leave those for a later series (and review is still underway
for that part of the commit-graph).

One place where I could use some guidance is related to the
current state of 'the_hash_algo' patches. The file format
allows a different "hash version" which then indicates the
length of the hash. What's the best way to ensure this
feature doesn't cause extra pain in the hash-agnostic series?
This will inform how I go back and make the commit-graph
feature better in this area, too.

Thanks,
-Stolee

[1] https://public-inbox.org/git/20180107181459.222909-1-dstolee@microsoft.com/T/#u
Previous MIDX RFC.

[2] https://public-inbox.org/git/20171012120220.226427-1-dstolee@microsoft.com/
A patch series on abbreviation speedups

@derrickstolee derrickstolee force-pushed the midx/upstream branch 9 times, most recently from dbf0f40 to 5e97b74 Compare June 26, 2018 13:03
@derrickstolee derrickstolee force-pushed the midx/upstream branch 4 times, most recently from d6de454 to 8c3cb94 Compare July 12, 2018 14:58
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The multi-pack-index feature generalizes the existing pack-index
feature by indexing objects across multiple pack-files.

Describe the basic file format, using a 12-byte header followed by
a lookup table for a list of "chunks" which will be described later.
The file ends with a footer containing a checksum using the hash
algorithm.

The header allows later versions to create breaking changes by
advancing the version number. We can also change the hash algorithm
using a different version value.

We will add the individual chunk format information as we introduce
the code that writes that information.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
This new 'git multi-pack-index' builtin will be the plumbing access
for writing, reading, and checking multi-pack-index files. The
initial implementation is a no-op.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
In anticipation of writing multi-pack-indexes, add a skeleton
'git multi-pack-index write' subcommand and send the options to a
write_midx_file() method. Also create a skeleton test script that
tests the 'write' subcommand.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
As we begin writing the multi-pack-index format to disk, start with
the basics: the 12-byte header and the 20-byte checksum footer. Start
with these basics so we can add the rest of the format in small
increments.

As we implement the format, we will use a technique to check that our
computed offsets within the multi-pack-index file match what we are
actually writing. Each method that writes to the hashfile will return
the number of bytes written, and we will track that those values match
our expectations.

Currently, write_midx_header() returns 12, but is not checked. We will
check the return value in a later commit.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Create a new multi_pack_index struct for loading multi-pack-indexes into
memory. Create a test-tool builtin for reading basic information about
that multi-pack-index to verify the correct data is written.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
As we build the multi-pack-index file format, we want to test the format
on real repositories. Add tests that create repository data including
multiple packfiles with both version 1 and version 2 formats.

The current 'git multi-pack-index write' command will always write the
same file with no "real" data. This will be expanded in future commits,
along with the test expectations.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
In anticipation of sharing the pack directory listing with the
multi-pack-index, generalize prepare_packed_git_one() into
for_each_file_in_pack_dir().

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
When constructing a multi-pack-index file for a given object directory,
read the files within the enclosed pack directory and find matches that
end with ".idx" and find the correct paired packfile using
add_packed_git().

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The multi-pack-index needs to track which packfiles it indexes. Store
these in our first required chunk. Since filenames are not well
structured, add padding to keep good alignment in later chunks.

Modify the 'git multi-pack-index read' subcommand to output the
existence of the pack-file name chunk. Modify t5319-multi-pack-index.sh
to reflect this new output and the new expected number of chunks.

Defense in depth: A pattern we are using in the multi-pack-index feature
is to verify the data as we write it. We want to ensure we never write
invalid data to the multi-pack-index. There are many checks that verify
that the values we are writing fit the format definitions. This mainly
helps developers while working on the feature, but it can also identify
issues that only appear when dealing with very large data sets. These
large sets are hard to encode into test cases.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Before writing a list of objects and their offsets to a multi-pack-index,
we need to collect the list of objects contained in the packfiles. There
may be multiple copies of some objects, so this list must be deduplicated.

It is possible to artificially get into a state where there are many
duplicate copies of objects. That can create high memory pressure if we
are to create a list of all objects before de-duplication. To reduce
this memory pressure without a significant performance drop,
automatically group objects by the first byte of their object id. Use
the IDX fanout tables to group the data, copy to a local array, then
sort.

Copy only the de-duplicated entries. Select the duplicate based on the
most-recent modified time of a packfile containing the object.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The final pair of chunks for the multi-pack-index file stores the object
offsets. We default to using 32-bit offsets as in the pack-index version
1 format, but if there exists an offset larger than 32-bits, we use a
trick similar to the pack-index version 2 format by storing all offsets
at least 2^31 in a 64-bit table; we use the 32-bit table to point into
that 64-bit table as necessary.

We only store these 64-bit offsets if necessary, so create a test that
manipulates a version 2 pack-index to fake a large offset. This allows
us to test that the large offset table is created, but the data does not
match the actual packfile offsets. The multi-pack-index offset does match
the (corrupted) pack-index offset, so a future feature will compare these
offsets during a 'verify' step.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
The core.multiPackIndex config setting controls the multi-pack-
index (MIDX) feature. If false, the setting will disable all reads
from the multi-pack-index file.

Read this config setting in the new prepare_multi_pack_index_one()
which is called during prepare_packed_git(). This check is run once
per repository.

Add comparison commands in t5319-multi-pack-index.sh to check
typical Git behavior remains the same as the config setting is turned
on and off. This currently includes 'git rev-list' and 'git log'
commands to trigger several object database reads. Currently, these
would only catch an error in the prepare_multi_pack_index_one(), but
with later commits will catch errors in object lookups, abbreviations,
and approximate object counts.

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>

midx: prepare midxed_git struct

Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
repo_diff_setup() calls through to diff.c's static prep_parse_options(),
which in  turn allocates a new array into diff_opts.parseopts.
diff_setup_done() is responsible for freeing that array, and has the
benefit of verifying diff_opts too - hence we add a call to
diff_setup_done() to avoid leaking parseopts.

Output from the leak as found while running t0090 with LSAN:

Direct leak of 7120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3
    #1 0xa8bf89 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8
    #2 0x7a7bae in prep_parse_options diff.c:5636:2
    #3 0x7a7bae in repo_diff_setup diff.c:4611:2
    #4 0x93716c in repo_index_has_changes read-cache.c:2518:3
    #5 0x872233 in unclean merge-ort-wrappers.c:12:14
    #6 0x872233 in merge_ort_recursive merge-ort-wrappers.c:53:6
    #7 0x5d5b11 in try_merge_strategy builtin/merge.c:752:12
    #8 0x5d0b6b in cmd_merge builtin/merge.c:1666:9
    #9 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #10 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #11 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #12 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #13 0x6bdc2d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #14 0x7f551eb51349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 7120 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s)

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
apply_multi_file_filter and async_query_available_blobs both query
subprocess output using subprocess_read_status, which writes data into
the identically named filter_status strbuf. We add a strbuf_release to
avoid leaking their contents.

Leak output seen when running t0021 with LSAN:

Direct leak of 24 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa8c2b5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0x9ff99d in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0x9ff99d in strbuf_addbuf strbuf.c:304:2
    #4 0xa101d6 in subprocess_read_status sub-process.c:45:5
    #5 0x77793c in apply_multi_file_filter convert.c:886:8
    #6 0x77793c in apply_filter convert.c:1042:10
    #7 0x77a0b5 in convert_to_git_filter_fd convert.c:1492:7
    #8 0x8b48cd in index_stream_convert_blob object-file.c:2156:2
    #9 0x8b48cd in index_fd object-file.c:2248:9
    #10 0x597411 in hash_fd builtin/hash-object.c:43:9
    #11 0x596be1 in hash_object builtin/hash-object.c:59:2
    #12 0x596be1 in cmd_hash_object builtin/hash-object.c:153:3
    #13 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #14 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #15 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #16 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #17 0x6bdc2d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #18 0x7f42acf79349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 24 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

Direct leak of 120 byte(s) in 5 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa8c295 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0x9ff97d in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0x9ff97d in strbuf_addbuf strbuf.c:304:2
    #4 0xa101b6 in subprocess_read_status sub-process.c:45:5
    #5 0x775c73 in async_query_available_blobs convert.c:960:8
    #6 0x80029d in finish_delayed_checkout entry.c:183:9
    #7 0xa65d1e in check_updates unpack-trees.c:493:10
    #8 0xa5f469 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:1747:8
    #9 0x525971 in checkout builtin/clone.c:815:6
    #10 0x525971 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1409:8
    #11 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #12 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #13 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #14 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #15 0x6bdc2d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #16 0x7fa253fce349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 120 byte(s) leaked in 5 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
These leaks all happen at the end of cmd_mv, hence don't matter in any
way. But we still fix the easy ones and squash the rest to get us closer
to being able to run tests without leaks.

