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fix 'mmap' related race #3

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pabeni opened this issue Mar 19, 2020 · 1 comment
Closed

fix 'mmap' related race #3

pabeni opened this issue Mar 19, 2020 · 1 comment

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@pabeni
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pabeni commented Mar 19, 2020

mptcp_connect self-tests with additional '-m mmap' argument produce a splat - WARN_ON_ONCE in mptcp_reset_timer() as the mptcp timer is not initialized yet

pkrystad pushed a commit to pkrystad/mptcp_net-next that referenced this issue Mar 19, 2020
journal_head::b_transaction and journal_head::b_next_transaction could
be accessed concurrently as noticed by KCSAN,

 LTP: starting fsync04
 /dev/zero: Can't open blockdev
 EXT4-fs (loop0): mounting ext3 file system using the ext4 subsystem
 EXT4-fs (loop0): mounted filesystem with ordered data mode. Opts: (null)
 ==================================================================
 BUG: KCSAN: data-race in __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer [jbd2] / jbd2_write_access_granted [jbd2]

 write to 0xffff99f9b1bd0e30 of 8 bytes by task 25721 on cpu 70:
  __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer+0xdd/0x210 [jbd2]
  __jbd2_journal_refile_buffer at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:2569
  jbd2_journal_commit_transaction+0x2d15/0x3f20 [jbd2]
  (inlined by) jbd2_journal_commit_transaction at fs/jbd2/commit.c:1034
  kjournald2+0x13b/0x450 [jbd2]
  kthread+0x1cd/0x1f0
  ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

 read to 0xffff99f9b1bd0e30 of 8 bytes by task 25724 on cpu 68:
  jbd2_write_access_granted+0x1b2/0x250 [jbd2]
  jbd2_write_access_granted at fs/jbd2/transaction.c:1155
  jbd2_journal_get_write_access+0x2c/0x60 [jbd2]
  __ext4_journal_get_write_access+0x50/0x90 [ext4]
  ext4_mb_mark_diskspace_used+0x158/0x620 [ext4]
  ext4_mb_new_blocks+0x54f/0xca0 [ext4]
  ext4_ind_map_blocks+0xc79/0x1b40 [ext4]
  ext4_map_blocks+0x3b4/0x950 [ext4]
  _ext4_get_block+0xfc/0x270 [ext4]
  ext4_get_block+0x3b/0x50 [ext4]
  __block_write_begin_int+0x22e/0xae0
  __block_write_begin+0x39/0x50
  ext4_write_begin+0x388/0xb50 [ext4]
  generic_perform_write+0x15d/0x290
  ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x11f/0x210 [ext4]
  ext4_file_write_iter+0xce/0x9e0 [ext4]
  new_sync_write+0x29c/0x3b0
  __vfs_write+0x92/0xa0
  vfs_write+0x103/0x260
  ksys_write+0x9d/0x130
  __x64_sys_write+0x4c/0x60
  do_syscall_64+0x91/0xb05
  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x49/0xbe

 5 locks held by fsync04/25724:
  #0: ffff99f9911093f8 (sb_writers#13){.+.+}, at: vfs_write+0x21c/0x260
  multipath-tcp#1: ffff99f9db4c0348 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#15){+.+.}, at: ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x65/0x210 [ext4]
  multipath-tcp#2: ffff99f5e7dfcf58 (jbd2_handle){++++}, at: start_this_handle+0x1c1/0x9d0 [jbd2]
  multipath-tcp#3: ffff99f9db4c0168 (&ei->i_data_sem){++++}, at: ext4_map_blocks+0x176/0x950 [ext4]
  multipath-tcp#4: ffffffff99086b40 (rcu_read_lock){....}, at: jbd2_write_access_granted+0x4e/0x250 [jbd2]
 irq event stamp: 1407125
 hardirqs last  enabled at (1407125): [<ffffffff980da9b7>] __find_get_block+0x107/0x790
 hardirqs last disabled at (1407124): [<ffffffff980da8f9>] __find_get_block+0x49/0x790
 softirqs last  enabled at (1405528): [<ffffffff98a0034c>] __do_softirq+0x34c/0x57c
 softirqs last disabled at (1405521): [<ffffffff97cc67a2>] irq_exit+0xa2/0xc0

 Reported by Kernel Concurrency Sanitizer on:
 CPU: 68 PID: 25724 Comm: fsync04 Tainted: G L 5.6.0-rc2-next-20200221+ multipath-tcp#7
 Hardware name: HPE ProLiant DL385 Gen10/ProLiant DL385 Gen10, BIOS A40 07/10/2019

The plain reads are outside of jh->b_state_lock critical section which result
in data races. Fix them by adding pairs of READ|WRITE_ONCE().

Reviewed-by: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
Signed-off-by: Qian Cai <cai@lca.pw>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20200222043111.2227-1-cai@lca.pw
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
pkrystad pushed a commit to pkrystad/mptcp_net-next that referenced this issue Mar 19, 2020
the following packetdrill script

  socket(..., SOCK_STREAM, IPPROTO_MPTCP) = 3
  fcntl(3, F_GETFL) = 0x2 (flags O_RDWR)
  fcntl(3, F_SETFL, O_RDWR|O_NONBLOCK) = 0
  connect(3, ..., ...) = -1 EINPROGRESS (Operation now in progress)
  > S 0:0(0) <mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 100 ecr 0,nop,wscale 8,mpcapable v1 flags[flag_h] nokey>
  < S. 0:0(0) ack 1 win 65535 <mss 1460,sackOK,TS val 700 ecr 100,nop,wscale 8,mpcapable v1 flags[flag_h] key[skey=2]>
  > . 1:1(0) ack 1 win 256 <nop, nop, TS val 100 ecr 700,mpcapable v1 flags[flag_h] key[ckey,skey]>
  getsockopt(3, SOL_SOCKET, SO_ERROR, [0], [4]) = 0
  fcntl(3, F_SETFL, O_RDWR) = 0
  write(3, ..., 1000) = 1000

doesn't transmit 1KB data packet after a successful three-way-handshake,
using mp_capable with data as required by protocol v1, and write() hangs
forever:

 PID: 973    TASK: ffff97dd399cae80  CPU: 1   COMMAND: "packetdrill"
  #0 [ffffa9b94062fb78] __schedule at ffffffff9c90a000
  multipath-tcp#1 [ffffa9b94062fc08] schedule at ffffffff9c90a4a0
  multipath-tcp#2 [ffffa9b94062fc18] schedule_timeout at ffffffff9c90e00d
  multipath-tcp#3 [ffffa9b94062fc90] wait_woken at ffffffff9c120184
  multipath-tcp#4 [ffffa9b94062fcb0] sk_stream_wait_connect at ffffffff9c75b064
  multipath-tcp#5 [ffffa9b94062fd20] mptcp_sendmsg at ffffffff9c8e801c
  multipath-tcp#6 [ffffa9b94062fdc0] sock_sendmsg at ffffffff9c747324
  multipath-tcp#7 [ffffa9b94062fdd8] sock_write_iter at ffffffff9c7473c7
  multipath-tcp#8 [ffffa9b94062fe48] new_sync_write at ffffffff9c302976
  multipath-tcp#9 [ffffa9b94062fed0] vfs_write at ffffffff9c305685
 multipath-tcp#10 [ffffa9b94062ff00] ksys_write at ffffffff9c305985
 multipath-tcp#11 [ffffa9b94062ff38] do_syscall_64 at ffffffff9c004475
 multipath-tcp#12 [ffffa9b94062ff50] entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe at ffffffff9ca0008c
     RIP: 00007f959407eaf7  RSP: 00007ffe9e95a910  RFLAGS: 00000293
     RAX: ffffffffffffffda  RBX: 0000000000000008  RCX: 00007f959407eaf7
     RDX: 00000000000003e8  RSI: 0000000001785fe0  RDI: 0000000000000008
     RBP: 0000000001785fe0   R8: 0000000000000000   R9: 0000000000000003
     R10: 0000000000000007  R11: 0000000000000293  R12: 00000000000003e8
     R13: 00007ffe9e95ae30  R14: 0000000000000000  R15: 0000000000000000
     ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001  CS: 0033  SS: 002b

Fix it ensuring that socket state is TCP_ESTABLISHED on reception of the
third ack.

Fixes: 1954b86 ("mptcp: Check connection state before attempting send")
Suggested-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Davide Caratti <dcaratti@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
pkrystad pushed a commit to pkrystad/mptcp_net-next that referenced this issue Mar 19, 2020
Paul Blakey says:

====================
Introduce connection tracking offload

Background
----------

The connection tracking action provides the ability to associate connection state to a packet.
The connection state may be used for stateful packet processing such as stateful firewalls
and NAT operations.

Connection tracking in TC SW
----------------------------

The CT state may be matched only after the CT action is performed.
As such, CT use cases are commonly implemented using multiple chains.
Consider the following TC filters, as an example:
1. tc filter add dev ens1f0_0 ingress prio 1 chain 0 proto ip flower \
    src_mac 24:8a:07:a5:28:01 ct_state -trk \
    action ct \
    pipe action goto chain 2

2. tc filter add dev ens1f0_0 ingress prio 1 chain 2 proto ip flower \
    ct_state +trk+new \
    action ct commit \
    pipe action tunnel_key set \
        src_ip 0.0.0.0 \
        dst_ip 7.7.7.8 \
        id 98 \
        dst_port 4789 \
    action mirred egress redirect dev vxlan0

3. tc filter add dev ens1f0_0 ingress prio 1 chain 2 proto ip flower \
    ct_state +trk+est \
    action tunnel_key set \
        src_ip 0.0.0.0 \
        dst_ip 7.7.7.8 \
        id 98 \
        dst_port 4789 \
    action mirred egress redirect dev vxlan0

Filter multipath-tcp#1 (chain 0) decides, after initial packet classification, to send the packet to the
connection tracking module (ct action).
Once the ct_state is initialized by the CT action the packet processing continues on chain 2.

Chain 2 classifies the packet based on the ct_state.
Filter multipath-tcp#2 matches on the +trk+new CT state while filter multipath-tcp#3 matches on the +trk+est ct_state.

MLX5 Connection tracking HW offload - MLX5 driver patches
------------------------------

The MLX5 hardware model aligns with the software model by realizing a multi-table
architecture. In SW the TC CT action sets the CT state on the skb. Similarly,
HW sets the CT state on a HW register. Driver gets this CT state while offloading
a tuple with a new ct_metadata action that provides it.

Matches on ct_state are translated to HW register matches.

TC filter with CT action broken to two rules, a pre_ct rule, and a post_ct rule.
pre_ct rule:
   Inserted on the corrosponding tc chain table, matches on original tc match, with
   actions: any pre ct actions, set fte_id, set zone, and goto the ct table.
   The fte_id is a register mapping uniquely identifying this filter.
post_ct_rule:
   Inserted in a post_ct table, matches on the fte_id register mapping, with
   actions: counter + any post ct actions (this is usally 'goto chain X')

post_ct table is a table that all the tuples inserted to the ct table goto, so
if there is a tuple hit, packet will continue from ct table to post_ct table,
after being marked with the CT state (mark/label..)

This design ensures that the rule's actions and counters will be executed only after a CT hit.
HW misses will continue processing in SW from the last chain ID that was processed in hardware.

The following illustrates the HW model:

+-------------------+      +--------------------+    +--------------+
+ pre_ct (tc chain) +----->+ CT (nat or no nat) +--->+ post_ct      +----->
+ original match    +   |  + tuple + zone match + |  + fte_id match +  |
+-------------------+   |  +--------------------+ |  +--------------+  |
                        v                         v                    v
                     set chain miss mapping    set mark             original
                     set fte_id                set label            filter
                     set zone                  set established      actions
                     set tunnel_id             do nat (if needed)
                     do decap

To fill CT table, driver registers a CB for flow offload events, for each new
flow table that is passed to it from offloading ct actions. Once a flow offload
event is triggered on this CB, offload this flow to the hardware CT table.

Established events offload
--------------------------

Currently, act_ct maintains an FT instance per ct zone. Flow table entries
are created, per ct connection, when connections enter an established
state and deleted otherwise. Once an entry is created, the FT assumes
ownership of the entries, and manages their aging. FT is used for software
offload of conntrack. FT entries associate 5-tuples with an action list.

The act_ct changes in this patchset:
Populate the action list with a (new) ct_metadata action, providing the
connection's ct state (zone,mark and label), and mangle actions if NAT
is configured.

Pass the action's flow table instance as ct action entry parameter,
so  when the action is offloaded, the driver may register a callback on
it's block to receive FT flow offload add/del/stats events.

Netilter changes
--------------------------
The netfilter changes export the relevant bits, and add the relevant CBs
to support the above.

Applying this patchset
--------------------------

On top of current net-next ("r8169: simplify getting stats by using netdev_stats_to_stats64"),
pull Saeed's ct-offload branch, from git git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/saeed/linux.git
and fix the following non trivial conflict in fs_core.c as follows:

Then apply this patchset.

Changelog:
  v2->v3:
    Added the first two patches needed after rebasing on net-next:
     "net/mlx5: E-Switch, Enable reg c1 loopback when possible"
     "net/mlx5e: en_rep: Create uplink rep root table after eswitch offloads table"
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
pkrystad pushed a commit to pkrystad/mptcp_net-next that referenced this issue Mar 19, 2020
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
This patch set fixes bug in CO-RE relocation candidate finding logic, which
currently allows matching against forward declarations, functions, and other
named types, even though it makes no sense to even attempt. As part of
verifying the fix, add test using vmlinux.h with preserve_access_index
attribute and utilizing struct pt_regs heavily to trace nanosleep syscall
using 5 different types of tracing BPF programs.