LSAN output from t0050:

Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa8c015 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0xa0a7e1 in add_entry string-list.c:44:2
    #3 0xa0a7e1 in string_list_insert string-list.c:58:14
    #4 0x5dac03 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:248:4
    #5 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #6 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #7 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #8 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #9 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #10 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3
    #1 0xa8bd09 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8
    #2 0x5dbc34 in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:32:2
    #3 0x5da575 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:158:14
    #4 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #5 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #6 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #7 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #8 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #9 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49a82d in malloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:145:3
    #1 0xa8bd09 in do_xmalloc wrapper.c:41:8
    #2 0x5dbc34 in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:32:2
    #3 0x5da4e4 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:148:11
    #4 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #5 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #6 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #7 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #8 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #9 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49a9a2 in calloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3
    #1 0xa8c119 in xcalloc wrapper.c:140:8
    #2 0x5da585 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:159:22
    #3 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #4 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #5 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #6 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #7 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #8 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49a9a2 in calloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154:3
    #1 0xa8c119 in xcalloc wrapper.c:140:8
    #2 0x5da4f8 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:149:10
    #3 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #4 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #5 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #6 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #7 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #8 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Indirect leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa8c015 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0xa00226 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0xa00226 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:394:3
    #4 0xa065c7 in xstrvfmt strbuf.c:981:2
    #5 0xa065c7 in xstrfmt strbuf.c:991:8
    #6 0x9e7ce7 in prefix_path_gently setup.c:115:15
    #7 0x9e7fa6 in prefix_path setup.c:128:12
    #8 0x5dbdbf in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:55:23
    #9 0x5da575 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:158:14
    #10 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #11 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #14 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #15 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Indirect leak of 65 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa8c015 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0xa00226 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0xa00226 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:394:3
    #4 0xa065c7 in xstrvfmt strbuf.c:981:2
    #5 0xa065c7 in xstrfmt strbuf.c:991:8
    #6 0x9e7ce7 in prefix_path_gently setup.c:115:15
    #7 0x9e7fa6 in prefix_path setup.c:128:12
    #8 0x5dbdbf in internal_prefix_pathspec builtin/mv.c:55:23
    #9 0x5da4e4 in cmd_mv builtin/mv.c:148:11
    #10 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #11 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #12 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #13 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #14 0x6bd9ad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #15 0x7fbfeffc4349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 558 byte(s) leaked in 7 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
merge_name() calls dwim_ref(), which allocates a new string into
found_ref. Therefore add a free() to avoid leaking found_ref.

LSAN output from t0021:

Direct leak of 16 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x486804 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3
    #1 0xa8beb8 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14
    #2 0x954054 in expand_ref refs.c:671:12
    #3 0x953cb6 in repo_dwim_ref refs.c:644:22
    #4 0x5d3759 in dwim_ref refs.h:162:9
    #5 0x5d3759 in merge_name builtin/merge.c:517:6
    #6 0x5d3759 in collect_parents builtin/merge.c:1214:5
    #7 0x5cf60d in cmd_merge builtin/merge.c:1458:16
    #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #12 0x6bdbfd in main common-main.c:52:11
    #13 0x7f0430502349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 16 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
- cmd_rebase populates rebase_options.strategy with newly allocated
  strings, hence we need to free those strings at the end of cmd_rebase
  to avoid a leak.
- In some cases: get_replay_opts() is called, which prepares replay_opts
  using data from rebase_options. We used to simply copy the pointer
  from rebase_options.strategy,  however that would now result in a
  double-free because sequencer_remove_state() is eventually used to
  free replay_opts.strategy. To avoid this we xstrdup() strategy when
  adding it to replay_opts.

The original leak happens because we always populate
rebase_options.strategy, but we don't always enter the path that calls
get_replay_opts() and later sequencer_remove_state() - in  other words
we'd always allocate a new string into rebase_options.strategy but
only sometimes did we free it. We now make sure that rebase_options
and replay_opts both own their own copies of strategy, and each copy
is free'd independently.

This was first seen when running t0021 with LSAN, but t2012 helped catch
the fact that we can't just free(options.strategy) at the end of
cmd_rebase (as that can cause a double-free). LSAN output from t0021:

LSAN output from t0021:

Direct leak of 4 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x486804 in strdup ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:452:3
    #1 0xa71eb8 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14
    #2 0x61b1cc in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1779:22
    #3 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #4 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #5 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #6 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #7 0x6b3fad in main common-main.c:52:11
    #8 0x7f267b512349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 4 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Aug 10, 2021
setup_unpack_trees_porcelain() populates various fields on
unpack_tree_opts, we need to call clear_unpack_trees_porcelain() to
avoid leaking them. Specifically, we used to leak
unpack_tree_opts.msgs_to_free.

We have to do this in leave_reset_head because there are multiple
scenarios where unpack_tree_opts has already been configured, followed
by a 'goto leave_reset_head'. But we can also 'goto leave_reset_head'
prior to having initialised unpack_tree_opts via memset(..., 0, ...).
Therefore we also move unpack_tree_opts initialisation to the start of
reset_head(), and convert it to use brace initialisation - which
guarantees that we can never clear an uninitialised unpack_tree_opts.
clear_unpack_tree_opts() is always safe to call as long as
unpack_tree_opts is at least zero-initialised, i.e. it does not depend
on a previous call to setup_unpack_trees_porcelain().

LSAN output from t0021:

Direct leak of 192 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0x9f7861 in strvec_push_nodup strvec.c:19:2
    #3 0x9f7861 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:39:2
    #4 0xa43e14 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:129:3
    #5 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2
    #6 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9
    #7 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #8 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #9 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #10 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #11 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #12 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Indirect leak of 147 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:401:3
    #4 0x9f7774 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:36:2
    #5 0xa43e14 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:129:3
    #6 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2
    #7 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9
    #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #12 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #13 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Indirect leak of 134 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:401:3
    #4 0x9f7774 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:36:2
    #5 0xa43fe4 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:168:3
    #6 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2
    #7 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9
    #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #12 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #13 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

Indirect leak of 130 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x49ab49 in realloc ../projects/compiler-rt/lib/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:164:3
    #1 0xa721e5 in xrealloc wrapper.c:126:8
    #2 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:98:2
    #3 0x9e8d54 in strbuf_vaddf strbuf.c:401:3
    #4 0x9f7774 in strvec_pushf strvec.c:36:2
    #5 0xa43f20 in setup_unpack_trees_porcelain unpack-trees.c:150:3
    #6 0x97e011 in reset_head reset.c:53:2
    #7 0x61dfa5 in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:1991:9
    #8 0x4ce83e in run_builtin git.c:475:11
    #9 0x4ccafe in handle_builtin git.c:729:3
    #10 0x4cb01c in run_argv git.c:818:4
    #11 0x4cb01c in cmd_main git.c:949:19
    #12 0x6b3f3d in main common-main.c:52:11
    #13 0x7fa8addf3349 in __libc_start_main (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x24349)

SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 603 byte(s) leaked in 4 allocation(s).

Signed-off-by: Andrzej Hunt <andrzej@ahunt.org>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified
to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is
sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path
from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That
triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that
is being verified.  Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this
results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a
sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a
call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe
and Derick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem.

==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080
READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0
    #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863
    #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910
    #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250
    #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87
    #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)
    #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d)

0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127
    #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35
    #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310
    #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588
    #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850
    #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910
    #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250
    #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87
    #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
    #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140
    #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17
    #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763
    #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764
    #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764
    #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779
    #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85
    #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)

Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 7, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified
to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is
sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path
from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That
triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that
is being verified.  Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this
results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a
sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a
call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe
and Derrick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem.

==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080
READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0
    #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863
    #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910
    #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250
    #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87
    #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)
    #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d)

0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127
    #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35
    #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310
    #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588
    #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850
    #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910
    #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250
    #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87
    #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
    #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140
    #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17
    #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763
    #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764
    #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764
    #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779
    #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85
    #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)

Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Derrick Stolee <dstolee@microsoft.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 26, 2021
In a sparse index it is possible for the tree that is being verified
to be freed while it is being verified. This happens when the index is
sparse but the cache tree is not and index_name_pos() looks up a path
from the cache tree that is a descendant of a sparse index entry. That
triggers a call to ensure_full_index() which frees the cache tree that
is being verified.  Carrying on trying to verify the tree after this
results in a use-after-free bug. Instead restart the verification if a
sparse index is converted to a full index. This bug is triggered by a
call to reset_head() in "git rebase --apply". Thanks to René Scharfe
and Derrick Stolee for their help analyzing the problem.

==74345==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free on address 0x606000001b20 at pc 0x557cbe82d3a2 bp 0x7ffdfee08090 sp 0x7ffdfee08080
READ of size 4 at 0x606000001b20 thread T0
    #0 0x557cbe82d3a1 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:863
    #1 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #2 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #3 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #4 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910
    #5 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250
    #6 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87
    #7 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #8 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #10 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #12 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #13 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)
    #14 0x557cbe5bcb8d in _start (/home/phil/src/git/git+0x1b9b8d)

0x606000001b20 is located 0 bytes inside of 56-byte region [0x606000001b20,0x606000001b58)
freed by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fdd4bacff19 in __interceptor_free /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:127
    #1 0x557cbe82af60 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:35
    #2 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #3 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #4 0x557cbe82aee5 in cache_tree_free /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:31
    #5 0x557cbeb2557a in ensure_full_index /home/phil/src/git/sparse-index.c:310
    #6 0x557cbea45c4a in index_name_stage_pos /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:588
    #7 0x557cbe82ce37 in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:850
    #8 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #9 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #10 0x557cbe82ca9d in verify_one /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:840
    #11 0x557cbe830a2b in cache_tree_verify /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:910
    #12 0x557cbea53741 in write_locked_index /home/phil/src/git/read-cache.c:3250
    #13 0x557cbeab7fdd in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:87
    #14 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #15 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #16 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #17 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #18 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #19 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #20 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)

previously allocated by thread T0 here:
    #0 0x7fdd4bad0459 in __interceptor_calloc /build/gcc/src/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
    #1 0x557cbebc1807 in xcalloc /home/phil/src/git/wrapper.c:140
    #2 0x557cbe82b7d8 in cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:17
    #3 0x557cbe82b7d8 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:763
    #4 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764
    #5 0x557cbe82b837 in prime_cache_tree_rec /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:764
    #6 0x557cbe8304e1 in prime_cache_tree /home/phil/src/git/cache-tree.c:779
    #7 0x557cbeab7fa7 in reset_head /home/phil/src/git/reset.c:85
    #8 0x557cbe72147f in cmd_rebase builtin/rebase.c:2074
    #9 0x557cbe5bd151 in run_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:461
    #10 0x557cbe5bd151 in handle_builtin /home/phil/src/git/git.c:714
    #11 0x557cbe5c0503 in run_argv /home/phil/src/git/git.c:781
    #12 0x557cbe5c0503 in cmd_main /home/phil/src/git/git.c:912
    #13 0x557cbe5bad28 in main /home/phil/src/git/common-main.c:52
    #14 0x7fdd4b82eb24 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x27b24)

Signed-off-by: Phillip Wood <phillip.wood@dunelm.org.uk>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 2, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region!

It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger:

```
#0  ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404
#1  0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386
#2  0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244
#3  read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426
#4  0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286
#5  0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, 
    oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850
#6  0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947
#7  repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603
#8  0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650
#9  0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638
#10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800
#11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999
#12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528
#13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785
#14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857
#15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993
#16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52
```

The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 8, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region!

It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger:

```
#0  ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404
#1  0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386
#2  0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244
#3  read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426
#4  0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286
#5  0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, 
    oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850
#6  0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947
#7  repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603
#8  0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650
#9  0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638
#10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800
#11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999
#12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528
#13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785
#14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857
#15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993
#16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52
```

The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 10, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region!

It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger:

```
#0  ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404
#1  0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386
#2  0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244
#3  read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426
#4  0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286
#5  0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, 
    oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850
#6  0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947
#7  repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603
#8  0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650
#9  0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638
#10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800
#11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999
#12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528
#13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785
#14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857
#15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993
#16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52
```

The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee added a commit that referenced this pull request Nov 16, 2021
When I was playing around with trace2 data and creating flamegraphs, I tried a `git fetch` call to see how the `git-remote-https` command would show up. What I didn't expect was an `ensure_full_index()` region!

It turns out that `git fetch` and `git pull` need to check the index for a `.gitmodules` file to see if it should recurse into any submodules. Here is the stack trace from a debugger:

```
#0  ensure_full_index (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at sparse-index.c:404
#1  0x000055555571a979 in do_read_index (istate=istate@entry=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=path@entry=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", must_exist=must_exist@entry=0) at read-cache.c:2386
#2  0x000055555571eb7d in do_read_index (must_exist=0, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>) at hash.h:244
#3  read_index_from (istate=0x555555ac1c80 <the_index>, path=0x555555ad7b90 ".git/index", gitdir=0x555555ad7b30 ".git") at read-cache.c:2426
#4  0x000055555573f4c2 in repo_read_index (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at repository.c:286
#5  0x00005555556f14d0 in get_oid_with_context_1 (repo=repo@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", flags=flags@entry=0, prefix=prefix@entry=0x0, 
    oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00, oc=oc@entry=0x7fffffffda70) at object-name.c:1850
#6  0x00005555556f1f53 in get_oid_with_context (oc=0x7fffffffda70, oid=0x7fffffffdb00, flags=0, str=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>) at object-name.c:1947
#7  repo_get_oid (r=r@entry=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, name=name@entry=0x55555582c022 ":.gitmodules", oid=oid@entry=0x7fffffffdb00) at object-name.c:1603
#8  0x000055555577330f in config_from_gitmodules (fn=fn@entry=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>, repo=0x555555ac1da0 <the_repo>, data=data@entry=0x7fffffffdb60) at submodule-config.c:650
#9  0x000055555577462d in config_from_gitmodules (data=0x7fffffffdb60, repo=<optimized out>, fn=0x555555773460 <gitmodules_fetch_config>) at submodule-config.c:638
#10 fetch_config_from_gitmodules (max_children=<optimized out>, recurse_submodules=<optimized out>) at submodule-config.c:800
#11 0x00005555555b9e41 in cmd_fetch (argc=1, argv=0x7fffffffe090, prefix=0x0) at builtin/fetch.c:1999
#12 0x0000555555573ff6 in run_builtin (argv=<optimized out>, argc=<optimized out>, p=<optimized out>) at git.c:528
#13 handle_builtin (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:785
#14 0x000055555557528c in run_argv (argv=0x7fffffffddf0, argcp=0x7fffffffddfc) at git.c:857
#15 cmd_main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at git.c:993
#16 0x0000555555573ac8 in main (argc=3, argv=0x7fffffffe088) at common-main.c:52
```

The operations these commands use are guarded by items such as `index_name_pos()` and others. Since the `.gitmodules` file is always at root, we would not need to expand, anyway.
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Feb 23, 2022
When trying to write a MIDX, we already prevent the case where there
weren't any packs present, and thus we would have written an empty MIDX.

But there is another "empty" case, which is more interesting, and we
don't yet handle. If we try to write a MIDX which has at least one pack,
but those packs together don't contain any objects, we will encounter a
BUG() when trying to use the bitmap corresponding to that MIDX, like so:

    $ git rev-parse HEAD | git pack-objects --revs --use-bitmap-index --stdout >/dev/null
    BUG: pack-revindex.c:394: pack_pos_to_midx: out-of-bounds object at 0

(note that in the above reproduction, both `--use-bitmap-index` and
`--stdout` are important, since without the former we won't even both to
load the .bitmap, and without the latter we wont attempt pack reuse).

The problem occurs when we try to discover the identity of the
preferred pack to determine which range if any of existing packs we can
reuse verbatim. This path is: `reuse_packfile_objects()` ->
`reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap()` -> `midx_preferred_pack()`.

    #4  0x000055555575401f in pack_pos_to_midx (m=0x555555997160, pos=0) at pack-revindex.c:394
    #5  0x00005555557502c8 in midx_preferred_pack (bitmap_git=0x55555599c280) at pack-bitmap.c:1431
    #6  0x000055555575036c in reuse_partial_packfile_from_bitmap (bitmap_git=0x55555599c280, packfile_out=0x5555559666b0 <reuse_packfile>,
        entries=0x5555559666b8 <reuse_packfile_objects>, reuse_out=0x5555559666c0 <reuse_packfile_bitmap>) at pack-bitmap.c:1452
    #7  0x00005555556041f6 in get_object_list_from_bitmap (revs=0x7fffffffcbf0) at builtin/pack-objects.c:3658
    #8  0x000055555560465c in get_object_list (ac=2, av=0x555555997050) at builtin/pack-objects.c:3765
    #9  0x0000555555605e4e in cmd_pack_objects (argc=0, argv=0x7fffffffe920, prefix=0x0) at builtin/pack-objects.c:4154

Since neither the .bitmap or MIDX stores the identity of the
preferred pack, we infer it by trying to load the first object in
pseudo-pack order, and then asking the MIDX which pack was chosen to
represent that object.

But this fails our bounds check, since there are zero objects in the
MIDX to begin with, which results in the BUG().

We could catch this more carefully in `midx_preferred_pack()`, but
signaling the absence of a preferred pack out to all of its callers is
somewhat awkward.

Instead, let's avoid writing a MIDX .bitmap without any objects
altogether. We catch this case in `write_midx_internal()`, and emit a
warning if the caller indicated they wanted to write a bitmap before
clearing out the relevant flags. If we somehow got to
write_midx_bitmap(), then we will call BUG(), but this should now be an
unreachable path.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Mar 15, 2022
Add "fast_unwind_on_malloc=0" to LSAN_OPTIONS to get more meaningful
stack traces from LSAN. This isn't required under ASAN which will emit
traces such as this one for a leak in "t/t0006-date.sh":

    $ ASAN_OPTIONS=detect_leaks=1 ./t0006-date.sh -vixd
    [...]
    Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x488b94 in strdup (t/helper/test-tool+0x488b94)
        #1 0x9444a4 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14
        #2 0x5995fa in parse_date_format date.c:991:24
        #3 0x4d2056 in show_dates t/helper/test-date.c:39:2
        #4 0x4d174a in cmd__date t/helper/test-date.c:116:3
        #5 0x4cce89 in cmd_main t/helper/test-tool.c:127:11
        #6 0x4cd1e3 in main common-main.c:52:11
        #7 0x7fef3c695e49 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:314:16
        #8 0x422b09 in _start (t/helper/test-tool+0x422b09)

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: 3 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
    Aborted

Whereas LSAN would emit this instead:

    $ ./t0006-date.sh -vixd
    [...]
    Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x4323b8 in malloc (t/helper/test-tool+0x4323b8)
        #1 0x7f2be1d614aa in strdup string/strdup.c:42:15

    SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 3 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
    Aborted

Now we'll instead git this sensible stack trace under
LSAN. I.e. almost the same one (but starting with "malloc", as is
usual for LSAN) as under ASAN:

    Direct leak of 3 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x4323b8 in malloc (t/helper/test-tool+0x4323b8)
        #1 0x7f012af5c4aa in strdup string/strdup.c:42:15
        #2 0x5cb164 in xstrdup wrapper.c:29:14
        #3 0x495ee9 in parse_date_format date.c:991:24
        #4 0x453aac in show_dates t/helper/test-date.c:39:2
        #5 0x453782 in cmd__date t/helper/test-date.c:116:3
        #6 0x451d95 in cmd_main t/helper/test-tool.c:127:11
        #7 0x451f1e in main common-main.c:52:11
        #8 0x7f012aef5e49 in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:314:16
        #9 0x42e0a9 in _start (t/helper/test-tool+0x42e0a9)

    SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 3 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
    Aborted

As the option name suggests this does make things slower, e.g. for
t0001-init.sh we're around 10% slower:

    $ hyperfine -L v 0,1 'LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc={v} make T=t0001-init.sh' -r 3
    Benchmark 1: LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0 make T=t0001-init.sh
      Time (mean ± σ):      2.135 s ±  0.015 s    [User: 1.951 s, System: 0.554 s]
      Range (min … max):    2.122 s …  2.152 s    3 runs

    Benchmark 2: LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=1 make T=t0001-init.sh
      Time (mean ± σ):      1.981 s ±  0.055 s    [User: 1.769 s, System: 0.488 s]
      Range (min … max):    1.941 s …  2.044 s    3 runs

    Summary
      'LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=1 make T=t0001-init.sh' ran
        1.08 ± 0.03 times faster than 'LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0 make T=t0001-init.sh'

I think that's more than worth it to get the more meaningful stack
traces, we can always provide LSAN_OPTIONS=fast_unwind_on_malloc=0 for
one-off "fast" runs.

Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 7, 2022
In the preceding [1] (pack-objects: move revs out of
get_object_list(), 2022-03-22) the "repo_init_revisions()" was moved
to cmd_pack_objects() so that it unconditionally took place for all
invocations of "git pack-objects".

We'd thus start leaking memory, which is easily reproduced in
e.g. git.git by feeding e83c516 (Initial revision of "git", the
information manager from hell, 2005-04-07) to "git pack-objects";

    $ echo e83c516 | ./git pack-objects initial
    [...]
	==19130==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

	Direct leak of 7120 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
	    #0 0x455308 in __interceptor_malloc (/home/avar/g/git/git+0x455308)
	    #1 0x75b399 in do_xmalloc /home/avar/g/git/wrapper.c:41:8
	    #2 0x75b356 in xmalloc /home/avar/g/git/wrapper.c:62:9
	    #3 0x5d7609 in prep_parse_options /home/avar/g/git/diff.c:5647:2
	    #4 0x5d415a in repo_diff_setup /home/avar/g/git/diff.c:4621:2
	    #5 0x6dffbb in repo_init_revisions /home/avar/g/git/revision.c:1853:2
	    #6 0x4f599d in cmd_pack_objects /home/avar/g/git/builtin/pack-objects.c:3980:2
	    #7 0x4592ca in run_builtin /home/avar/g/git/git.c:465:11
	    #8 0x457d81 in handle_builtin /home/avar/g/git/git.c:718:3
	    #9 0x458ca5 in run_argv /home/avar/g/git/git.c:785:4
	    #10 0x457b40 in cmd_main /home/avar/g/git/git.c:916:19
	    #11 0x562259 in main /home/avar/g/git/common-main.c:56:11
	    #12 0x7fce792ac7ec in __libc_start_main csu/../csu/libc-start.c:332:16
	    #13 0x4300f9 in _start (/home/avar/g/git/git+0x4300f9)

	SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 7120 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
	Aborted

Narrowly fixing that commit would have been easy, just add call
repo_init_revisions() right before get_object_list(), which is
effectively what was done before that commit.

But an unstated constraint when setting it up early is that it was
needed for the subsequent [2] (pack-objects: parse --filter directly
into revs.filter, 2022-03-22), i.e. we might have a --filter
command-line option, and need to either have the "struct rev_info"
setup when we encounter that option, or later.

Let's just change the control flow so that we'll instead set up the
"struct rev_info" only when we need it. Doing so leads to a bit more
verbosity, but it's a lot clearer what we're doing and why.

An earlier version of this commit[3] went behind
opt_parse_list_objects_filter()'s back by faking up a "struct option"
before calling it. Let's avoid that and instead create a blessed API
for this pattern.

We could furthermore combine the two get_object_list() invocations
here by having repo_init_revisions() invoked on &pfd.revs, but I think
clearly separating the two makes the flow clearer. Likewise
redundantly but explicitly (i.e. redundant v.s. a "{ 0 }") "0" to
"have_revs" early in cmd_pack_objects().

While we're at it add parentheses around the arguments to the OPT_*
macros in in list-objects-filter-options.h, as we need to change those
lines anyway. It doesn't matter in this case, but is good general
practice.

1. https://lore.kernel.org/git/619b757d98465dbc4995bdc11a5282fbfcbd3daa.1647970119.git.gitgitgadget@gmail.com
2. https://lore.kernel.org/git/97de926904988b89b5663bd4c59c011a1723a8f5.1647970119.git.gitgitgadget@gmail.com
3. https://lore.kernel.org/git/patch-1.1-193534b0f07-20220325T121715Z-avarab@gmail.com/

Signed-off-by: Ævar Arnfjörð Bjarmason <avarab@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 19, 2022
Since commit fcc07e9 (is_promisor_object(): free tree buffer after
parsing, 2021-04-13), we'll always free the buffers attached to a
"struct tree" after searching them for promisor links. But there's an
important case where we don't want to do so: if somebody else is already
using the tree!

This can happen during a "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor" traversal
in a partial clone that is missing one or more trees or blobs. The
backtrace for the free looks like this:

      #1 free_tree_buffer tree.c:147
      #2 add_promisor_object packfile.c:2250
      #3 for_each_object_in_pack packfile.c:2190
      #4 for_each_packed_object packfile.c:2215
      #5 is_promisor_object packfile.c:2272
      #6 finish_object__ma builtin/rev-list.c:245
      #7 finish_object builtin/rev-list.c:261
      #8 show_object builtin/rev-list.c:274
      #9 process_blob list-objects.c:63
      #10 process_tree_contents list-objects.c:145
      #11 process_tree list-objects.c:201
      #12 traverse_trees_and_blobs list-objects.c:344
      [...]

We're in the middle of walking through the entries of a tree object via
process_tree_contents(). We see a blob (or it could even be another tree
entry) that we don't have, so we call is_promisor_object() to check it.
That function loops over all of the objects in the promisor packfile,
including the tree we're currently walking. When we're done with it
there, we free the tree buffer. But as we return to the walk in
process_tree_contents(), it's still holding on to a pointer to that
buffer, via its tree_desc iterator, and it accesses the freed memory.

Even a trivial use of "--missing=allow-promisor" triggers this problem,
as the included test demonstrates (it's just a vanilla --blob:none
clone).

We can detect this case by only freeing the tree buffer if it was
allocated on our behalf. This is a little tricky since that happens
inside parse_object(), and it doesn't tell us whether the object was
already parsed, or whether it allocated the buffer itself. But by
checking for an already-parsed tree beforehand, we can distinguish the
two cases.

That feels a little hacky, and does incur an extra lookup in the
object-hash table. But that cost is fairly minimal compared to actually
loading objects (and since we're iterating the whole pack here, we're
likely to be loading most objects, rather than reusing cached results).

It may also be a good direction for this function in general, as there
are other possible optimizations that rely on doing some analysis before
parsing:

  - we could detect blobs and avoid reading their contents; they can't
    link to other objects, but parse_object() doesn't know that we don't
    care about checking their hashes.

  - we could avoid allocating object structs entirely for most objects
    (since we really only need them in the oidset), which would save
    some memory.

  - promisor commits could use the commit-graph rather than loading the
    object from disk

This commit doesn't do any of those optimizations, but I think it argues
that this direction is reasonable, rather than relying on parse_object()
and trying to teach it to give us more information about whether it
parsed.

The included test fails reliably under SANITIZE=address just when
running "rev-list --missing=allow-promisor". Checking the output isn't
strictly necessary to detect the bug, but it seems like a reasonable
addition given the general lack of coverage for "allow-promisor" in the
test suite.

Reported-by: Andrew Olsen <andrew.olsen@koordinates.com>
Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 19, 2022
Fix a memory leak occuring in case of pathspec copy in preload_index.

Direct leak of 8 byte(s) in 8 object(s) allocated from:
    #0 0x7f0a353ead47 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/gcc/x86_64-pc-linux-gnu/11.3.0/libasan.so.6+0xb5d47)
    #1 0x55750995e840 in do_xmalloc /home/anthony/src/c/git/wrapper.c:51
    #2 0x55750995e840 in xmalloc /home/anthony/src/c/git/wrapper.c:72
    #3 0x55750970f824 in copy_pathspec /home/anthony/src/c/git/pathspec.c:684
    #4 0x557509717278 in preload_index /home/anthony/src/c/git/preload-index.c:135
    #5 0x55750975f21e in refresh_index /home/anthony/src/c/git/read-cache.c:1633
    #6 0x55750915b926 in cmd_status builtin/commit.c:1547
    #7 0x5575090e1680 in run_builtin /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:466
    #8 0x5575090e1680 in handle_builtin /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:720
    #9 0x5575090e284a in run_argv /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:787
    #10 0x5575090e284a in cmd_main /home/anthony/src/c/git/git.c:920
    #11 0x5575090dbf82 in main /home/anthony/src/c/git/common-main.c:56
    #12 0x7f0a348230ab  (/lib64/libc.so.6+0x290ab)

Signed-off-by: Anthony Delannoy <anthony.2lannoy@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 24, 2022
In the tmp-objdir api, tmp_objdir_create will create a temporary
directory but also register signal handlers responsible for removing
the directory's contents and the directory itself. However, the
function responsible for recursively removing the contents and
directory, remove_dir_recurse() calls opendir(3) and closedir(3).
This can be problematic because these functions allocate and free
memory, which are not async-signal-safe functions. This can lead to
deadlocks.