This test also demonstrated problems using struct pt_regs in syscall
tracepoints and required a new set of macro, which were added in patch multipath-tcp#3
into bpf_tracing.h.

Patch multipath-tcp#1 fixes annoying issue with selftest failure messages being out of
sync.

v1->v2:
  - drop unused handle__probed() function (Martin).
====================

Signed-off-by: Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>
pkrystad pushed a commit to pkrystad/mptcp_net-next that referenced this issue Mar 19, 2020
Petr Machata says:

====================
RED: Introduce an ECN tail-dropping mode

When the RED qdisc is currently configured to enable ECN, the RED algorithm
is used to decide whether a certain SKB should be marked. If that SKB is
not ECN-capable, it is early-dropped.

It is also possible to keep all traffic in the queue, and just mark the
ECN-capable subset of it, as appropriate under the RED algorithm. Some
switches support this mode, and some installations make use of it.
There is currently no way to put the RED qdiscs to this mode.

Therefore this patchset adds a new RED flag, TC_RED_TAILDROP. When the
qdisc is configured with this flag, non-ECT traffic is enqueued (and
tail-dropped when the queue size is exhausted) instead of being
early-dropped.

Unfortunately, adding a new RED flag is not as simple as it sounds. RED
flags are passed in tc_red_qopt.flags. However RED neglects to validate the
flag field, and just copies it over wholesale to its internal structure,
and later dumps it back.

A broken userspace can therefore configure a RED qdisc with arbitrary
unsupported flags, and later expect to see the flags on qdisc dump. The
current ABI thus allows storage of 5 bits of custom data along with the
qdisc instance.

GRED, SFQ and CHOKE qdiscs are in the same situation. (GRED validates VQ
flags, but not the flags for the main queue.) E.g. if SFQ ever needs to
support TC_RED_ADAPTATIVE, it needs another way of doing it, and at the
same time it needs to retain the possibility to store 6 bits of
uninterpreted data.

For RED, this problem is resolved in patch multipath-tcp#2, which adds a new attribute,
and a way to separate flags from userbits that can be reused by other
qdiscs. The flag itself and related behavioral changes are added in patch

To test the new feature, patch multipath-tcp#1 first introduces a TDC testsuite that
covers the existing RED flags. Patch multipath-tcp#5 later extends it with taildrop
coverage. Patch multipath-tcp#6 contains a forwarding selftest for the offloaded
datapath.

To test the SW datapath, I took the mlxsw selftest and adapted it in mostly
obvious ways. The test is stable enough to verify that RED, ECN and ECN
taildrop actually work. However, I have no confidence in its portability to
other people's machines or mildly different configurations. I therefore do
not find it suitable for upstreaming.

GRED and CHOKE can use the same method as RED if they ever need to support
extra flags. SFQ uses the length of TCA_OPTIONS to dispatch on binary
control structure version, and would therefore need a different approach.

v2:
- Patch multipath-tcp#1
    - Require nsPlugin in each RED test
    - Match end-of-line to catch cases of more flags reported than
      requested
- Patch multipath-tcp#2:
    - Replaced with another patch.
- Patch multipath-tcp#3:
    - Fix red_use_taildrop() condition in red_enqueue switch for
      probabilistic case.
- Patch multipath-tcp#5:
    - Require nsPlugin in each RED test
    - Match end-of-line to catch cases of more flags reported than
      requested
    - Add a test for creation of non-ECN taildrop, which should fail
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 21, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Offload TC action skbedit priority

Petr says:

The TC action "skbedit priority P" has the effect of assigning skbprio of P
to SKBs that it's applied on. In HW datapath of a switch, the corresponding
action is assignment of internal switch priority. Spectrum switches allow
setting of packet priority based on an ACL action, which is good match for
the skbedit priority gadget. This patchset therefore implements offloading
of this action to the Spectrum ACL engine.

After a bit of refactoring in patch #1, patch #2 extends the skbedit action
to support offloading of "priority" subcommand.

On mlxsw side, in patch #3, the QOS_ACTION flexible action is added, with
fields necessary for priority adjustment. In patch #4, "skbedit priority"
is connected to that action.

Patch #5 implements a new forwarding selftest, suitable for both SW- and
HW-datapath testing.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 26, 2020
…event

An eventfd monitors multiple memory thresholds of the cgroup, closes them,
the kernel deletes all events related to this eventfd.  Before all events
are deleted, another eventfd monitors the memory threshold of this cgroup,
leading to a crash:

  BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000004
  #PF: supervisor write access in kernel mode
  #PF: error_code(0x0002) - not-present page
  PGD 800000033058e067 P4D 800000033058e067 PUD 3355ce067 PMD 0
  Oops: 0002 [#1] SMP PTI
  CPU: 2 PID: 14012 Comm: kworker/2:6 Kdump: loaded Not tainted 5.6.0-rc4 #3
  Hardware name: LENOVO 20AWS01K00/20AWS01K00, BIOS GLET70WW (2.24 ) 05/21/2014
  Workqueue: events memcg_event_remove
  RIP: 0010:__mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event+0xb3/0x190
  RSP: 0018:ffffb47e01c4fe18 EFLAGS: 00010202
  RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff8bb223a8a000 RCX: 0000000000000001
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: ffff8bb22fb83540 RDI: 0000000000000001
  RBP: ffffb47e01c4fe48 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000010
  R10: 000000000000000c R11: 071c71c71c71c71c R12: ffff8bb226aba880
  R13: ffff8bb223a8a480 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000
  FS:  0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff8bb242680000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000000000000004 CR3: 000000032c29c003 CR4: 00000000001606e0
  Call Trace:
    memcg_event_remove+0x32/0x90
    process_one_work+0x172/0x380
    worker_thread+0x49/0x3f0
    kthread+0xf8/0x130
    ret_from_fork+0x35/0x40
  CR2: 0000000000000004

We can reproduce this problem in the following ways:

1. We create a new cgroup subdirectory and a new eventfd, and then we
   monitor multiple memory thresholds of the cgroup through this eventfd.

2.  closing this eventfd, and __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event ()
   will be called multiple times to delete all events related to this
   eventfd.

The first time __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event() is called, the
kernel will clear all items related to this eventfd in thresholds->
primary.

Since there is currently only one eventfd, thresholds-> primary becomes
empty, so the kernel will set thresholds-> primary and hresholds-> spare
to NULL.  If at this time, the user creates a new eventfd and monitor
the memory threshold of this cgroup, kernel will re-initialize
thresholds-> primary.

Then when __mem_cgroup_usage_unregister_event () is called for the
second time, because thresholds-> primary is not empty, the system will
access thresholds-> spare, but thresholds-> spare is NULL, which will
trigger a crash.

In general, the longer it takes to delete all events related to this
eventfd, the easier it is to trigger this problem.

The solution is to check whether the thresholds associated with the
eventfd has been cleared when deleting the event.  If so, we do nothing.

[akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix comment, per Kirill]
Fixes: 907860e ("cgroups: make cftype.unregister_event() void-returning")
Signed-off-by: Chunguang Xu <brookxu@tencent.com>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Acked-by: Kirill A. Shutemov <kirill.shutemov@linux.intel.com>
Cc: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Cc: Vladimir Davydov <vdavydov.dev@gmail.com>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/077a6f67-aefa-4591-efec-f2f3af2b0b02@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 27, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Offload TC action pedit munge dsfield

Petr says:

The Spectrum switches allow packet prioritization based on DSCP on ingress,
and update of DSCP on egress. This is configured through the DCB APP rules.
For some use cases, assigning a custom DSCP value based on an ACL match is
a better tool. To that end, offload FLOW_ACTION_MANGLE to permit changing
of dsfield as a whole, or DSCP and ECN values in isolation.

After fixing a commentary nit in patch #1, and mlxsw naming in patch #2,
patches #3 and #4 add the offload to mlxsw.

Patch #5 adds a forwarding selftest for pedit dsfield, applicable to SW as
well as HW datapaths. Patch #6 adds a mlxsw-specific test to verify DSCP
rewrite due to DCB APP rules is not performed on pedited packets.

The tests only cover IPv4 dsfield setting. We have tests for IPv6 as well,
but would like to postpone their contribution until the corresponding
iproute patches have been accepted.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 27, 2020
Petr Machata says:

====================
Implement stats_update callback for pedit and skbedit

The stats_update callback is used for adding HW counters to the SW ones.
Both skbedit and pedit actions are actually recognized by flow_offload.h,
but do not implement these callbacks. As a consequence, the reported values
are only the SW ones, even where there is a HW counter available.

Patch #1 adds the callback to action skbedit, patch #2 adds it to action
pedit. Patch #3 tweaks an skbedit selftest with a check that would have
caught this problem.

The pedit test is not likewise tweaked, because the iproute2 pedit action
currently does not support JSON dumping. This will be addressed later.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 28, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Various static checkers fixes

Jakub told me he gets some warnings with W=1, so I decided to check with
sparse, smatch and coccinelle as well. This patch set fixes all the
issues found. None are actual bugs / regressions and therefore not
targeted at net.

Patches #1-#2 add missing kernel-doc comments.

Patch #3 removes dead code.

Patch #4 reworks the ACL code to avoid defining a static variable in a
header file.

Patch #5 removes unnecessary conversion to bool that coccinelle warns
about.

Patch #6 avoids false-positive uninitialized symbol errors emitted by
smatch.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Mar 31, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Add packet trap policers support

Background
==========

Devices capable of offloading the kernel's datapath and perform
functions such as bridging and routing must also be able to send (trap)
specific packets to the kernel (i.e., the CPU) for processing.

For example, a device acting as a multicast-aware bridge must be able to
trap IGMP membership reports to the kernel for processing by the bridge
module.

Motivation
==========

In most cases, the underlying device is capable of handling packet rates
that are several orders of magnitude higher compared to those that can
be handled by the CPU.

Therefore, in order to prevent the underlying device from overwhelming
the CPU, devices usually include packet trap policers that are able to
police the trapped packets to rates that can be handled by the CPU.

Proposed solution
=================

This patch set allows capable device drivers to register their supported
packet trap policers with devlink. User space can then tune the
parameters of these policers (currently, rate and burst size) and read
from the device the number of packets that were dropped by the policer,
if supported.

These packet trap policers can then be bound to existing packet trap
groups, which are used to aggregate logically related packet traps. As a
result, trapped packets are policed to rates that can be handled the
host CPU.

Example usage
=============

Instantiate netdevsim:

Dump available packet trap policers:
netdevsim/netdevsim10:
  policer 1 rate 1000 burst 128
  policer 2 rate 2000 burst 256
  policer 3 rate 3000 burst 512

Change the parameters of a packet trap policer:

Bind a packet trap policer to a packet trap group:

Dump parameters and statistics of a packet trap policer:
netdevsim/netdevsim10:
  policer 3 rate 100 burst 16
    stats:
        rx:
          dropped 92

Unbind a packet trap policer from a packet trap group:

Patch set overview
==================

Patch #1 adds the core infrastructure in devlink which allows capable
device drivers to register their supported packet trap policers with
devlink.

Patch #2 extends the existing devlink-trap documentation.

Patch #3 extends netdevsim to register a few dummy packet trap policers
with devlink. Used later on to selftests the core infrastructure.

Patches #4-#5 adds infrastructure in devlink to allow binding of packet
trap policers to packet trap groups.

Patch #6 extends netdevsim to allow such binding.

Patch #7 adds a selftest over netdevsim that verifies the core
devlink-trap policers functionality.

Patches #8-#14 gradually add devlink-trap policers support in mlxsw.

Patch #15 adds a selftest over mlxsw. All registered packet trap
policers are verified to handle the configured rate and burst size.

Future plans
============

* Allow changing default association between packet traps and packet
  trap groups
* Add more packet traps. For example, for control packets (e.g., IGMP)

v3:
* Rebase

v2 (address comments from Jiri and Jakub):
* Patch #1: Add 'strict_start_type' in devlink policy
* Patch #1: Have device drivers provide max/min rate/burst size for each
  policer. Use them to check validity of user provided parameters
* Patch #3: Remove check about burst size being a power of 2 and instead
  add a debugfs knob to fail the operation
* Patch #3: Provide max/min rate/burst size when registering policers
  and remove the validity checks from nsim_dev_devlink_trap_policer_set()
* Patch #5: Check for presence of 'DEVLINK_ATTR_TRAP_POLICER_ID' in
  devlink_trap_group_set() and bail if not present
* Patch #5: Add extack error message in case trap group was partially
  modified
* Patch #7: Add test case with new 'fail_trap_policer_set' knob
* Patch #7: Add test case for partially modified trap group
* Patch #10: Provide max/min rate/burst size when registering policers
* Patch #11: Remove the max/min validity checks from
  __mlxsw_sp_trap_policer_set()
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
@cpaasch
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cpaasch commented Mar 31, 2020

For the record, syzkaller reproducer is

# {Threaded:false Collide:false Repeat:false RepeatTimes:0 Procs:1 Sandbox: Fault:false FaultCall:-1 FaultNth:0 Leak:false NetInjection:false NetDevices:false NetReset:false Cgroups:false BinfmtMisc:false
CloseFDs:false KCSAN:false DevlinkPCI:false UseTmpDir:false HandleSegv:false Repro:false Trace:false}
r0 = socket$inet_mptcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x106)
r1 = socket$inet_mptcp(0x2, 0x1, 0x106)
bind$inet(r1, &(0x7f00000013c0)={0x2, 0x4e20, @multicast2}, 0x10)
connect$inet(r1, &(0x7f0000000040)={0x2, 0x0, @loopback}, 0x10)
listen(r1, 0x3)
connect$inet(r0, &(0x7f0000000040)={0x2, 0x4e20, @loopback}, 0x4d)
sendmsg$inet(r0, &(0x7f0000000280)={0x0, 0x0, &(0x7f0000000000)=[{&(0x7f0000000080)="ff", 0x20000081}], 0x1}, 0x0)

C-repro

// autogenerated by syzkaller (https://github.com/google/syzkaller)

#define _GNU_SOURCE

#include <endian.h>
#include <stdint.h>
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>

uint64_t r[2] = {0xffffffffffffffff, 0xffffffffffffffff};

int main(void)
{
  syscall(__NR_mmap, 0x20000000ul, 0x1000000ul, 3ul, 0x32ul, -1, 0ul);
  intptr_t res = 0;
  res = syscall(__NR_socket, 2ul, 1ul, 0x106);
  if (res != -1)
    r[0] = res;
  res = syscall(__NR_socket, 2ul, 1ul, 0x106);
  if (res != -1)
    r[1] = res;
  *(uint16_t*)0x200013c0 = 2;
  *(uint16_t*)0x200013c2 = htobe16(0x4e20);
  *(uint32_t*)0x200013c4 = htobe32(0xe0000002);
  syscall(__NR_bind, r[1], 0x200013c0ul, 0x10ul);
  *(uint16_t*)0x20000040 = 2;
  *(uint16_t*)0x20000042 = htobe16(0);
  *(uint32_t*)0x20000044 = htobe32(0x7f000001);
  syscall(__NR_connect, r[1], 0x20000040ul, 0x10ul);
  syscall(__NR_listen, r[1], 3);
  *(uint16_t*)0x20000040 = 2;
  *(uint16_t*)0x20000042 = htobe16(0x4e20);
  *(uint32_t*)0x20000044 = htobe32(0x7f000001);
  syscall(__NR_connect, r[0], 0x20000040ul, 0x4dul);
  *(uint64_t*)0x20000280 = 0;
  *(uint32_t*)0x20000288 = 0;
  *(uint64_t*)0x20000290 = 0x20000000;
  *(uint64_t*)0x20000000 = 0x20000080;
  memcpy((void*)0x20000080, "\xff", 1);
  *(uint64_t*)0x20000008 = 0x20000081;
  *(uint64_t*)0x20000298 = 1;
  *(uint64_t*)0x200002a0 = 0;
  *(uint64_t*)0x200002a8 = 0;
  *(uint32_t*)0x200002b0 = 0;
  syscall(__NR_sendmsg, r[0], 0x20000280ul, 0ul);
  return 0;
}

jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 1, 2020
With the following patches:

- btrfs: backref, only collect file extent items matching backref offset
- btrfs: backref, not adding refs from shared block when resolving normal backref
- btrfs: backref, only search backref entries from leaves of the same root

we only collect the normal data refs we want, so the imprecise upper
bound total_refs of that EXTENT_ITEM could now be changed to the count
of the normal backref entry we want to search.

Background and how the patches fit together:

Btrfs has two types of data backref.
For BTRFS_EXTENT_DATA_REF_KEY type of backref, we don't have the
exact block number. Therefore, we need to call resolve_indirect_refs.
It uses btrfs_search_slot to locate the leaf block. Then
we need to walk through the leaves to search for the EXTENT_DATA items
that have disk bytenr matching the extent item (add_all_parents).

When resolving indirect refs, we could take entries that don't
belong to the backref entry we are searching for right now.
For that reason when searching backref entry, we always use total
refs of that EXTENT_ITEM rather than individual count.

For example:
item 11 key (40831553536 EXTENT_ITEM 4194304) itemoff 15460 itemsize
  extent refs 24 gen 7302 flags DATA
  shared data backref parent 394985472 count 10 #1
  extent data backref root 257 objectid 260 offset 1048576 count 3 #2
  extent data backref root 256 objectid 260 offset 65536 count 6 #3
  extent data backref root 257 objectid 260 offset 65536 count 5 #4

For example, when searching backref entry #4, we'll use total_refs
24, a very loose loop ending condition, instead of total_refs = 5.

But using total_refs = 24 is not accurate. Sometimes, we'll never find
all the refs from specific root.  As a result, the loop keeps on going
until we reach the end of that inode.

The first 3 patches, handle 3 different types refs we might encounter.
These refs do not belong to the normal backref we are searching, and
hence need to be skipped.

This patch changes the total_refs to correct number so that we could
end loop as soon as we find all the refs we want.

btrfs send uses backref to find possible clone sources, the following
is a simple test to compare the results with and without this patch:

 $ btrfs subvolume create /sub1
 $ for i in `seq 1 163840`; do
     dd if=/dev/zero of=/sub1/file bs=64K count=1 seek=$((i-1)) conv=notrunc oflag=direct
   done
 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot /sub1 /sub2
 $ for i in `seq 1 163840`; do
     dd if=/dev/zero of=/sub1/file bs=4K count=1 seek=$(((i-1)*16+10)) conv=notrunc oflag=direct
   done
 $ btrfs subvolume snapshot -r /sub1 /snap1
 $ time btrfs send /snap1 | btrfs receive /volume2

Without this patch:

real 69m48.124s
user 0m50.199s
sys  70m15.600s

With this patch:

real    1m59.683s
user    0m35.421s
sys     2m42.684s

Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Signed-off-by: ethanwu <ethanwu@synology.com>
[ add patchset cover letter with background and numbers ]
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 8, 2020
A lockdep circular locking dependency report was seen when running a
keyutils test:

[12537.027242] ======================================================
[12537.059309] WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
[12537.088148] 4.18.0-147.7.1.el8_1.x86_64+debug #1 Tainted: G OE    --------- -  -
[12537.125253] ------------------------------------------------------
[12537.153189] keyctl/25598 is trying to acquire lock:
[12537.175087] 000000007c39f96c (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}, at: __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12537.208365]
[12537.208365] but task is already holding lock:
[12537.234507] 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12537.270476]
[12537.270476] which lock already depends on the new lock.
[12537.270476]
[12537.307209]
[12537.307209] the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:
[12537.340754]
[12537.340754] -> #3 (&type->lock_class){++++}:
[12537.367434]        down_write+0x4d/0x110
[12537.385202]        __key_link_begin+0x87/0x280
[12537.405232]        request_key_and_link+0x483/0xf70
[12537.427221]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.444839]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.468445]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.496731]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.519418]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.546263]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.573551]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.601045]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.617906]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.636225]
[12537.636225] -> #2 (root_key_user.cons_lock){+.+.}:
[12537.664525]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.683734]        request_key_and_link+0x35a/0xf70
[12537.705640]        request_key+0x3c/0x80
[12537.723304]        dns_query+0x1db/0x5a5 [dns_resolver]
[12537.746773]        dns_resolve_server_name_to_ip+0x1e1/0x4d0 [cifs]
[12537.775607]        cifs_reconnect+0xe04/0x2500 [cifs]
[12537.798322]        cifs_readv_from_socket+0x461/0x690 [cifs]
[12537.823369]        cifs_read_from_socket+0xa0/0xe0 [cifs]
[12537.847262]        cifs_demultiplex_thread+0x311/0x2db0 [cifs]
[12537.873477]        kthread+0x30c/0x3d0
[12537.890281]        ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x50
[12537.908649]
[12537.908649] -> #1 (&tcp_ses->srv_mutex){+.+.}:
[12537.935225]        __mutex_lock+0x105/0x11f0
[12537.954450]        cifs_call_async+0x102/0x7f0 [cifs]
[12537.977250]        smb2_async_readv+0x6c3/0xc90 [cifs]
[12538.000659]        cifs_readpages+0x120a/0x1e50 [cifs]
[12538.023920]        read_pages+0xf5/0x560
[12538.041583]        __do_page_cache_readahead+0x41d/0x4b0
[12538.067047]        ondemand_readahead+0x44c/0xc10
[12538.092069]        filemap_fault+0xec1/0x1830
[12538.111637]        __do_fault+0x82/0x260
[12538.129216]        do_fault+0x419/0xfb0
[12538.146390]        __handle_mm_fault+0x862/0xdf0
[12538.167408]        handle_mm_fault+0x154/0x550
[12538.187401]        __do_page_fault+0x42f/0xa60
[12538.207395]        do_page_fault+0x38/0x5e0
[12538.225777]        page_fault+0x1e/0x30
[12538.243010]
[12538.243010] -> #0 (&mm->mmap_sem){++++}:
[12538.267875]        lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12538.286848]        __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12538.306006]        keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12538.327936]        assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12538.352154]        keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12538.370558]        keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12538.391470]        do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12538.410511]        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf
[12538.435535]
[12538.435535] other info that might help us debug this:
[12538.435535]
[12538.472829] Chain exists of:
[12538.472829]   &mm->mmap_sem --> root_key_user.cons_lock --> &type->lock_class
[12538.472829]
[12538.524820]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[12538.524820]
[12538.551431]        CPU0                    CPU1
[12538.572654]        ----                    ----
[12538.595865]   lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.613737]                                lock(root_key_user.cons_lock);
[12538.644234]                                lock(&type->lock_class);
[12538.672410]   lock(&mm->mmap_sem);
[12538.687758]
[12538.687758]  *** DEADLOCK ***
[12538.687758]
[12538.714455] 1 lock held by keyctl/25598:
[12538.732097]  #0: 000000003de5b58d (&type->lock_class){++++}, at: keyctl_read_key+0x15a/0x220
[12538.770573]
[12538.770573] stack backtrace:
[12538.790136] CPU: 2 PID: 25598 Comm: keyctl Kdump: loaded Tainted: G
[12538.844855] Hardware name: HP ProLiant DL360 Gen9/ProLiant DL360 Gen9, BIOS P89 12/27/2015
[12538.881963] Call Trace:
[12538.892897]  dump_stack+0x9a/0xf0
[12538.907908]  print_circular_bug.isra.25.cold.50+0x1bc/0x279
[12538.932891]  ? save_trace+0xd6/0x250
[12538.948979]  check_prev_add.constprop.32+0xc36/0x14f0
[12538.971643]  ? keyring_compare_object+0x104/0x190
[12538.992738]  ? check_usage+0x550/0x550
[12539.009845]  ? sched_clock+0x5/0x10
[12539.025484]  ? sched_clock_cpu+0x18/0x1e0
[12539.043555]  __lock_acquire+0x1f12/0x38d0
[12539.061551]  ? trace_hardirqs_on+0x10/0x10
[12539.080554]  lock_acquire+0x14c/0x420
[12539.100330]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.119079]  __might_fault+0x119/0x1b0
[12539.135869]  ? __might_fault+0xc4/0x1b0
[12539.153234]  keyring_read_iterator+0x7e/0x170
[12539.172787]  ? keyring_read+0x110/0x110
[12539.190059]  assoc_array_subtree_iterate+0x97/0x280
[12539.211526]  keyring_read+0xe9/0x110
[12539.227561]  ? keyring_gc_check_iterator+0xc0/0xc0
[12539.249076]  keyctl_read_key+0x1b9/0x220
[12539.266660]  do_syscall_64+0xa5/0x4b0
[12539.283091]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x6a/0xdf

One way to prevent this deadlock scenario from happening is to not
allow writing to userspace while holding the key semaphore. Instead,
an internal buffer is allocated for getting the keys out from the
read method first before copying them out to userspace without holding
the lock.

That requires taking out the __user modifier from all the relevant
read methods as well as additional changes to not use any userspace
write helpers. That is,

  1) The put_user() call is replaced by a direct copy.
  2) The copy_to_user() call is replaced by memcpy().
  3) All the fault handling code is removed.

Compiling on a x86-64 system, the size of the rxrpc_read() function is
reduced from 3795 bytes to 2384 bytes with this patch.

Fixes: ^1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Waiman Long <longman@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 8, 2020
Patch series "mm: memcontrol: recursive memory.low protection", v3.

The current memory.low (and memory.min) semantics require protection to be
assigned to a cgroup in an untinterrupted chain from the top-level cgroup
all the way to the leaf.

In practice, we want to protect entire cgroup subtrees from each other
(system management software vs.  workload), but we would like the VM to
balance memory optimally *within* each subtree, without having to make
explicit weight allocations among individual components.  The current
semantics make that impossible.

They also introduce unmanageable complexity into more advanced resource
trees.  For example:

          host root
          `- system.slice
             `- rpm upgrades
             `- logging
          `- workload.slice
             `- a container
                `- system.slice
                `- workload.slice
                   `- job A
                      `- component 1
                      `- component 2
                   `- job B

At a host-level perspective, we would like to protect the outer
workload.slice subtree as a whole from rpm upgrades, logging etc.  But for
that to be effective, right now we'd have to propagate it down through the
container, the inner workload.slice, into the job cgroup and ultimately
the component cgroups where memory is actually, physically allocated.
This may cross several tree delegation points and namespace boundaries,
which make such a setup near impossible.

CPU and IO on the other hand are already distributed recursively.  The
user would simply configure allowances at the host level, and they would
apply to the entire subtree without any downward propagation.