One place we call tmp_objdir_create() is in git-receive-pack, where
we create a temporary quarantine directory "incoming". Incoming
objects will be written to this directory before they get moved to
the object directory.

We have observed this code leading to a deadlock:

	Thread 1 (Thread 0x7f621ba0b200 (LWP 326305)):
	#0  __lll_lock_wait_private (futex=futex@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80
		<main_arena>) at ./lowlevellock.c:35
	#1  0x00007f621baa635b in __GI___libc_malloc
		(bytes=bytes@entry=32816) at malloc.c:3064
	#2  0x00007f621bae9f49 in __alloc_dir (statp=0x7fff2ea7ed60,
		flags=0, close_fd=true, fd=5)
		at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:118
	#3  opendir_tail (fd=5) at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:69
	#4  __opendir (name=<optimized out>)
		at ../sysdeps/posix/opendir.c:92
	#5  0x0000557c19c77de1 in remove_dir_recurse ()
	git#6  0x0000557c19d81a4f in remove_tmp_objdir_on_signal ()
	#7  <signal handler called>
	git#8  _int_malloc (av=av@entry=0x7f621bbf8b80 <main_arena>,
		bytes=bytes@entry=7160) at malloc.c:4116
	git#9  0x00007f621baa62c9 in __GI___libc_malloc (bytes=7160)
		at malloc.c:3066
	git#10 0x00007f621bd1e987 in inflateInit2_ ()
		from /opt/gitlab/embedded/lib/libz.so.1
	git#11 0x0000557c19dbe5f4 in git_inflate_init ()
	git#12 0x0000557c19cee02a in unpack_compressed_entry ()
	git#13 0x0000557c19cf08cb in unpack_entry ()
	git#14 0x0000557c19cf0f32 in packed_object_info ()
	git#15 0x0000557c19cd68cd in do_oid_object_info_extended ()
	git#16 0x0000557c19cd6e2b in read_object_file_extended ()
	git#17 0x0000557c19cdec2f in parse_object ()
	git#18 0x0000557c19c34977 in lookup_commit_reference_gently ()
	git#19 0x0000557c19d69309 in mark_uninteresting ()
	git#20 0x0000557c19d2d180 in do_for_each_repo_ref_iterator ()
	git#21 0x0000557c19d21678 in for_each_ref ()
	git#22 0x0000557c19d6a94f in assign_shallow_commits_to_refs ()
	git#23 0x0000557c19bc02b2 in cmd_receive_pack ()
	git#24 0x0000557c19b29fdd in handle_builtin ()
	git#25 0x0000557c19b2a526 in cmd_main ()
	git#26 0x0000557c19b28ea2 in main ()

Since we can't do the cleanup in a portable and signal-safe way, skip
the cleanup when we're handling a signal.

This means that when signal handling, the temporary directory may not
get cleaned up properly. This is mitigated by b3cecf4 (tmp-objdir: new
API for creating temporary writable databases, 2021-12-06) which changed
the default name and allows gc to clean up these temporary directories.

In the event of a normal exit, we should still be cleaning up via the
atexit() handler.

Helped-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: John Cai <johncai86@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
There is an out-of-bounds read possible when parsing gitattributes that
have an attribute that is 2^31+1 bytes long. This is caused due to an
integer overflow when we assign the result of strlen(3P) to an `int`,
where we use the wrapped-around value in a subsequent call to
memcpy(3P). The following code reproduces the issue:

    blob=$(perl -e 'print "a" x 2147483649 . " attr"' | git hash-object -w --stdin)
    git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes
    git check-attr --all file

    AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
    =================================================================
    ==8451==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7f93efa00800 (pc 0x7f94f1f8f082 bp 0x7ffddb59b3a0 sp 0x7ffddb59ab28 T0)
    ==8451==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
        #0 0x7f94f1f8f082  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082)
        #1 0x7f94f2047d9c in __interceptor_strspn /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:752
        #2 0x560e190f7f26 in parse_attr_line attr.c:375
        #3 0x560e190f9663 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
        #4 0x560e190f9ddd in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769
        #5 0x560e190f9f14 in read_attr attr.c:797
        #6 0x560e190fa24e in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867
        #7 0x560e190fa4a5 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902
        #8 0x560e190fb5dc in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097
        #9 0x560e190fb93f in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128
        #10 0x560e18e6136e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67
        #11 0x560e18e61c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183
        #12 0x560e18e15993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #13 0x560e18e16397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #14 0x560e18e16b2b in run_argv git.c:788
        #15 0x560e18e17991 in cmd_main git.c:926
        #16 0x560e190ae2bd in main common-main.c:57
        #17 0x7f94f1e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #18 0x7f94f1e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #19 0x560e18e110e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    AddressSanitizer can not provide additional info.
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: SEGV (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x176082)
    ==8451==ABORTING

Fix this bug by converting the variable to a `size_t` instead.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
It is possible to trigger an integer overflow when parsing attribute
names when there are more than 2^31 of them for a single pattern. This
can either lead to us dying due to trying to request too many bytes:

     blob=$(perl -e 'print "f" . " a=" x 2147483649' | git hash-object -w --stdin)
     git update-index --add --cacheinfo 100644,$blob,.gitattributes
     git attr-check --all file

    =================================================================
    ==1022==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: requested allocation size 0xfffffff800000032 (0xfffffff800001038 after adjustments for alignment, red zones etc.) exceeds maximum supported size of 0x10000000000 (thread T0)
        #0 0x7fd3efabf411 in __interceptor_calloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77
        #1 0x5563a0a1e3d3 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150
        #2 0x5563a058d005 in parse_attr_line attr.c:384
        #3 0x5563a058e661 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
        #4 0x5563a058eddb in read_attr_from_index attr.c:769
        #5 0x5563a058ef12 in read_attr attr.c:797
        #6 0x5563a058f24c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:867
        #7 0x5563a058f4a3 in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:902
        #8 0x5563a05905da in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1097
        #9 0x5563a059093d in git_all_attrs attr.c:1128
        #10 0x5563a02f636e in check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:67
        #11 0x5563a02f6c12 in cmd_check_attr builtin/check-attr.c:183
        #12 0x5563a02aa993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #13 0x5563a02ab397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #14 0x5563a02abb2b in run_argv git.c:788
        #15 0x5563a02ac991 in cmd_main git.c:926
        #16 0x5563a05432bd in main common-main.c:57
        #17 0x7fd3ef82228f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)

    ==1022==HINT: if you don't care about these errors you may set allocator_may_return_null=1
    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: allocation-size-too-big /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:77 in __interceptor_calloc
    ==1022==ABORTING

Or, much worse, it can lead to an out-of-bounds write because we
underallocate and then memcpy(3P) into an array:

    perl -e '
        print "A " . "\rh="x2000000000;
        print "\rh="x2000000000;
        print "\rh="x294967294 . "\n"
    ' >.gitattributes
    git add .gitattributes
    git commit -am "evil attributes"

    $ git clone --quiet /path/to/repo
    =================================================================
    ==15062==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000002550 at pc 0x5555559884d5 bp 0x7fffffffbc60 sp 0x7fffffffbc58
    WRITE of size 8 at 0x602000002550 thread T0
        #0 0x5555559884d4 in parse_attr_line attr.c:393
        #1 0x5555559884d4 in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
        #2 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784
        #3 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747
        #4 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800
        #5 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882
        #6 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917
        #7 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112
        #8 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126
        #9 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311
        #10 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553
        #11 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42
        #12 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480
        #13 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040
        #14 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724
        #15 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384
        #16 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466
        #17 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #18 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788
        #19 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926
        #20 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57
        #21 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308
        #22 0x555555723f39 in _start (git+0x1cff39)

    0x602000002552 is located 0 bytes to the right of 2-byte region [0x602000002550,0x602000002552) allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7ffff768c037 in __interceptor_calloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:154
        #1 0x555555d7fff7 in xcalloc wrapper.c:150
        #2 0x55555598815f in parse_attr_line attr.c:384
        #3 0x55555598815f in handle_attr_line attr.c:660
        #4 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:784
        #5 0x555555988902 in read_attr_from_index attr.c:747
        #6 0x555555988a1d in read_attr attr.c:800
        #7 0x555555989b0c in bootstrap_attr_stack attr.c:882
        #8 0x555555989b0c in prepare_attr_stack attr.c:917
        #9 0x555555989b0c in collect_some_attrs attr.c:1112
        #10 0x55555598b141 in git_check_attr attr.c:1126
        #11 0x555555a13004 in convert_attrs convert.c:1311
        #12 0x555555a95e04 in checkout_entry_ca entry.c:553
        #13 0x555555d58bf6 in checkout_entry entry.h:42
        #14 0x555555d58bf6 in check_updates unpack-trees.c:480
        #15 0x555555d5eb55 in unpack_trees unpack-trees.c:2040
        #16 0x555555785ab7 in checkout builtin/clone.c:724
        #17 0x555555785ab7 in cmd_clone builtin/clone.c:1384
        #18 0x55555572443c in run_builtin git.c:466
        #19 0x55555572443c in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #20 0x555555727872 in run_argv git.c:788
        #21 0x555555727872 in cmd_main git.c:926
        #22 0x555555721fa0 in main common-main.c:57
        #23 0x7ffff73f1d09 in __libc_start_main ../csu/libc-start.c:308

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow attr.c:393 in parse_attr_line
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c047fff8450: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 00 07 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
      0x0c047fff8460: fa fa 02 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa
      0x0c047fff8470: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa
      0x0c047fff8480: fa fa 07 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02
      0x0c047fff8490: fa fa 00 03 fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 03
    =>0x0c047fff84a0: fa fa 00 01 fa fa 00 02 fa fa[02]fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff84b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff84c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff84d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff84e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff84f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
      Shadow gap:              cc
    ==15062==ABORTING

Fix this bug by using `size_t` instead to count the number of attributes
so that this value cannot reasonably overflow without running out of
memory before already.

Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
When using a padding specifier in the pretty format passed to git-log(1)
we need to calculate the string length in several places. These string
lengths are stored in `int`s though, which means that these can easily
overflow when the input lengths exceeds 2GB. This can ultimately lead to
an out-of-bounds write when these are used in a call to memcpy(3P):

        ==8340==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7f1ec62f97fe at pc 0x7f2127e5f427 bp 0x7ffd3bd63de0 sp 0x7ffd3bd63588
    WRITE of size 1 at 0x7f1ec62f97fe thread T0
        #0 0x7f2127e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
        #1 0x5628e96aa605 in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1762
        #2 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #3 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #4 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #5 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #6 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #7 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #8 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #9 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #10 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #11 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #12 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #13 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #14 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #15 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
        #16 0x7f2127c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #17 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #18 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x7f1ec62f97fe is located 2 bytes to the left of 4831838265-byte region [0x7f1ec62f9800,0x7f1fe62f9839)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f2127ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
        #1 0x5628e98774d4 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
        #2 0x5628e97cb01c in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
        #3 0x5628e97ccd42 in strbuf_addchars strbuf.c:327
        #4 0x5628e96aa55c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1761
        #5 0x5628e96aa7f4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #6 0x5628e97cdb24 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #7 0x5628e96ab060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #8 0x5628e96acd0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #9 0x5628e95a44c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #10 0x5628e95a76ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #11 0x5628e922bed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #12 0x5628e922c35b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #13 0x5628e922f1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #14 0x5628e9106993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #15 0x5628e9107397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #16 0x5628e9107b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #17 0x5628e91088a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #18 0x5628e939d682 in main common-main.c:57
        #19 0x7f2127c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #20 0x7f2127c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #21 0x5628e91020e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0fe458c572a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572d0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0fe458c572e0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    =>0x0fe458c572f0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa[fa]
      0x0fe458c57300: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57310: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57320: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57330: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
      0x0fe458c57340: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==8340==ABORTING

The pretty format can also be used in `git archive` operations via the
`export-subst` attribute. So this is what in our opinion makes this a
critical issue in the context of Git forges which allow to download an
archive of user supplied Git repositories.

Fix this vulnerability by using `size_t` instead of `int` to track the
string lengths. Add tests which detect this vulnerability when Git is
compiled with the address sanitizer.

Reported-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Original-patch-by: Joern Schneeweisz <jschneeweisz@gitlab.com>
Modified-by: Taylor  Blau <me@ttalorr.com>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
With the `%>>(<N>)` pretty formatter, you can ask git-log(1) et al to
steal spaces. To do so we need to look ahead of the next token to see
whether there are spaces there. This loop takes into account ANSI
sequences that end with an `m`, and if it finds any it will skip them
until it finds the first space. While doing so it does not take into
account the buffer's limits though and easily does an out-of-bounds
read.

Add a test that hits this behaviour. While we don't have an easy way to
verify this, the test causes the following failure when run with
`SANITIZE=address`:

    ==37941==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000000baf at pc 0x55ba6f88e0d0 bp 0x7ffc84c50d20 sp 0x7ffc84c50d10
    READ of size 1 at 0x603000000baf thread T0
        #0 0x55ba6f88e0cf in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1712
        #1 0x55ba6f88e7b4 in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #2 0x55ba6f9b1ae4 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #3 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #4 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #5 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #6 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #7 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #8 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #9 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #10 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #11 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #12 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #13 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #14 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
        #15 0x7f2d08c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #16 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #17 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x603000000baf is located 1 bytes to the left of 24-byte region [0x603000000bb0,0x603000000bc8)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f2d08ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
        #1 0x55ba6fa5b494 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
        #2 0x55ba6f9aefdc in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
        #3 0x55ba6f9b0a06 in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
        #4 0x55ba6f9b1a25 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
        #5 0x55ba6f88f020 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #6 0x55ba6f890ccf in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #7 0x55ba6f7884c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #8 0x55ba6f78b6ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #9 0x55ba6f40fed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #10 0x55ba6f41035b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #11 0x55ba6f4131a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #12 0x55ba6f2ea993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #13 0x55ba6f2eb397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #14 0x55ba6f2ebb07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #15 0x55ba6f2ec8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #16 0x55ba6f581682 in main common-main.c:57
        #17 0x7f2d08c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #18 0x7f2d08c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #19 0x55ba6f2e60e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow pretty.c:1712 in format_and_pad_commit
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c067fff8120: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
      0x0c067fff8130: fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8140: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
      0x0c067fff8150: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa fa fa fd fd
      0x0c067fff8160: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
    =>0x0c067fff8170: fd fd fd fa fa[fa]00 00 00 fa fa fa 00 00 00 fa
      0x0c067fff8180: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8190: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff81a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff81b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff81c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb

Luckily enough, this would only cause us to copy the out-of-bounds data
into the formatted commit in case we really had an ANSI sequence
preceding our buffer. So this bug likely has no security consequences.

Fix it regardless by not traversing past the buffer's start.

Reported-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Reported-by: Eric Sesterhenn <eric.sesterhenn@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
An out-of-bounds read can be triggered when parsing an incomplete
padding format string passed via `--pretty=format` or in Git archives
when files are marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.

This bug exists since we have introduced support for truncating output
via the `trunc` keyword a7f01c6 (pretty: support truncating in %>, %<
and %><, 2013-04-19). Before this commit, we used to find the end of the
formatting string by using strchr(3P). This function returns a `NULL`
pointer in case the character in question wasn't found. The subsequent
check whether any character was found thus simply checked the returned
pointer. After the commit we switched to strcspn(3P) though, which only
returns the offset to the first found character or to the trailing NUL
byte. As the end pointer is now computed by adding the offset to the
start pointer it won't be `NULL` anymore, and as a consequence the check
doesn't do anything anymore.

The out-of-bounds data that is being read can in fact end up in the
formatted string. As a consequence, it is possible to leak memory
contents either by calling git-log(1) or via git-archive(1) when any of
the archived files is marked with the `export-subst` gitattribute.

    ==10888==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x602000000398 at pc 0x7f0356047cb2 bp 0x7fff3ffb95d0 sp 0x7fff3ffb8d78
    READ of size 1 at 0x602000000398 thread T0
        #0 0x7f0356047cb1 in __interceptor_strchrnul /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725
        #1 0x563b7cec9a43 in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:417
        #2 0x563b7cda7060 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #3 0x563b7cda8d0f in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #4 0x563b7cca04c8 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #5 0x563b7cca36ba in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #6 0x563b7c927ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #7 0x563b7c92835b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #8 0x563b7c92b1a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
        #14 0x7f0355e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x602000000398 is located 0 bytes to the right of 8-byte region [0x602000000390,0x602000000398)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f0356072faa in __interceptor_strdup /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_interceptors.cpp:439
        #1 0x563b7cf7317c in xstrdup wrapper.c:39
        #2 0x563b7cd9a06a in save_user_format pretty.c:40
        #3 0x563b7cd9b3e5 in get_commit_format pretty.c:173
        #4 0x563b7ce54ea0 in handle_revision_opt revision.c:2456
        #5 0x563b7ce597c9 in setup_revisions revision.c:2850
        #6 0x563b7c9269e0 in cmd_log_init_finish builtin/log.c:269
        #7 0x563b7c927362 in cmd_log_init builtin/log.c:348
        #8 0x563b7c92b193 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:882
        #9 0x563b7c802993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #10 0x563b7c803397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #11 0x563b7c803b07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #12 0x563b7c8048a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #13 0x563b7ca99682 in main common-main.c:57
        #14 0x7f0355e3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #15 0x7f0355e3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #16 0x563b7c7fe0e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:725 in __interceptor_strchrnul
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c047fff8020: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
      0x0c047fff8030: fa fa 00 02 fa fa 06 fa fa fa 05 fa fa fa fd fd
      0x0c047fff8040: fa fa 00 07 fa fa 03 fa fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00
      0x0c047fff8050: fa fa 00 01 fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 01
      0x0c047fff8060: fa fa 00 06 fa fa 00 06 fa fa 05 fa fa fa 05 fa
    =>0x0c047fff8070: fa fa 00[fa]fa fa fd fa fa fa fd fd fa fa fd fd
      0x0c047fff8080: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa 00 fa fa fa fd fa
      0x0c047fff8090: fa fa fd fd fa fa 00 00 fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff80a0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff80b0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c047fff80c0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==10888==ABORTING

Fix this bug by checking whether `end` points at the trailing NUL byte.
Add a test which catches this out-of-bounds read and which demonstrates
that we used to write out-of-bounds data into the formatted message.

Reported-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Original-patch-by: Markus Vervier <markus.vervier@x41-dsec.de>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jan 17, 2023
The return type of both `utf8_strwidth()` and `utf8_strnwidth()` is
`int`, but we operate on string lengths which are typically of type
`size_t`. This means that when the string is longer than `INT_MAX`, we
will overflow and thus return a negative result.