To enable the above-mentioned usecases and bring memory in line with other
resource controllers, this patch series extends memory.low/min such that
settings apply recursively to the entire subtree.  Users can still assign
explicit shares in subgroups, but if they don't, any ancestral protection
will be distributed such that children compete freely amongst each other -
as if no memory control were enabled inside the subtree - but enjoy
protection from neighboring trees.

In the above example, the user would then be able to configure shares of
CPU, IO and memory at the host level to comprehensively protect and
isolate the workload.slice as a whole from system.slice activity.

Patch #1 fixes an existing bug that can give a cgroup tree more protection
than it should receive as per ancestor configuration.

Patch #2 simplifies and documents the existing code to make it easier to
reason about the changes in the next patch.

Patch #3 finally implements recursive memory protection semantics.

Because of a risk of regressing legacy setups, the new semantics are
hidden behind a cgroup2 mount option, 'memory_recursiveprot'.

More details in patch #3.

This patch (of 3):

When memory.low is overcommitted - i.e.  the children claim more
protection than their shared ancestor grants them - the allowance is
distributed in proportion to how much each sibling uses their own declared
protection:

	low_usage = min(memory.low, memory.current)
	elow = parent_elow * (low_usage / siblings_low_usage)

However, siblings_low_usage is not the sum of all low_usages. It sums
up the usages of *only those cgroups that are within their memory.low*
That means that low_usage can be *bigger* than siblings_low_usage, and
consequently the total protection afforded to the children can be
bigger than what the ancestor grants the subtree.

Consider three groups where two are in excess of their protection:

  A/memory.low = 10G
  A/A1/memory.low = 10G, memory.current = 20G
  A/A2/memory.low = 10G, memory.current = 20G
  A/A3/memory.low = 10G, memory.current =  8G
  siblings_low_usage = 8G (only A3 contributes)

  A1/elow = parent_elow(10G) * low_usage(10G) / siblings_low_usage(8G) = 12.5G -> 10G
  A2/elow = parent_elow(10G) * low_usage(10G) / siblings_low_usage(8G) = 12.5G -> 10G
  A3/elow = parent_elow(10G) * low_usage(8G) / siblings_low_usage(8G) = 10.0G

  (the 12.5G are capped to the explicit memory.low setting of 10G)

With that, the sum of all awarded protection below A is 30G, when A
only grants 10G for the entire subtree.

What does this mean in practice? A1 and A2 would still be in excess of
their 10G allowance and would be reclaimed, whereas A3 would not. As
they eventually drop below their protection setting, they would be
counted in siblings_low_usage again and the error would right itself.

When reclaim was applied in a binary fashion (cgroup is reclaimed when
it's above its protection, otherwise it's skipped) this would actually
work out just fine. However, since 1bc63fb ("mm, memcg: make scan
aggression always exclude protection"), reclaim pressure is scaled to
how much a cgroup is above its protection. As a result this
calculation error unduly skews pressure away from A1 and A2 toward the
rest of the system.

But why did we do it like this in the first place?

The reasoning behind exempting groups in excess from
siblings_low_usage was to go after them first during reclaim in an
overcommitted subtree:

  A/memory.low = 2G, memory.current = 4G
  A/A1/memory.low = 3G, memory.current = 2G
  A/A2/memory.low = 1G, memory.current = 2G

  siblings_low_usage = 2G (only A1 contributes)
  A1/elow = parent_elow(2G) * low_usage(2G) / siblings_low_usage(2G) = 2G
  A2/elow = parent_elow(2G) * low_usage(1G) / siblings_low_usage(2G) = 1G

While the children combined are overcomitting A and are technically
both at fault, A2 is actively declaring unprotected memory and we
would like to reclaim that first.

However, while this sounds like a noble goal on the face of it, it
doesn't make much difference in actual memory distribution: Because A
is overcommitted, reclaim will not stop once A2 gets pushed back to
within its allowance; we'll have to reclaim A1 either way. The end
result is still that protection is distributed proportionally, with A1
getting 3/4 (1.5G) and A2 getting 1/4 (0.5G) of A's allowance.

[ If A weren't overcommitted, it wouldn't make a difference since each
  cgroup would just get the protection it declares:

  A/memory.low = 2G, memory.current = 3G
  A/A1/memory.low = 1G, memory.current = 1G
  A/A2/memory.low = 1G, memory.current = 2G

  With the current calculation:

  siblings_low_usage = 1G (only A1 contributes)
  A1/elow = parent_elow(2G) * low_usage(1G) / siblings_low_usage(1G) = 2G -> 1G
  A2/elow = parent_elow(2G) * low_usage(1G) / siblings_low_usage(1G) = 2G -> 1G

  Including excess groups in siblings_low_usage:

  siblings_low_usage = 2G
  A1/elow = parent_elow(2G) * low_usage(1G) / siblings_low_usage(2G) = 1G -> 1G
  A2/elow = parent_elow(2G) * low_usage(1G) / siblings_low_usage(2G) = 1G -> 1G ]

Simplify the calculation and fix the proportional reclaim bug by
including excess cgroups in siblings_low_usage.

After this patch, the effective memory.low distribution from the
example above would be as follows:

  A/memory.low = 10G
  A/A1/memory.low = 10G, memory.current = 20G
  A/A2/memory.low = 10G, memory.current = 20G
  A/A3/memory.low = 10G, memory.current =  8G
  siblings_low_usage = 28G

  A1/elow = parent_elow(10G) * low_usage(10G) / siblings_low_usage(28G) = 3.5G
  A2/elow = parent_elow(10G) * low_usage(10G) / siblings_low_usage(28G) = 3.5G
  A3/elow = parent_elow(10G) * low_usage(8G) / siblings_low_usage(28G) = 2.8G

Fixes: 1bc63fb ("mm, memcg: make scan aggression always exclude protection")
Fixes: 2306715 ("mm: memory.low hierarchical behavior")
Signed-off-by: Johannes Weiner <hannes@cmpxchg.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
Acked-by: Tejun Heo <tj@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Roman Gushchin <guro@fb.com>
Acked-by: Chris Down <chris@chrisdown.name>
Acked-by: Michal Hocko <mhocko@suse.com>
Cc: Michal Koutný <mkoutny@suse.com>
Link: http://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200227195606.46212-2-hannes@cmpxchg.org
Signed-off-by: Linus Torvalds <torvalds@linux-foundation.org>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 17, 2020
We hit following warning when running tests on kernel
compiled with CONFIG_DEBUG_ATOMIC_SLEEP=y:

 WARNING: CPU: 19 PID: 4472 at mm/gup.c:2381 __get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200
 CPU: 19 PID: 4472 Comm: dummy Not tainted 5.6.0-rc6+ #3
 RIP: 0010:__get_user_pages_fast+0x1a4/0x200
 ...
 Call Trace:
  perf_prepare_sample+0xff1/0x1d90
  perf_event_output_forward+0xe8/0x210
  __perf_event_overflow+0x11a/0x310
  __intel_pmu_pebs_event+0x657/0x850
  intel_pmu_drain_pebs_nhm+0x7de/0x11d0
  handle_pmi_common+0x1b2/0x650
  intel_pmu_handle_irq+0x17b/0x370
  perf_event_nmi_handler+0x40/0x60
  nmi_handle+0x192/0x590
  default_do_nmi+0x6d/0x150
  do_nmi+0x2f9/0x3c0
  nmi+0x8e/0xd7

While __get_user_pages_fast() is IRQ-safe, it calls access_ok(),
which warns on:

  WARN_ON_ONCE(!in_task() && !pagefault_disabled())

Peter suggested disabling page faults around __get_user_pages_fast(),
which gets rid of the warning in access_ok() call.

Suggested-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200407141427.3184722-1-jolsa@kernel.org
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 17, 2020
sched/core.c uses update_avg() for rq->avg_idle and sched/fair.c uses an
open-coded version (with the exact same decay factor) for
rq->avg_scan_cost. On top of that, select_idle_cpu() expects to be able to
compare these two fields.

The only difference between the two is that rq->avg_scan_cost is computed
using a pure division rather than a shift. Turns out it actually matters,
first of all because the shifted value can be negative, and the standard
has this to say about it:

  """
  The result of E1 >> E2 is E1 right-shifted E2 bit positions. [...] If E1
  has a signed type and a negative value, the resulting value is
  implementation-defined.
  """

Not only this, but (arithmetic) right shifting a negative value (using 2's
complement) is *not* equivalent to dividing it by the corresponding power
of 2. Let's look at a few examples:

  -4      -> 0xF..FC
  -4 >> 3 -> 0xF..FF == -1 != -4 / 8

  -8      -> 0xF..F8
  -8 >> 3 -> 0xF..FF == -1 == -8 / 8

  -9      -> 0xF..F7
  -9 >> 3 -> 0xF..FE == -2 != -9 / 8

Make update_avg() use a division, and export it to the private scheduler
header to reuse it where relevant. Note that this still lets compilers use
a shift here, but should prevent any unwanted surprise. The disassembly of
select_idle_cpu() remains unchanged on arm64, and ttwu_do_wakeup() gains 2
instructions; the diff sort of looks like this:

  - sub x1, x1, x0
  + subs x1, x1, x0 // set condition codes
  + add x0, x1, #0x7
  + csel x0, x0, x1, mi // x0 = x1 < 0 ? x0 : x1
    add x0, x3, x0, asr #3

which does the right thing (i.e. gives us the expected result while still
using an arithmetic shift)

Signed-off-by: Valentin Schneider <valentin.schneider@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: Peter Zijlstra (Intel) <peterz@infradead.org>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20200330090127.16294-1-valentin.schneider@arm.com
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 23, 2020
Florian Fainelli says:

====================
dt-bindings: net: mdio.yaml fixes

This patch series documents some common MDIO devices properties such as
resets (and delays) and broken-turn-around. The second patch also
rephrases some descriptions to be more general towards MDIO devices and
not specific towards Ethernet PHYs.

Changes in v3:

- corrected wording of 'broken-turn-around' in ethernet-phy.yaml and
  mdio.yaml, add Andrew's R-b tag to patch #3
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 25, 2020
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
mlxsw: Mirroring cleanups

This patch set contains various cleanups in SPAN (mirroring) code
noticed by Amit and I while working on future enhancements in this area.
No functional changes intended. Tested by current mirroring selftests.

Patches #1-#2 from Amit reduce nesting in a certain function and rename
a callback to a more meaningful name.

Patch #3 removes debug prints that have little value.

Patch #4 converts a reference count to 'refcount_t' in order to catch
over/under flows.

Patch #5 replaces a zero-length array with flexible-array member in
order to get a compiler warning in case the flexible array does not
occur last in the structure.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue Apr 27, 2020
Luo bin says:

====================
hinic: add SR-IOV support

patch #1 adds mailbox channel support and vf can
communicate with pf or hw through it.
patch #2 adds support for enabling vf and tx/rx
capabilities based on vf.
patch #3 adds support for vf's basic configurations.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 3, 2020
As discussed at LPC 2019 ([0]), this patch brings (a quite belated) support
for declarative BTF-defined map-in-map support in libbpf. It allows to define
ARRAY_OF_MAPS and HASH_OF_MAPS BPF maps without any user-space initialization
code involved.

Additionally, it allows to initialize outer map's slots with references to
respective inner maps at load time, also completely declaratively.

Despite a weak type system of C, the way BTF-defined map-in-map definition
works, it's actually quite hard to accidentally initialize outer map with
incompatible inner maps. This being C, of course, it's still possible, but
even that would be caught at load time and error returned with helpful debug
log pointing exactly to the slot that failed to be initialized.

As an example, here's a rather advanced HASH_OF_MAPS declaration and
initialization example, filling slots #0 and #4 with two inner maps:

  #include <bpf/bpf_helpers.h>

  struct inner_map {
          __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_ARRAY);
          __uint(max_entries, 1);
          __type(key, int);
          __type(value, int);
  } inner_map1 SEC(".maps"),
    inner_map2 SEC(".maps");

  struct outer_hash {
          __uint(type, BPF_MAP_TYPE_HASH_OF_MAPS);
          __uint(max_entries, 5);
          __uint(key_size, sizeof(int));
          __array(values, struct inner_map);
  } outer_hash SEC(".maps") = {
          .values = {
                  [0] = &inner_map2,
                  [4] = &inner_map1,
          },
  };

Here's the relevant part of libbpf debug log showing pretty clearly of what's
going on with map-in-map initialization:

  libbpf: .maps relo #0: for 6 value 0 rel.r_offset 96 name 260 ('inner_map1')
  libbpf: .maps relo #0: map 'outer_arr' slot [0] points to map 'inner_map1'
  libbpf: .maps relo #1: for 7 value 32 rel.r_offset 112 name 249 ('inner_map2')
  libbpf: .maps relo #1: map 'outer_arr' slot [2] points to map 'inner_map2'
  libbpf: .maps relo #2: for 7 value 32 rel.r_offset 144 name 249 ('inner_map2')
  libbpf: .maps relo #2: map 'outer_hash' slot [0] points to map 'inner_map2'
  libbpf: .maps relo #3: for 6 value 0 rel.r_offset 176 name 260 ('inner_map1')
  libbpf: .maps relo #3: map 'outer_hash' slot [4] points to map 'inner_map1'
  libbpf: map 'inner_map1': created successfully, fd=4
  libbpf: map 'inner_map2': created successfully, fd=5
  libbpf: map 'outer_hash': created successfully, fd=7
  libbpf: map 'outer_hash': slot [0] set to map 'inner_map2' fd=5
  libbpf: map 'outer_hash': slot [4] set to map 'inner_map1' fd=4

Notice from the log above that fd=6 (not logged explicitly) is used for inner
"prototype" map, necessary for creation of outer map. It is destroyed
immediately after outer map is created.