This can lead to an out-of-bounds write with `--pretty=format:%<1)%B`
and a commit message that is 2^31+1 bytes long:

    =================================================================
    ==26009==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x603000001168 at pc 0x7f95c4e5f427 bp 0x7ffd8541c900 sp 0x7ffd8541c0a8
    WRITE of size 2147483649 at 0x603000001168 thread T0
        #0 0x7f95c4e5f426 in __interceptor_memcpy /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827
        #1 0x5612bbb1068c in format_and_pad_commit pretty.c:1763
        #2 0x5612bbb1087a in format_commit_item pretty.c:1801
        #3 0x5612bbc33bab in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:429
        #4 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #5 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #6 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #7 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #8 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #9 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #10 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #11 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #12 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #13 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #14 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #15 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
        #16 0x7f95c4c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)
        #17 0x7f95c4c3c349 in __libc_start_main (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x23349)
        #18 0x5612bb5680e4 in _start ../sysdeps/x86_64/start.S:115

    0x603000001168 is located 0 bytes to the right of 24-byte region [0x603000001150,0x603000001168)
    allocated by thread T0 here:
        #0 0x7f95c4ebe7ea in __interceptor_realloc /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:85
        #1 0x5612bbcdd556 in xrealloc wrapper.c:136
        #2 0x5612bbc310a3 in strbuf_grow strbuf.c:99
        #3 0x5612bbc32acd in strbuf_add strbuf.c:298
        #4 0x5612bbc33aec in strbuf_expand strbuf.c:418
        #5 0x5612bbb110e7 in repo_format_commit_message pretty.c:1869
        #6 0x5612bbb12d96 in pretty_print_commit pretty.c:2161
        #7 0x5612bba0a4d5 in show_log log-tree.c:781
        #8 0x5612bba0d6c7 in log_tree_commit log-tree.c:1117
        #9 0x5612bb691ed5 in cmd_log_walk_no_free builtin/log.c:508
        #10 0x5612bb69235b in cmd_log_walk builtin/log.c:549
        #11 0x5612bb6951a2 in cmd_log builtin/log.c:883
        #12 0x5612bb56c993 in run_builtin git.c:466
        #13 0x5612bb56d397 in handle_builtin git.c:721
        #14 0x5612bb56db07 in run_argv git.c:788
        #15 0x5612bb56e8a7 in cmd_main git.c:923
        #16 0x5612bb803682 in main common-main.c:57
        #17 0x7f95c4c3c28f  (/usr/lib/libc.so.6+0x2328f)

    SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /usr/src/debug/gcc/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_common_interceptors.inc:827 in __interceptor_memcpy
    Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
      0x0c067fff81d0: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa
      0x0c067fff81e0: fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa fd fd
      0x0c067fff81f0: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8200: fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fd fa fa 00 00 00 fa
      0x0c067fff8210: fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa fd fd
    =>0x0c067fff8220: fd fa fa fa fd fd fd fa fa fa 00 00 00[fa]fa fa
      0x0c067fff8230: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8240: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8250: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8260: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
      0x0c067fff8270: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
    Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
      Addressable:           00
      Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
      Heap left redzone:       fa
      Freed heap region:       fd
      Stack left redzone:      f1
      Stack mid redzone:       f2
      Stack right redzone:     f3
      Stack after return:      f5
      Stack use after scope:   f8
      Global redzone:          f9
      Global init order:       f6
      Poisoned by user:        f7
      Container overflow:      fc
      Array cookie:            ac
      Intra object redzone:    bb
      ASan internal:           fe
      Left alloca redzone:     ca
      Right alloca redzone:    cb
    ==26009==ABORTING

Now the proper fix for this would be to convert both functions to return
an `size_t` instead of an `int`. But given that this commit may be part
of a security release, let's instead do the minimal viable fix and die
in case we see an overflow.

Add a test that would have previously caused us to crash.

Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 27, 2023
When t5583-push-branches.sh was originally introduced via 425b4d7
(push: introduce '--branches' option, 2023-05-06), it was not leak-free.
In fact, the test did not even run correctly until 022fbb6 (t5583:
fix shebang line, 2023-05-12), but after applying that patch, we see a
failure at t5583.8:

    ==2529087==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

    Direct leak of 384 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x7fb536330986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
        #1 0x55e07606cbf9 in xrealloc wrapper.c:140
        #2 0x55e075fb6cb3 in prio_queue_put prio-queue.c:42
        #3 0x55e075ec81cb in get_reachable_subset commit-reach.c:917
        #4 0x55e075fe9cce in add_missing_tags remote.c:1518
        #5 0x55e075fea1e4 in match_push_refs remote.c:1665
        #6 0x55e076050a8e in transport_push transport.c:1378
        #7 0x55e075e2eb74 in push_with_options builtin/push.c:401
        #8 0x55e075e2edb0 in do_push builtin/push.c:458
        #9 0x55e075e2ff7a in cmd_push builtin/push.c:702
        #10 0x55e075d8aaf0 in run_builtin git.c:452
        #11 0x55e075d8af08 in handle_builtin git.c:706
        #12 0x55e075d8b12c in run_argv git.c:770
        #13 0x55e075d8b6a0 in cmd_main git.c:905
        #14 0x55e075e81f07 in main common-main.c:60
        #15 0x7fb5360ab6c9 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
        #16 0x7fb5360ab784 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
        #17 0x55e075d88f40 in _start (git+0x1ff40) (BuildId: 38ad998b85a535e786129979443630d025ec2453)

    SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 384 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).

This leak was addressed independently via 68b5117 (commit-reach: fix
memory leak in get_reachable_subset(), 2023-06-03), which makes t5583
leak-free.

But t5583 was not in the tree when 68b5117 was written, and the two
only met after the latter was merged back in via 693bde4 (Merge
branch 'mh/commit-reach-get-reachable-plug-leak', 2023-06-20).

At that point, t5583 was leak-free. Let's mark it as such accordingly.

Signed-off-by: Taylor Blau <me@ttaylorr.com>
Acked-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Apr 4, 2024
The t5309 script triggers a racy false positive with SANITIZE=leak on a
multi-core system. Running with "--stress --run=6" usually fails within
10 seconds or so for me, complaining with something like:

    + git index-pack --fix-thin --stdin
    fatal: REF_DELTA at offset 46 already resolved (duplicate base 01d7713666f4de822776c7622c10f1b07de280dc?)

    =================================================================
    ==3904583==ERROR: LeakSanitizer: detected memory leaks

    Direct leak of 32 byte(s) in 1 object(s) allocated from:
        #0 0x7fa790d01986 in __interceptor_realloc ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:98
        #1 0x7fa790add769 in __pthread_getattr_np nptl/pthread_getattr_np.c:180
        #2 0x7fa790d117c5 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackTopAndBottom(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:150
        #3 0x7fa790d11957 in __sanitizer::GetThreadStackAndTls(bool, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*, unsigned long*) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/sanitizer_common/sanitizer_linux_libcdep.cpp:598
        #4 0x7fa790d03fe8 in __lsan::ThreadStart(unsigned int, unsigned long long, __sanitizer::ThreadType) ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_posix.cpp:51
        #5 0x7fa790d013fd in __lsan_thread_start_func ../../../../src/libsanitizer/lsan/lsan_interceptors.cpp:440
        #6 0x7fa790adc3eb in start_thread nptl/pthread_create.c:444
        #7 0x7fa790b5ca5b in clone3 ../sysdeps/unix/sysv/linux/x86_64/clone3.S:81

    SUMMARY: LeakSanitizer: 32 byte(s) leaked in 1 allocation(s).
    Aborted

What happens is this:

  0. We construct a bogus pack with a duplicate object in it and trigger
     index-pack.

  1. We spawn a bunch of worker threads to resolve deltas (on my system
     it is 16 threads).

  2. One of the threads sees the duplicate object and bails by calling
     exit(), taking down all of the threads. This is expected and is the
     point of the test.

  3. At the time exit() is called, we may still be spawning threads from
     the main process via pthread_create(). LSan hooks thread creation
     to update its book-keeping; it has to know where each thread's
     stack is (so it can find entry points for reachable memory). So it
     calls pthread_getattr_np() to get information about the new thread.
     That may allocate memory that must be freed with a matching call to
     pthread_attr_destroy(). Probably LSan does that immediately, but
     if you're unlucky enough, the exit() will happen while it's between
     those two calls, and the allocated pthread_attr_t appears as a
     leak.

This isn't a real leak. It's not even in our code, but rather in the
LSan instrumentation code. So we could just ignore it. But the false
positive can cause people to waste time tracking it down.

It's possibly something that LSan could protect against (e.g., cover the
getattr/destroy pair with a mutex, and then in the final post-exit()
check for leaks try to take the same mutex). But I don't know enough
about LSan to say if that's a reasonable approach or not (or if my
analysis is even completely correct).

In the meantime, it's pretty easy to avoid the race by making creation
of the worker threads "atomic". That is, we'll spawn all of them before
letting any of them start to work. That's easy to do because we already
have a work_lock() mutex for handing out that work. If the main process
takes it, then all of the threads will immediately block until we've
finished spawning and released it.

This shouldn't make any practical difference for non-LSan runs. The
thread spawning is quick, and could happen before any worker thread gets
scheduled anyway.

Probably other spots that use threads are subject to the same issues.
But since we have to manually insert locking (and since this really is
kind of a hack), let's not bother with them unless somebody experiences
a similar racy false-positive in practice.