See also included selftest with some extra comments explaining extra details
of usage. Additionally, similar initialization syntax and libbpf functionality
can be used to do initialization of BPF_PROG_ARRAY with references to BPF
sub-programs. This can be done in follow up patches, if there will be a demand
for this.

  [0] https://linuxplumbersconf.org/event/4/contributions/448/

Signed-off-by: Andrii Nakryiko <andriin@fb.com>
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Toke Høiland-Jørgensen <toke@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/bpf/20200429002739.48006-4-andriin@fb.com
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 3, 2020
Andrii Nakryiko says:

====================
This patch set teaches libbpf how to declare and initialize ARRAY_OF_MAPS and
HASH_OF_MAPS maps. See patch #3 for all the details.

Patch #1 refactors parsing BTF definition of map to re-use it cleanly for
inner map definition parsing.

Patch #2 refactors map creation and destruction logic for reuse. It also fixes
existing bug with not closing successfully created maps when bpf_object map
creation overall fails.

Patch #3 adds support for an extension of BTF-defined map syntax, as well as
parsing, recording, and use of relocations to allow declaratively initialize
outer maps with references to inner maps.

v1->v2:
  - rename __inner to __array (Alexei).
====================

Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 8, 2020
Use follow_pfn() to get the PFN of a PFNMAP VMA instead of assuming that
vma->vm_pgoff holds the base PFN of the VMA.  This fixes a bug where
attempting to do VFIO_IOMMU_MAP_DMA on an arbitrary PFNMAP'd region of
memory calculates garbage for the PFN.

Hilariously, this only got detected because the first "PFN" calculated
by vaddr_get_pfn() is PFN 0 (vma->vm_pgoff==0), and iommu_iova_to_phys()
uses PA==0 as an error, which triggers a WARN in vfio_unmap_unpin()
because the translation "failed".  PFN 0 is now unconditionally reserved
on x86 in order to mitigate L1TF, which causes is_invalid_reserved_pfn()
to return true and in turns results in vaddr_get_pfn() returning success
for PFN 0.  Eventually the bogus calculation runs into PFNs that aren't
reserved and leads to failure in vfio_pin_map_dma().  The subsequent
call to vfio_remove_dma() attempts to unmap PFN 0 and WARNs.

  WARNING: CPU: 8 PID: 5130 at drivers/vfio/vfio_iommu_type1.c:750 vfio_unmap_unpin+0x2e1/0x310 [vfio_iommu_type1]
  Modules linked in: vfio_pci vfio_virqfd vfio_iommu_type1 vfio ...
  CPU: 8 PID: 5130 Comm: sgx Tainted: G        W         5.6.0-rc5-705d787c7fee-vfio+ #3
  Hardware name: Intel Corporation Mehlow UP Server Platform/Moss Beach Server, BIOS CNLSE2R1.D00.X119.B49.1803010910 03/01/2018
  RIP: 0010:vfio_unmap_unpin+0x2e1/0x310 [vfio_iommu_type1]
  Code: <0f> 0b 49 81 c5 00 10 00 00 e9 c5 fe ff ff bb 00 10 00 00 e9 3d fe
  RSP: 0018:ffffbeb5039ebda8 EFLAGS: 00010246
  RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ffff9a55cbf8d480 RCX: 0000000000000000
  RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000001 RDI: ffff9a52b771c200
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000040 R09: 00000000fffffff2
  R10: 0000000000000001 R11: ffff9a51fa896000 R12: 0000000184010000
  R13: 0000000184000000 R14: 0000000000010000 R15: ffff9a55cb66ea08
  FS:  00007f15d3830b40(0000) GS:ffff9a55d5600000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
  CS:  0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
  CR2: 0000561cf39429e0 CR3: 000000084f75f005 CR4: 00000000003626e0
  DR0: 0000000000000000 DR1: 0000000000000000 DR2: 0000000000000000
  DR3: 0000000000000000 DR6: 00000000fffe0ff0 DR7: 0000000000000400
  Call Trace:
   vfio_remove_dma+0x17/0x70 [vfio_iommu_type1]
   vfio_iommu_type1_ioctl+0x9e3/0xa7b [vfio_iommu_type1]
   ksys_ioctl+0x92/0xb0
   __x64_sys_ioctl+0x16/0x20
   do_syscall_64+0x4c/0x180
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x44/0xa9
  RIP: 0033:0x7f15d04c75d7
  Code: <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 8b 0d 81 48 2d 00 f7 d8 64 89 01 48

Fixes: 73fa0d1 ("vfio: Type1 IOMMU implementation")
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <sean.j.christopherson@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Alex Williamson <alex.williamson@redhat.com>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 8, 2020
…f fs_info::journal_info

[BUG]
One run of btrfs/063 triggered the following lockdep warning:
  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  kworker/u24:0/7 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(sb_internal#2);
    lock(sb_internal#2);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  4 locks held by kworker/u24:0/7:
   #0: ffff88817b495948 ((wq_completion)btrfs-endio-write){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #1: ffff888189ea7db8 ((work_completion)(&work->normal_work)){+.+.}, at: process_one_work+0x557/0xb80
   #2: ffff88817d3a46e0 (sb_internal#2){.+.+}, at: start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   #3: ffff888174ca4da8 (&fs_info->reloc_mutex){+.+.}, at: btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x83/0xd0 [btrfs]

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 PID: 7 Comm: kworker/u24:0 Not tainted 5.6.0-rc7-custom+ #48
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
  Workqueue: btrfs-endio-write btrfs_work_helper [btrfs]
  Call Trace:
   dump_stack+0xc2/0x11a
   __lock_acquire.cold+0xce/0x214
   lock_acquire+0xe6/0x210
   __sb_start_write+0x14e/0x290
   start_transaction+0x66c/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   find_free_extent+0x1504/0x1a50 [btrfs]
   btrfs_reserve_extent+0xd5/0x1f0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_alloc_tree_block+0x1ac/0x570 [btrfs]
   btrfs_copy_root+0x213/0x580 [btrfs]
   create_reloc_root+0x3bd/0x470 [btrfs]
   btrfs_init_reloc_root+0x2d2/0x310 [btrfs]
   record_root_in_trans+0x191/0x1d0 [btrfs]
   btrfs_record_root_in_trans+0x90/0xd0 [btrfs]
   start_transaction+0x16e/0x890 [btrfs]
   btrfs_join_transaction+0x1d/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_finish_ordered_io+0x55d/0xcd0 [btrfs]
   finish_ordered_fn+0x15/0x20 [btrfs]
   btrfs_work_helper+0x116/0x9a0 [btrfs]
   process_one_work+0x632/0xb80
   worker_thread+0x80/0x690
   kthread+0x1a3/0x1f0
   ret_from_fork+0x27/0x50

It's pretty hard to reproduce, only one hit so far.

[CAUSE]
This is because we're calling btrfs_join_transaction() without re-using
the current running one:

btrfs_finish_ordered_io()
|- btrfs_join_transaction()		<<< Call #1
   |- btrfs_record_root_in_trans()
      |- btrfs_reserve_extent()
	 |- btrfs_join_transaction()	<<< Call #2

Normally such btrfs_join_transaction() call should re-use the existing
one, without trying to re-start a transaction.

But the problem is, in btrfs_join_transaction() call #1, we call
btrfs_record_root_in_trans() before initializing current::journal_info.

And in btrfs_join_transaction() call #2, we're relying on
current::journal_info to avoid such deadlock.

[FIX]
Call btrfs_record_root_in_trans() after we have initialized
current::journal_info.

CC: stable@vger.kernel.org # 4.4+
Signed-off-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 8, 2020
…nsmission

The mptcp_connect self-tests with additional '-m mmap' argument triggers a
(harmless) WARN_ON_ONCE splat in mptcp_reset_timer() as the mptcp timer
is not initialized yet.

This is because the timer is only set up after the transmit loop, but
consecutive iterations can trigger the splat.

Make sure the timer is set as soon as we pass the first chunk of data.

Closes: #3
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 8, 2020
…nsmission

The mptcp_connect self-tests with additional '-m mmap' argument triggers a
(harmless) WARN_ON_ONCE splat in mptcp_reset_timer() as the mptcp timer
is not initialized yet.

This is because the timer is only set up after the transmit loop, but
consecutive iterations can trigger the splat.

Make sure the timer is set as soon as we pass the first chunk of data.

Closes: #3
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 8, 2020
…nsmission

The mptcp_connect self-tests with additional '-m mmap' argument triggers a
(harmless) WARN_ON_ONCE splat in mptcp_reset_timer() as the mptcp timer
is not initialized yet.

This is because the timer is only set up after the transmit loop, but
consecutive iterations can trigger the splat.

Make sure the timer is set as soon as we pass the first chunk of data.

Closes: #3
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 10, 2020
…nsmission

The mptcp_connect self-tests with additional '-m mmap' argument triggers a
(harmless) WARN_ON_ONCE splat in mptcp_reset_timer() as the mptcp timer
is not initialized yet.

This is because the timer is only set up after the transmit loop, but
consecutive iterations can trigger the splat.

Make sure the timer is set as soon as we pass the first chunk of data.

Closes: #3
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
jenkins-tessares pushed a commit that referenced this issue May 11, 2020
…nsmission

The mptcp_connect self-tests with additional '-m mmap' argument triggers a
(harmless) WARN_ON_ONCE splat in mptcp_reset_timer() as the mptcp timer
is not initialized yet.

This is because the timer is only set up after the transmit loop, but
consecutive iterations can trigger the splat.

Make sure the timer is set as soon as we pass the first chunk of data.

Closes: #3
Signed-off-by: Florian Westphal <fw@strlen.de>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 3, 2024
Sebastian Andrzej Siewior says:

====================
net: bpf_net_context cleanups.

a small series with bpf_net_context cleanups/ improvements.
Jakub asked for #1 and #2 and while looking around I made #3.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240628103020.1766241-1-bigeasy@linutronix.de
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 5, 2024
…play

During inode logging (and log replay too), we are holding a transaction
handle and we often need to call btrfs_iget(), which will read an inode
from its subvolume btree if it's not loaded in memory and that results in
allocating an inode with GFP_KERNEL semantics at the btrfs_alloc_inode()
callback - and this may recurse into the filesystem in case we are under
memory pressure and attempt to commit the current transaction, resulting
in a deadlock since the logging (or log replay) task is holding a
transaction handle open.

Syzbot reported this with the following stack traces:

  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00361-g061d1af7b030 #0 Not tainted
  ------------------------------------------------------
  syz-executor.1/9919 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline]
  ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3891 [inline]
  ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
  ffffffff8dd3aac0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4020

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88804b569358 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_log_inode+0x39c/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6481

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

  the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #3 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __mutex_lock_common kernel/locking/mutex.c:608 [inline]
         __mutex_lock+0x175/0x9c0 kernel/locking/mutex.c:752
         btrfs_log_inode+0x39c/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6481
         btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x8cb/0x2a90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7079
         btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7180
         btrfs_sync_file+0x9c1/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1959
         vfs_fsync_range+0x141/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
         generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2794 [inline]
         btrfs_do_write_iter+0x584/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1705
         new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
         vfs_write+0x6b6/0x1140 fs/read_write.c:590
         ksys_write+0x12f/0x260 fs/read_write.c:643
         do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
         __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
         do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
         entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e

  -> #2 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}:
         join_transaction+0x164/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:315
         start_transaction+0x427/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:700
         btrfs_commit_super+0xa1/0x110 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4170
         close_ctree+0xcb0/0xf90 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:4324
         generic_shutdown_super+0x159/0x3d0 fs/super.c:642
         kill_anon_super+0x3a/0x60 fs/super.c:1226
         btrfs_kill_super+0x3b/0x50 fs/btrfs/super.c:2096
         deactivate_locked_super+0xbe/0x1a0 fs/super.c:473
         deactivate_super+0xde/0x100 fs/super.c:506
         cleanup_mnt+0x222/0x450 fs/namespace.c:1267
         task_work_run+0x14e/0x250 kernel/task_work.c:180
         resume_user_mode_work include/linux/resume_user_mode.h:50 [inline]
         exit_to_user_mode_loop kernel/entry/common.c:114 [inline]
         exit_to_user_mode_prepare include/linux/entry-common.h:328 [inline]
         __syscall_exit_to_user_mode_work kernel/entry/common.c:207 [inline]
         syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x278/0x2a0 kernel/entry/common.c:218
         __do_fast_syscall_32+0x80/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:389
         do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
         entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e

  -> #1 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}:
         __lock_release kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5468 [inline]
         lock_release+0x33e/0x6c0 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5774
         percpu_up_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:99 [inline]
         __sb_end_write include/linux/fs.h:1650 [inline]
         sb_end_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1767 [inline]
         __btrfs_end_transaction+0x5ca/0x920 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:1071
         btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x228/0x330 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1301
         btrfs_evict_inode+0x960/0xe80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5291
         evict+0x2ed/0x6c0 fs/inode.c:667
         iput_final fs/inode.c:1741 [inline]
         iput.part.0+0x5a8/0x7f0 fs/inode.c:1767
         iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1757
         dentry_unlink_inode+0x295/0x480 fs/dcache.c:400
         __dentry_kill+0x1d0/0x600 fs/dcache.c:603
         dput.part.0+0x4b1/0x9b0 fs/dcache.c:845
         dput+0x1f/0x30 fs/dcache.c:835
         ovl_stack_put+0x60/0x90 fs/overlayfs/util.c:132
         ovl_destroy_inode+0xc6/0x190 fs/overlayfs/super.c:182
         destroy_inode+0xc4/0x1b0 fs/inode.c:311
         iput_final fs/inode.c:1741 [inline]
         iput.part.0+0x5a8/0x7f0 fs/inode.c:1767
         iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1757
         dentry_unlink_inode+0x295/0x480 fs/dcache.c:400
         __dentry_kill+0x1d0/0x600 fs/dcache.c:603
         shrink_kill fs/dcache.c:1048 [inline]
         shrink_dentry_list+0x140/0x5d0 fs/dcache.c:1075
         prune_dcache_sb+0xeb/0x150 fs/dcache.c:1156
         super_cache_scan+0x32a/0x550 fs/super.c:221
         do_shrink_slab+0x44f/0x11c0 mm/shrinker.c:435
         shrink_slab_memcg mm/shrinker.c:548 [inline]
         shrink_slab+0xa87/0x1310 mm/shrinker.c:626
         shrink_one+0x493/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4790
         shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4851 [inline]
         lru_gen_shrink_node+0x89f/0x1750 mm/vmscan.c:4951
         shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5910 [inline]
         kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6720 [inline]
         balance_pgdat+0x1105/0x1970 mm/vmscan.c:6911
         kswapd+0x5ea/0xbf0 mm/vmscan.c:7180
         kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
         ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
         ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

  -> #0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
         check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
         check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
         validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 [inline]
         __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
         lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 [inline]
         lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719
         __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3801 [inline]
         fs_reclaim_acquire+0x102/0x160 mm/page_alloc.c:3815
         might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline]
         slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3891 [inline]
         slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
         kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4020
         btrfs_alloc_inode+0x118/0xb20 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8411
         alloc_inode+0x5d/0x230 fs/inode.c:261
         iget5_locked fs/inode.c:1235 [inline]
         iget5_locked+0x1c9/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1228
         btrfs_iget_locked fs/btrfs/inode.c:5590 [inline]
         btrfs_iget_path fs/btrfs/inode.c:5607 [inline]
         btrfs_iget+0xfb/0x230 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5636
         add_conflicting_inode fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5657 [inline]
         copy_inode_items_to_log+0x1039/0x1e30 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5928
         btrfs_log_inode+0xa48/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6592
         log_new_delayed_dentries fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6363 [inline]
         btrfs_log_inode+0x27dd/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6718
         btrfs_log_all_parents fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6833 [inline]
         btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x22ba/0x2a90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7141
         btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7180
         btrfs_sync_file+0x9c1/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1959
         vfs_fsync_range+0x141/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
         generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2794 [inline]
         btrfs_do_write_iter+0x584/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1705
         do_iter_readv_writev+0x504/0x780 fs/read_write.c:741
         vfs_writev+0x36f/0xde0 fs/read_write.c:971
         do_pwritev+0x1b2/0x260 fs/read_write.c:1072
         __do_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1218 [inline]
         __se_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1210 [inline]
         __ia32_compat_sys_pwritev2+0x121/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:1210
         do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
         __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
         do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
         entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e

  other info that might help us debug this:

  Chain exists of:
    fs_reclaim --> btrfs_trans_num_extwriters --> &ei->log_mutex

   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0                    CPU1
         ----                    ----
    lock(&ei->log_mutex);
                                 lock(btrfs_trans_num_extwriters);
                                 lock(&ei->log_mutex);
    lock(fs_reclaim);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

  7 locks held by syz-executor.1/9919:
   #0: ffff88802be20420 (sb_writers#23){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: do_pwritev+0x1b2/0x260 fs/read_write.c:1072
   #1: ffff888065c0f8f0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#33){++++}-{3:3}, at: inode_lock include/linux/fs.h:791 [inline]
   #1: ffff888065c0f8f0 (&sb->s_type->i_mutex_key#33){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_inode_lock+0xc8/0x110 fs/btrfs/inode.c:385
   #2: ffff888065c0f778 (&ei->i_mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_inode_lock+0xee/0x110 fs/btrfs/inode.c:388
   #3: ffff88802be20610 (sb_internal#4){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_sync_file+0x95b/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1952
   #4: ffff8880546323f0 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x430/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:290
   #5: ffff888054632418 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}, at: join_transaction+0x430/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:290
   #6: ffff88804b569358 (&ei->log_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: btrfs_log_inode+0x39c/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6481

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 2 PID: 9919 Comm: syz-executor.1 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00361-g061d1af7b030 #0
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <TASK>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114
   check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
   check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
   check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
   validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 [inline]
   __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
   lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 [inline]
   lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719
   __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3801 [inline]
   fs_reclaim_acquire+0x102/0x160 mm/page_alloc.c:3815
   might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline]
   slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3891 [inline]
   slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3981 [inline]
   kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4020
   btrfs_alloc_inode+0x118/0xb20 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8411
   alloc_inode+0x5d/0x230 fs/inode.c:261
   iget5_locked fs/inode.c:1235 [inline]
   iget5_locked+0x1c9/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1228
   btrfs_iget_locked fs/btrfs/inode.c:5590 [inline]
   btrfs_iget_path fs/btrfs/inode.c:5607 [inline]
   btrfs_iget+0xfb/0x230 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5636
   add_conflicting_inode fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5657 [inline]
   copy_inode_items_to_log+0x1039/0x1e30 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:5928
   btrfs_log_inode+0xa48/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6592
   log_new_delayed_dentries fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6363 [inline]
   btrfs_log_inode+0x27dd/0x4660 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6718
   btrfs_log_all_parents fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:6833 [inline]
   btrfs_log_inode_parent+0x22ba/0x2a90 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7141
   btrfs_log_dentry_safe+0x59/0x80 fs/btrfs/tree-log.c:7180
   btrfs_sync_file+0x9c1/0xe10 fs/btrfs/file.c:1959
   vfs_fsync_range+0x141/0x230 fs/sync.c:188
   generic_write_sync include/linux/fs.h:2794 [inline]
   btrfs_do_write_iter+0x584/0x10c0 fs/btrfs/file.c:1705
   do_iter_readv_writev+0x504/0x780 fs/read_write.c:741
   vfs_writev+0x36f/0xde0 fs/read_write.c:971
   do_pwritev+0x1b2/0x260 fs/read_write.c:1072
   __do_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1218 [inline]
   __se_compat_sys_pwritev2 fs/read_write.c:1210 [inline]
   __ia32_compat_sys_pwritev2+0x121/0x1b0 fs/read_write.c:1210
   do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
   __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
   do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
   entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e
  RIP: 0023:0xf7334579
  Code: b8 01 10 06 03 (...)
  RSP: 002b:00000000f5f265ac EFLAGS: 00000292 ORIG_RAX: 000000000000017b
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000004 RCX: 00000000200002c0
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
  RBP: 0000000000000000 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000292 R12: 0000000000000000
  R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 0000000000000000

Fix this by ensuring we are under a NOFS scope whenever we call
btrfs_iget() during inode logging and log replay.

Reported-by: syzbot+8576cfa84070dce4d59b@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000274a3a061abbd928@google.com/
Fixes: 712e36c ("btrfs: use GFP_KERNEL in btrfs_alloc_inode")
Reviewed-by: Johannes Thumshirn <johannes.thumshirn@wdc.com>
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Reviewed-by: Qu Wenruo <wqu@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 10, 2024
Since f663a03 ("bpf, x64: Remove tail call detection"),
tail_call_reachable won't be detected in x86 JIT. And, tail_call_reachable
is provided by verifier.

Therefore, in test_bpf, the tail_call_reachable must be provided in test
cases before running.

Fix and test:

[  174.828662] test_bpf: #0 Tail call leaf jited:1 170 PASS
[  174.829574] test_bpf: #1 Tail call 2 jited:1 244 PASS
[  174.830363] test_bpf: #2 Tail call 3 jited:1 296 PASS
[  174.830924] test_bpf: #3 Tail call 4 jited:1 719 PASS
[  174.831863] test_bpf: #4 Tail call load/store leaf jited:1 197 PASS
[  174.832240] test_bpf: #5 Tail call load/store jited:1 326 PASS
[  174.832240] test_bpf: #6 Tail call error path, max count reached jited:1 2214 PASS
[  174.835713] test_bpf: #7 Tail call count preserved across function calls jited:1 609751 PASS
[  175.446098] test_bpf: #8 Tail call error path, NULL target jited:1 472 PASS
[  175.447597] test_bpf: #9 Tail call error path, index out of range jited:1 206 PASS
[  175.448833] test_bpf: test_tail_calls: Summary: 10 PASSED, 0 FAILED, [10/10 JIT'ed]

Reported-by: kernel test robot <oliver.sang@intel.com>
Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-lkp/202406251415.c51865bc-oliver.sang@intel.com
Fixes: f663a03 ("bpf, x64: Remove tail call detection")
Signed-off-by: Leon Hwang <hffilwlqm@gmail.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240625145351.40072-1-hffilwlqm@gmail.com
Signed-off-by: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 12, 2024
Bos can be put with multiple unrelated dma-resv locks held. But
imported bos attempt to grab the bo dma-resv during dma-buf detach
that typically happens during cleanup. That leads to lockde splats
similar to the below and a potential ABBA deadlock.

Fix this by always taking the delayed workqueue cleanup path for
imported bos.

Requesting stable fixes from when the Xe driver was introduced,
since its usage of drm_exec and wide vm dma_resvs appear to be
the first reliable trigger of this.

[22982.116427] ============================================
[22982.116428] WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
[22982.116429] 6.10.0-rc2+ #10 Tainted: G     U  W
[22982.116430] --------------------------------------------
[22982.116430] glxgears:sh0/5785 is trying to acquire lock:
[22982.116431] ffff8c2bafa539a8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116438]
               but task is already holding lock:
[22982.116438] ffff8c2d9aba6da8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_exec_lock_obj+0x49/0x2b0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116442]
               other info that might help us debug this:
[22982.116442]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

[22982.116443]        CPU0
[22982.116444]        ----
[22982.116444]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[22982.116445]   lock(reservation_ww_class_mutex);
[22982.116447]
                *** DEADLOCK ***

[22982.116447]  May be due to missing lock nesting notation

[22982.116448] 5 locks held by glxgears:sh0/5785:
[22982.116449]  #0: ffff8c2d9aba58c8 (&xef->vm.lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: xe_file_close+0xde/0x1c0 [xe]
[22982.116507]  #1: ffff8c2e28cc8480 (&vm->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: xe_vm_close_and_put+0x161/0x9b0 [xe]
[22982.116578]  #2: ffff8c2e31982970 (&val->lock){.+.+}-{3:3}, at: xe_validation_ctx_init+0x6d/0x70 [xe]
[22982.116647]  #3: ffffacdc469478a8 (reservation_ww_class_acquire){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0x7f/0xe0 [xe]
[22982.116716]  #4: ffff8c2d9aba6da8 (reservation_ww_class_mutex){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: drm_exec_lock_obj+0x49/0x2b0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116719]
               stack backtrace:
[22982.116720] CPU: 8 PID: 5785 Comm: glxgears:sh0 Tainted: G     U  W          6.10.0-rc2+ #10
[22982.116721] Hardware name: ASUS System Product Name/PRIME B560M-A AC, BIOS 2001 02/01/2023
[22982.116723] Call Trace:
[22982.116724]  <TASK>
[22982.116725]  dump_stack_lvl+0x77/0xb0
[22982.116727]  __lock_acquire+0x1232/0x2160
[22982.116730]  lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
[22982.116732]  ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116734]  ? __lock_acquire+0x417/0x2160
[22982.116736]  __ww_mutex_lock.constprop.0+0xd0/0x13b0
[22982.116738]  ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116741]  ? dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116743]  ? ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90
[22982.116745]  ww_mutex_lock+0x2b/0x90
[22982.116747]  dma_buf_detach+0x3b/0xf0
[22982.116749]  drm_prime_gem_destroy+0x2f/0x40 [drm]
[22982.116775]  xe_ttm_bo_destroy+0x32/0x220 [xe]
[22982.116818]  ? __mutex_unlock_slowpath+0x3a/0x290
[22982.116821]  drm_exec_unlock_all+0xa1/0xd0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116823]  drm_exec_fini+0x12/0xb0 [drm_exec]
[22982.116824]  xe_validation_ctx_fini+0x15/0x40 [xe]
[22982.116892]  xe_vma_destroy_unlocked+0xb1/0xe0 [xe]
[22982.116959]  xe_vm_close_and_put+0x41a/0x9b0 [xe]
[22982.117025]  ? xa_find+0xe3/0x1e0
[22982.117028]  xe_file_close+0x10a/0x1c0 [xe]
[22982.117074]  drm_file_free+0x22a/0x280 [drm]
[22982.117099]  drm_release_noglobal+0x22/0x70 [drm]
[22982.117119]  __fput+0xf1/0x2d0
[22982.117122]  task_work_run+0x59/0x90
[22982.117125]  do_exit+0x330/0xb40
[22982.117127]  do_group_exit+0x36/0xa0
[22982.117129]  get_signal+0xbd2/0xbe0
[22982.117131]  arch_do_signal_or_restart+0x3e/0x240
[22982.117134]  syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0x1e7/0x290
[22982.117137]  do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180
[22982.117139]  ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
[22982.117140]  ? __set_task_comm+0x28/0x1e0
[22982.117141]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[22982.117144]  ? __set_task_comm+0xe1/0x1e0
[22982.117145]  ? lock_release+0xca/0x290
[22982.117147]  ? __do_sys_prctl+0x245/0xab0
[22982.117149]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0xde/0x190
[22982.117150]  ? syscall_exit_to_user_mode+0xb0/0x290
[22982.117152]  ? do_syscall_64+0xa1/0x180
[22982.117154]  ? __lock_acquire+0x417/0x2160
[22982.117155]  ? reacquire_held_locks+0xd1/0x1f0
[22982.117156]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x30c/0x790
[22982.117158]  ? lock_acquire+0xcb/0x2d0
[22982.117160]  ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
[22982.117162]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x357/0x790
[22982.117163]  ? lock_release+0xca/0x290
[22982.117164]  ? do_user_addr_fault+0x361/0x790
[22982.117166]  ? trace_hardirqs_off+0x4b/0xc0
[22982.117168]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0
[22982.117170]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0
[22982.117172]  ? clear_bhb_loop+0x45/0xa0
[22982.117174]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
[22982.117176] RIP: 0033:0x7f943d267169
[22982.117192] Code: Unable to access opcode bytes at 0x7f943d26713f.
[22982.117193] RSP: 002b:00007f9430bffc80 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 00000000000000ca
[22982.117195] RAX: fffffffffffffe00 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: 00007f943d267169
[22982.117196] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000189 RDI: 00005622f89579d0
[22982.117197] RBP: 00007f9430bffcb0 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 00000000ffffffff
[22982.117198] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
[22982.117199] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00005622f89579d0
[22982.117202]  </TASK>