Signed-off-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Jul 3, 2024
Memory sanitizer (msan) is detecting a use of an uninitialized variable
(`size`) in `read_attr_from_index`:

    ==2268==WARNING: MemorySanitizer: use-of-uninitialized-value
    #0 0x5651f3416504 in read_attr_from_index git/attr.c:868:11
    #1 0x5651f3415530 in read_attr git/attr.c
    #2 0x5651f3413d74 in bootstrap_attr_stack git/attr.c:968:6
    #3 0x5651f3413d74 in prepare_attr_stack git/attr.c:1004:2
    #4 0x5651f3413d74 in collect_some_attrs git/attr.c:1199:2
    #5 0x5651f3413144 in git_check_attr git/attr.c:1345:2
    #6 0x5651f34728da in convert_attrs git/convert.c:1320:2
    #7 0x5651f3473425 in would_convert_to_git_filter_fd git/convert.c:1373:2
    #8 0x5651f357a35e in index_fd git/object-file.c:2630:34
    #9 0x5651f357aa15 in index_path git/object-file.c:2657:7
    #10 0x5651f35db9d9 in add_to_index git/read-cache.c:766:7
    #11 0x5651f35dc170 in add_file_to_index git/read-cache.c:799:9
    #12 0x5651f321f9b2 in add_files git/builtin/add.c:346:7
    #13 0x5651f321f9b2 in cmd_add git/builtin/add.c:565:18
    #14 0x5651f321d327 in run_builtin git/git.c:474:11
    #15 0x5651f321bc9e in handle_builtin git/git.c:729:3
    #16 0x5651f321a792 in run_argv git/git.c:793:4
    #17 0x5651f321a792 in cmd_main git/git.c:928:19
    #18 0x5651f33dde1f in main git/common-main.c:62:11

The issue exists because `size` is an output parameter from
`read_blob_data_from_index`, but it's only modified if
`read_blob_data_from_index` returns non-NULL. The read of `size` when
calling `read_attr_from_buf` unconditionally may read from an
uninitialized value. `read_attr_from_buf` checks that `buf` is non-NULL
before reading from `size`, but by then it's already too late: the
uninitialized read will have happened already. Furthermore, there's no
guarantee that the compiler won't reorder things so that it checks
`size` before checking `!buf`.

Make the call to `read_attr_from_buf` conditional on `buf` being
non-NULL, ensuring that `size` is not read if it's never set.

Signed-off-by: Kyle Lippincott <spectral@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Sep 5, 2024
It was recently reported that concurrent reads and writes may cause the
reftable backend to segfault. The root cause of this is that we do not
properly keep track of reftable readers across reloads.

Suppose that you have a reftable iterator and then decide to reload the
stack while iterating through the iterator. When the stack has been
rewritten since we have created the iterator, then we would end up
discarding a subset of readers that may still be in use by the iterator.
The consequence is that we now try to reference deallocated memory,
which of course segfaults.

One way to trigger this is in t5616, where some background maintenance
jobs have been leaking from one test into another. This leads to stack
traces like the following one:

  + git -c protocol.version=0 -C pc1 fetch --filter=blob:limit=29999 --refetch origin
  AddressSanitizer:DEADLYSIGNAL
  =================================================================
  ==657994==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: SEGV on unknown address 0x7fa0f0ec6089 (pc 0x55f23e52ddf9 bp
0x7ffe7bfa1700 sp 0x7ffe7bfa1700 T0)
  ==657994==The signal is caused by a READ memory access.
      #0 0x55f23e52ddf9 in get_var_int reftable/record.c:29
      #1 0x55f23e53295e in reftable_decode_keylen reftable/record.c:170
      #2 0x55f23e532cc0 in reftable_decode_key reftable/record.c:194
      #3 0x55f23e54e72e in block_iter_next reftable/block.c:398
      #4 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next_in_block reftable/reader.c:240
      #5 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:355
      #6 0x55f23e5573dc in table_iter_next reftable/reader.c:339
      #7 0x55f23e551283 in merged_iter_advance_subiter reftable/merged.c:69
      #8 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_entry reftable/merged.c:123
      #9 0x55f23e55169e in merged_iter_next_void reftable/merged.c:172
      #10 0x55f23e537625 in reftable_iterator_next_ref reftable/generic.c:175
      #11 0x55f23e2cf9c6 in reftable_ref_iterator_advance refs/reftable-backend.c:464
      #12 0x55f23e2d996e in ref_iterator_advance refs/iterator.c:13
      #13 0x55f23e2d996e in do_for_each_ref_iterator refs/iterator.c:452
      #14 0x55f23dca6767 in get_ref_map builtin/fetch.c:623
      #15 0x55f23dca6767 in do_fetch builtin/fetch.c:1659
      #16 0x55f23dca6767 in fetch_one builtin/fetch.c:2133
      #17 0x55f23dca6767 in cmd_fetch builtin/fetch.c:2432
      #18 0x55f23dba7764 in run_builtin git.c:484
      #19 0x55f23dba7764 in handle_builtin git.c:741
      #20 0x55f23dbab61e in run_argv git.c:805
      #21 0x55f23dbab61e in cmd_main git.c:1000
      #22 0x55f23dba4781 in main common-main.c:64
      #23 0x7fa0f063fc89 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
      #24 0x7fa0f063fd44 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
      #25 0x55f23dba6ad0 in _start (git+0xadfad0) (BuildId: 803b2b7f59beb03d7849fb8294a8e2145dd4aa27)

While it is somewhat awkward that the maintenance processes survive
tests in the first place, it is totally expected that reftables should
work alright with concurrent writers. Seemingly they don't.

The only underlying resource that we need to care about in this context
is the reftable reader, which is responsible for reading a single table
from disk. These readers get discarded immediately (unless reused) when
calling `reftable_stack_reload()`, which is wrong. We can only close
them once we know that there are no iterators using them anymore.

Prepare for a fix by converting the reftable readers to be refcounted.

Reported-by: Jeff King <peff@peff.net>
Signed-off-by: Patrick Steinhardt <ps@pks.im>
Signed-off-by: Junio C Hamano <gitster@pobox.com>
derrickstolee pushed a commit that referenced this pull request Oct 9, 2024
An internal customer reported a segfault when running `git
sparse-checkout set` with the `index.sparse` config enabled. I was
unable to reproduce it locally, but with their help we debugged into the
failing process and discovered the following stacktrace:

```
#0  0x00007ff6318fb7b0 in rehash (map=0x3dfb00d0440, newsize=1048576) at hashmap.c:125
#1  0x00007ff6318fbc66 in hashmap_add (map=0x3dfb00d0440, entry=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at hashmap.c:247
#2  0x00007ff631937a70 in hash_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:122
#3  0x00007ff631938a2f in add_name_hash (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at name-hash.c:638
#4  0x00007ff631a064de in set_index_entry (istate=0x3dfb00d0400, nr=8291, ce=0x3dfb5c58bc8) at sparse-index.c:255
#5  0x00007ff631a06692 in add_path_to_index (oid=0x5ff130, base=0x5ff580, path=0x3dfb4b725da "<redacted>", mode=33188, context=0x5ff570)    at sparse-index.c:307
#6  0x00007ff631a3b48c in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41f60, base=0x5ff580, depth=2, pathspec=0x5ff5a0,    fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:46
#7  0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41e80, base=0x5ff580, depth=1, pathspec=0x5ff5a0,    fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80
#8  0x00007ff631a3b60b in read_tree_at (r=0x7ff631c026a0 <the_repo>, tree=0x3dfb5b41ac8, base=0x5ff580, depth=0, pathspec=0x5ff5a0,    fn=0x7ff631a064e5 <add_path_to_index>, context=0x5ff570) at tree.c:80
#9  0x00007ff631a06a95 in expand_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, pl=0x0) at sparse-index.c:422
#10 0x00007ff631a06cbd in ensure_full_index (istate=0x3dfb00d0100) at sparse-index.c:456
#11 0x00007ff631990d08 in index_name_stage_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21, stage=0,    search_mode=EXPAND_SPARSE) at read-cache.c:556
#12 0x00007ff631990d6c in index_name_pos (istate=0x3dfb00d0100, name=0x3dfb0020080 "algorithm/levenshtein", namelen=21) at read-cache.c:566
#13 0x00007ff63180dbb5 in sanitize_paths (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0, skip_checks=0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:756
#14 0x00007ff63180de50 in sparse_checkout_set (argc=185, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:860
#15 0x00007ff63180e6c5 in cmd_sparse_checkout (argc=186, argv=0x3dfb0030018, prefix=0x0) at builtin/sparse-checkout.c:1063
#16 0x00007ff6317234cb in run_builtin (p=0x7ff631ad9b38 <commands+2808>, argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:548
#17 0x00007ff6317239c0 in handle_builtin (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:808
#18 0x00007ff631723c7d in run_argv (argcp=0x5ffdd0, argv=0x5ffd78) at git.c:877
#19 0x00007ff6317241d1 in cmd_main (argc=187, argv=0x3dfb0030018) at git.c:1017
#20 0x00007ff631838b60 in main (argc=190, argv=0x3dfb0030000) at common-main.c:64 
```

The very bottom of the stack being the `rehash()` method from
`hashmap.c` as called within the `name-hash` API made me look at where
these hashmaps were being used in the sparse index logic. These were
being copied across indexes, which seems dangerous. Indeed, clearing
these hashmaps and setting them as not initialized fixes the segfault.

The second commit is a response to a test failure that happens in
`t1092-sparse-checkout-compatibility.sh` where `git stash pop` starts to
fail because the underlying `git checkout-index` process fails due to
colliding files. Passing the `-f` flag appears to work, but it's unclear
why this name-hash change causes that change in behavior.
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