Fixes: dd08ebf ("drm/xe: Introduce a new DRM driver for Intel GPUs")
Cc: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Cc: Daniel Vetter <daniel@ffwll.ch>
Cc: dri-devel@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: intel-xe@lists.freedesktop.org
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org> # v6.8+
Signed-off-by: Thomas Hellström <thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthew Brost <matthew.brost@intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Daniel Vetter <daniel.vetter@ffwll.ch>
Reviewed-by: Christian König <christian.koenig@amd.com>
Link: https://patchwork.freedesktop.org/patch/msgid/20240628153848.4989-1-thomas.hellstrom@linux.intel.com
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 15, 2024
When putting an inode during extent map shrinking we're doing a standard
iput() but that may take a long time in case the inode is dirty and we are
doing the final iput that triggers eviction - the VFS will have to wait
for writeback before calling the btrfs evict callback (see
fs/inode.c:evict()).

This slows down the task running the shrinker which may have been
triggered while updating some tree for example, meaning locks are held
as well as an open transaction handle.

Also if the iput() ends up triggering eviction and the inode has no links
anymore, then we trigger item truncation which requires flushing delayed
items, space reservation to start a transaction and that may trigger the
space reclaim task and wait for it, resulting in deadlocks in case the
reclaim task needs for example to commit a transaction and the shrinker
is being triggered from a path holding a transaction handle.

Syzbot reported such a case with the following stack traces:

   ======================================================
   WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
   6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00010-g2ab795141095 #0 Not tainted
   ------------------------------------------------------
   kswapd0/111 is trying to acquire lock:
   ffff88801eae4610 (sb_internal#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x110/0x330 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1275

   but task is already holding lock:
   ffffffff8dd3a9a0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xa88/0x1970 mm/vmscan.c:6924

   which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

   -> #3 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}:
          __fs_reclaim_acquire mm/page_alloc.c:3783 [inline]
          fs_reclaim_acquire+0x102/0x160 mm/page_alloc.c:3797
          might_alloc include/linux/sched/mm.h:334 [inline]
          slab_pre_alloc_hook mm/slub.c:3890 [inline]
          slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3980 [inline]
          kmem_cache_alloc_lru_noprof+0x58/0x2f0 mm/slub.c:4019
          btrfs_alloc_inode+0x118/0xb20 fs/btrfs/inode.c:8411
          alloc_inode+0x5d/0x230 fs/inode.c:261
          iget5_locked fs/inode.c:1235 [inline]
          iget5_locked+0x1c9/0x2c0 fs/inode.c:1228
          btrfs_iget_locked fs/btrfs/inode.c:5590 [inline]
          btrfs_iget_path fs/btrfs/inode.c:5607 [inline]
          btrfs_iget+0xfb/0x230 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5636
          create_reloc_inode+0x403/0x820 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:3911
          btrfs_relocate_block_group+0x471/0xe60 fs/btrfs/relocation.c:4114
          btrfs_relocate_chunk+0x143/0x450 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:3373
          __btrfs_balance fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4157 [inline]
          btrfs_balance+0x211a/0x3f00 fs/btrfs/volumes.c:4534
          btrfs_ioctl_balance fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:3675 [inline]
          btrfs_ioctl+0x12ed/0x8290 fs/btrfs/ioctl.c:4742
          __do_compat_sys_ioctl+0x2c3/0x330 fs/ioctl.c:1007
          do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
          __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
          do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
          entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e

   -> #2 (btrfs_trans_num_extwriters){++++}-{0:0}:
          join_transaction+0x164/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:315
          start_transaction+0x427/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:700
          btrfs_rebuild_free_space_tree+0xaa/0x480 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1323
          btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0x218/0xf60 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:2999
          open_ctree+0x41ab/0x52e0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3554
          btrfs_fill_super fs/btrfs/super.c:946 [inline]
          btrfs_get_tree_super fs/btrfs/super.c:1863 [inline]
          btrfs_get_tree+0x11e9/0x1b90 fs/btrfs/super.c:2089
          vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x380 fs/super.c:1780
          fc_mount+0x16/0xc0 fs/namespace.c:1125
          btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2052 [inline]
          btrfs_get_tree+0xa53/0x1b90 fs/btrfs/super.c:2090
          vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x380 fs/super.c:1780
          do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3352 [inline]
          path_mount+0x6e1/0x1f10 fs/namespace.c:3679
          do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline]
          __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline]
          __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3875 [inline]
          __ia32_sys_mount+0x295/0x320 fs/namespace.c:3875
          do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
          __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
          do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
          entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e

   -> #1 (btrfs_trans_num_writers){++++}-{0:0}:
          join_transaction+0x148/0xf40 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:314
          start_transaction+0x427/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:700
          btrfs_rebuild_free_space_tree+0xaa/0x480 fs/btrfs/free-space-tree.c:1323
          btrfs_start_pre_rw_mount+0x218/0xf60 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:2999
          open_ctree+0x41ab/0x52e0 fs/btrfs/disk-io.c:3554
          btrfs_fill_super fs/btrfs/super.c:946 [inline]
          btrfs_get_tree_super fs/btrfs/super.c:1863 [inline]
          btrfs_get_tree+0x11e9/0x1b90 fs/btrfs/super.c:2089
          vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x380 fs/super.c:1780
          fc_mount+0x16/0xc0 fs/namespace.c:1125
          btrfs_get_tree_subvol fs/btrfs/super.c:2052 [inline]
          btrfs_get_tree+0xa53/0x1b90 fs/btrfs/super.c:2090
          vfs_get_tree+0x8f/0x380 fs/super.c:1780
          do_new_mount fs/namespace.c:3352 [inline]
          path_mount+0x6e1/0x1f10 fs/namespace.c:3679
          do_mount fs/namespace.c:3692 [inline]
          __do_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3898 [inline]
          __se_sys_mount fs/namespace.c:3875 [inline]
          __ia32_sys_mount+0x295/0x320 fs/namespace.c:3875
          do_syscall_32_irqs_on arch/x86/entry/common.c:165 [inline]
          __do_fast_syscall_32+0x73/0x120 arch/x86/entry/common.c:386
          do_fast_syscall_32+0x32/0x80 arch/x86/entry/common.c:411
          entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x84/0x8e

   -> #0 (sb_internal#3){.+.+}-{0:0}:
          check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
          check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
          validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 [inline]
          __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
          lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 [inline]
          lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719
          percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
          __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1655 [inline]
          sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1838 [inline]
          start_transaction+0xbc1/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:694
          btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x110/0x330 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1275
          btrfs_evict_inode+0x960/0xe80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5291
          evict+0x2ed/0x6c0 fs/inode.c:667
          iput_final fs/inode.c:1741 [inline]
          iput.part.0+0x5a8/0x7f0 fs/inode.c:1767
          iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1757
          btrfs_scan_root fs/btrfs/extent_map.c:1118 [inline]
          btrfs_free_extent_maps+0xbd3/0x1320 fs/btrfs/extent_map.c:1189
          super_cache_scan+0x409/0x550 fs/super.c:227
          do_shrink_slab+0x44f/0x11c0 mm/shrinker.c:435
          shrink_slab+0x18a/0x1310 mm/shrinker.c:662
          shrink_one+0x493/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4790
          shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4851 [inline]
          lru_gen_shrink_node+0x89f/0x1750 mm/vmscan.c:4951
          shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5910 [inline]
          kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6720 [inline]
          balance_pgdat+0x1105/0x1970 mm/vmscan.c:6911
          kswapd+0x5ea/0xbf0 mm/vmscan.c:7180
          kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
          ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
          ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244

   other info that might help us debug this:

   Chain exists of:
     sb_internal#3 --> btrfs_trans_num_extwriters --> fs_reclaim

    Possible unsafe locking scenario:

          CPU0                    CPU1
          ----                    ----
     lock(fs_reclaim);
                                  lock(btrfs_trans_num_extwriters);
                                  lock(fs_reclaim);
     rlock(sb_internal#3);

    *** DEADLOCK ***

   2 locks held by kswapd0/111:
    #0: ffffffff8dd3a9a0 (fs_reclaim){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: balance_pgdat+0xa88/0x1970 mm/vmscan.c:6924
    #1: ffff88801eae40e0 (&type->s_umount_key#62){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_trylock_shared fs/super.c:562 [inline]
    #1: ffff88801eae40e0 (&type->s_umount_key#62){++++}-{3:3}, at: super_cache_scan+0x96/0x550 fs/super.c:196

   stack backtrace:
   CPU: 0 PID: 111 Comm: kswapd0 Not tainted 6.10.0-rc2-syzkaller-00010-g2ab795141095 #0
   Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.2-debian-1.16.2-1 04/01/2014
   Call Trace:
    <TASK>
    __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:88 [inline]
    dump_stack_lvl+0x116/0x1f0 lib/dump_stack.c:114
    check_noncircular+0x31a/0x400 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:2187
    check_prev_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3134 [inline]
    check_prevs_add kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3253 [inline]
    validate_chain kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3869 [inline]
    __lock_acquire+0x2478/0x3b30 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5137
    lock_acquire kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5754 [inline]
    lock_acquire+0x1b1/0x560 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5719
    percpu_down_read include/linux/percpu-rwsem.h:51 [inline]
    __sb_start_write include/linux/fs.h:1655 [inline]
    sb_start_intwrite include/linux/fs.h:1838 [inline]
    start_transaction+0xbc1/0x1a70 fs/btrfs/transaction.c:694
    btrfs_commit_inode_delayed_inode+0x110/0x330 fs/btrfs/delayed-inode.c:1275
    btrfs_evict_inode+0x960/0xe80 fs/btrfs/inode.c:5291
    evict+0x2ed/0x6c0 fs/inode.c:667
    iput_final fs/inode.c:1741 [inline]
    iput.part.0+0x5a8/0x7f0 fs/inode.c:1767
    iput+0x5c/0x80 fs/inode.c:1757
    btrfs_scan_root fs/btrfs/extent_map.c:1118 [inline]
    btrfs_free_extent_maps+0xbd3/0x1320 fs/btrfs/extent_map.c:1189
    super_cache_scan+0x409/0x550 fs/super.c:227
    do_shrink_slab+0x44f/0x11c0 mm/shrinker.c:435
    shrink_slab+0x18a/0x1310 mm/shrinker.c:662
    shrink_one+0x493/0x7c0 mm/vmscan.c:4790
    shrink_many mm/vmscan.c:4851 [inline]
    lru_gen_shrink_node+0x89f/0x1750 mm/vmscan.c:4951
    shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:5910 [inline]
    kswapd_shrink_node mm/vmscan.c:6720 [inline]
    balance_pgdat+0x1105/0x1970 mm/vmscan.c:6911
    kswapd+0x5ea/0xbf0 mm/vmscan.c:7180
    kthread+0x2c1/0x3a0 kernel/kthread.c:389
    ret_from_fork+0x45/0x80 arch/x86/kernel/process.c:147
    ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:244
    </TASK>

So fix this by using btrfs_add_delayed_iput() so that the final iput is
delegated to the cleaner kthread.

Link: https://lore.kernel.org/linux-btrfs/000000000000892280061a344581@google.com/
Reported-by: syzbot+3dad89b3993a4b275e72@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Fixes: 956a17d ("btrfs: add a shrinker for extent maps")
Reviewed-by: Josef Bacik <josef@toxicpanda.com>
Signed-off-by: Filipe Manana <fdmanana@suse.com>
Reviewed-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: David Sterba <dsterba@suse.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 17, 2024
…_child().

syzkaller reported KMSAN splat in tcp_create_openreq_child(). [0]

The uninit variable is tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid.

tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid is initialised only when tcp_conn_request() finds
a valid TCP AO option in SYN.  Then, tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao is set
accordingly.

Let's not read tcp_rsk(req)->ao_keyid when tcp_rsk(req)->used_tcp_ao is
false.

[0]:
BUG: KMSAN: uninit-value in tcp_create_openreq_child+0x198b/0x1ff0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:610
 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x198b/0x1ff0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:610
 tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x18e/0x2170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1754
 tcp_check_req+0x1a3e/0x20c0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:852
 tcp_v4_rcv+0x26a4/0x53a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2265
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x884/0x1270 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x30f/0x530 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x230/0x4c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
 ip_sublist_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:580 [inline]
 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:631 [inline]
 ip_sublist_rcv+0x10f7/0x13e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:639
 ip_list_rcv+0x952/0x9c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:674
 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5703 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xd92/0x11d0 net/core/dev.c:5751
 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5803 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xd8f/0x1350 net/core/dev.c:5895
 gro_normal_list include/net/gro.h:515 [inline]
 napi_complete_done+0x3f2/0x990 net/core/dev.c:6246
 e1000_clean+0x1fa4/0x5e50 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3808
 __napi_poll+0xd9/0x990 net/core/dev.c:6771
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6840 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x90f/0x17e0 net/core/dev.c:6962
 handle_softirqs+0x152/0x6b0 kernel/softirq.c:554
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:637 [inline]
 irq_exit_rcu+0x5d/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:649
 common_interrupt+0x83/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:278
 asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:693
 __msan_instrument_asm_store+0xd6/0xe0
 arch_atomic_inc arch/x86/include/asm/atomic.h:53 [inline]
 raw_atomic_inc include/linux/atomic/atomic-arch-fallback.h:992 [inline]
 atomic_inc include/linux/atomic/atomic-instrumented.h:436 [inline]
 page_ref_inc include/linux/page_ref.h:153 [inline]
 folio_ref_inc include/linux/page_ref.h:160 [inline]
 filemap_map_order0_folio mm/filemap.c:3596 [inline]
 filemap_map_pages+0x11c7/0x2270 mm/filemap.c:3644
 do_fault_around mm/memory.c:4879 [inline]
 do_read_fault mm/memory.c:4912 [inline]
 do_fault mm/memory.c:5051 [inline]
 do_pte_missing mm/memory.c:3897 [inline]
 handle_pte_fault mm/memory.c:5381 [inline]
 __handle_mm_fault mm/memory.c:5524 [inline]
 handle_mm_fault+0x3677/0x6f00 mm/memory.c:5689
 do_user_addr_fault+0x1373/0x2b20 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1338
 handle_page_fault arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1481 [inline]
 exc_page_fault+0x54/0xc0 arch/x86/mm/fault.c:1539
 asm_exc_page_fault+0x26/0x30 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:623

Uninit was stored to memory at:
 tcp_create_openreq_child+0x1984/0x1ff0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:611
 tcp_v4_syn_recv_sock+0x18e/0x2170 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1754
 tcp_check_req+0x1a3e/0x20c0 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:852
 tcp_v4_rcv+0x26a4/0x53a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2265
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x884/0x1270 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x30f/0x530 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x230/0x4c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
 ip_sublist_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:580 [inline]
 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:631 [inline]
 ip_sublist_rcv+0x10f7/0x13e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:639
 ip_list_rcv+0x952/0x9c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:674
 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5703 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xd92/0x11d0 net/core/dev.c:5751
 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5803 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xd8f/0x1350 net/core/dev.c:5895
 gro_normal_list include/net/gro.h:515 [inline]
 napi_complete_done+0x3f2/0x990 net/core/dev.c:6246
 e1000_clean+0x1fa4/0x5e50 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3808
 __napi_poll+0xd9/0x990 net/core/dev.c:6771
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6840 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x90f/0x17e0 net/core/dev.c:6962
 handle_softirqs+0x152/0x6b0 kernel/softirq.c:554
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:637 [inline]
 irq_exit_rcu+0x5d/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:649
 common_interrupt+0x83/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:278
 asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:693

Uninit was created at:
 __alloc_pages_noprof+0x82d/0xcb0 mm/page_alloc.c:4706
 __alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:269 [inline]
 alloc_pages_node_noprof include/linux/gfp.h:296 [inline]
 alloc_slab_page mm/slub.c:2265 [inline]
 allocate_slab mm/slub.c:2428 [inline]
 new_slab+0x2af/0x14e0 mm/slub.c:2481
 ___slab_alloc+0xf73/0x3150 mm/slub.c:3667
 __slab_alloc mm/slub.c:3757 [inline]
 __slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3810 [inline]
 slab_alloc_node mm/slub.c:3990 [inline]
 kmem_cache_alloc_noprof+0x53a/0x9f0 mm/slub.c:4009
 reqsk_alloc_noprof net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:920 [inline]
 inet_reqsk_alloc+0x63/0x700 net/ipv4/inet_connection_sock.c:951
 tcp_conn_request+0x339/0x4860 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:7177
 tcp_v4_conn_request+0x13b/0x190 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1719
 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2dd/0x4a10 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6711
 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0xbee/0x10d0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1932
 tcp_v4_rcv+0x3fad/0x53a0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2334
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x884/0x1270 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x30f/0x530 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
 NF_HOOK include/linux/netfilter.h:314 [inline]
 ip_local_deliver+0x230/0x4c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:254
 dst_input include/net/dst.h:460 [inline]
 ip_sublist_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:580 [inline]
 ip_list_rcv_finish net/ipv4/ip_input.c:631 [inline]
 ip_sublist_rcv+0x10f7/0x13e0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:639
 ip_list_rcv+0x952/0x9c0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:674
 __netif_receive_skb_list_ptype net/core/dev.c:5703 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0xd92/0x11d0 net/core/dev.c:5751
 __netif_receive_skb_list net/core/dev.c:5803 [inline]
 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0xd8f/0x1350 net/core/dev.c:5895
 gro_normal_list include/net/gro.h:515 [inline]
 napi_complete_done+0x3f2/0x990 net/core/dev.c:6246
 e1000_clean+0x1fa4/0x5e50 drivers/net/ethernet/intel/e1000/e1000_main.c:3808
 __napi_poll+0xd9/0x990 net/core/dev.c:6771
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6840 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x90f/0x17e0 net/core/dev.c:6962
 handle_softirqs+0x152/0x6b0 kernel/softirq.c:554
 __do_softirq kernel/softirq.c:588 [inline]
 invoke_softirq kernel/softirq.c:428 [inline]
 __irq_exit_rcu kernel/softirq.c:637 [inline]
 irq_exit_rcu+0x5d/0x120 kernel/softirq.c:649
 common_interrupt+0x83/0x90 arch/x86/kernel/irq.c:278
 asm_common_interrupt+0x26/0x40 arch/x86/include/asm/idtentry.h:693

CPU: 0 PID: 239 Comm: modprobe Tainted: G    B              6.10.0-rc7-01816-g852e42cc2dd4 #3 1107521f0c7b55c9309062382d0bda9f604dbb6d
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.16.3-0-ga6ed6b701f0a-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014

Fixes: 06b22ef ("net/tcp: Wire TCP-AO to request sockets")
Reported-by: syzkaller <syzkaller@googlegroups.com>
Signed-off-by: Kuniyuki Iwashima <kuniyu@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Acked-by: Dmitry Safonov <0x7f454c46@gmail.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240714161719.6528-1-kuniyu@amazon.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 22, 2024
Test case: 2 threads write short inline data to a file.
In ext4_page_mkwrite the resulting inline data is converted.
Handling ext4_grp_locked_error with description "block bitmap
and bg descriptor inconsistent: X vs Y free clusters" calls
ext4_force_shutdown. The conversion clears
EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA but fails for
ext4_destroy_inline_data_nolock and ext4_mark_iloc_dirty due
to ext4_forced_shutdown. The restoration of inline data fails
for the same reason not setting EXT4_STATE_MAY_INLINE_DATA.
Without the flag set a regular process path in ext4_da_write_end
follows trying to dereference page folio private pointer that has
not been set. The fix calls early return with -EIO error shall the
pointer to private be NULL.

Sample crash report:

Unable to handle kernel paging request at virtual address dfff800000000004
KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000020-0x0000000000000027]
Mem abort info:
  ESR = 0x0000000096000005
  EC = 0x25: DABT (current EL), IL = 32 bits
  SET = 0, FnV = 0
  EA = 0, S1PTW = 0
  FSC = 0x05: level 1 translation fault
Data abort info:
  ISV = 0, ISS = 0x00000005, ISS2 = 0x00000000
  CM = 0, WnR = 0, TnD = 0, TagAccess = 0
  GCS = 0, Overlay = 0, DirtyBit = 0, Xs = 0
[dfff800000000004] address between user and kernel address ranges
Internal error: Oops: 0000000096000005 [#1] PREEMPT SMP
Modules linked in:
CPU: 1 PID: 20274 Comm: syz-executor185 Not tainted 6.9.0-rc7-syzkaller-gfda5695d692c #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 03/27/2024
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : __block_commit_write+0x64/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2167
lr : __block_commit_write+0x3c/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2160
sp : ffff8000a1957600
x29: ffff8000a1957610 x28: dfff800000000000 x27: ffff0000e30e34b0
x26: 0000000000000000 x25: dfff800000000000 x24: dfff800000000000
x23: fffffdffc397c9e0 x22: 0000000000000020 x21: 0000000000000020
x20: 0000000000000040 x19: fffffdffc397c9c0 x18: 1fffe000367bd196
x17: ffff80008eead000 x16: ffff80008ae89e3c x15: 00000000200000c0
x14: 1fffe0001cbe4e04 x13: 0000000000000000 x12: 0000000000000000
x11: 0000000000000001 x10: 0000000000ff0100 x9 : 0000000000000000
x8 : 0000000000000004 x7 : 0000000000000000 x6 : 0000000000000000
x5 : fffffdffc397c9c0 x4 : 0000000000000020 x3 : 0000000000000020
x2 : 0000000000000040 x1 : 0000000000000020 x0 : fffffdffc397c9c0
Call trace:
 __block_commit_write+0x64/0x2b0 fs/buffer.c:2167
 block_write_end+0xb4/0x104 fs/buffer.c:2253
 ext4_da_do_write_end fs/ext4/inode.c:2955 [inline]
 ext4_da_write_end+0x2c4/0xa40 fs/ext4/inode.c:3028
 generic_perform_write+0x394/0x588 mm/filemap.c:3985
 ext4_buffered_write_iter+0x2c0/0x4ec fs/ext4/file.c:299
 ext4_file_write_iter+0x188/0x1780
 call_write_iter include/linux/fs.h:2110 [inline]
 new_sync_write fs/read_write.c:497 [inline]
 vfs_write+0x968/0xc3c fs/read_write.c:590
 ksys_write+0x15c/0x26c fs/read_write.c:643
 __do_sys_write fs/read_write.c:655 [inline]
 __se_sys_write fs/read_write.c:652 [inline]
 __arm64_sys_write+0x7c/0x90 fs/read_write.c:652
 __invoke_syscall arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:34 [inline]
 invoke_syscall+0x98/0x2b8 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:48
 el0_svc_common+0x130/0x23c arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:133
 do_el0_svc+0x48/0x58 arch/arm64/kernel/syscall.c:152
 el0_svc+0x54/0x168 arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:712
 el0t_64_sync_handler+0x84/0xfc arch/arm64/kernel/entry-common.c:730
 el0t_64_sync+0x190/0x194 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S:598
Code: 97f85911 f94002da 91008356 d343fec8 (38796908)
---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
----------------
Code disassembly (best guess):
   0:	97f85911 	bl	0xffffffffffe16444
   4:	f94002da 	ldr	x26, [x22]
   8:	91008356 	add	x22, x26, #0x20
   c:	d343fec8 	lsr	x8, x22, #3
* 10:	38796908 	ldrb	w8, [x8, x25] <-- trapping instruction

Reported-by: syzbot+18df508cf00a0598d9a6@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=18df508cf00a0598d9a6
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/all/000000000000f19a1406109eb5c5@google.com/T/
Signed-off-by: Wojciech Gładysz <wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240703070112.10235-1-wojciech.gladysz@infogain.com
Signed-off-by: Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 26, 2024
When tries to demote 1G hugetlb folios, a lockdep warning is observed:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty #79 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
bash/710 is trying to acquire lock:
ffffffff8f0a7850 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0x244/0x460

but task is already holding lock:
ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(&h->resize_lock);
  lock(&h->resize_lock);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

4 locks held by bash/710:
 #0: ffff8f118439c3f0 (sb_writers#5){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 #1: ffff8f11893b9e88 (&of->mutex#2){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0xf8/0x1d0
 #2: ffff8f1183dc4428 (kn->active#98){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x100/0x1d0
 #3: ffffffff8f0a6f48 (&h->resize_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: demote_store+0xae/0x460

stack backtrace:
CPU: 3 PID: 710 Comm: bash Not tainted 6.10.0-rc6-00452-ga4d0275fa660-dirty #79
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <TASK>
 dump_stack_lvl+0x68/0xa0
 __lock_acquire+0x10f2/0x1ca0
 lock_acquire+0xbe/0x2d0
 __mutex_lock+0x6d/0x400
 demote_store+0x244/0x460
 kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x12c/0x1d0
 vfs_write+0x380/0x540
 ksys_write+0x64/0xe0
 do_syscall_64+0xb9/0x1d0
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fa61db14887
RSP: 002b:00007ffc56c48358 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000002 RCX: 00007fa61db14887
RDX: 0000000000000002 RSI: 000055a030050220 RDI: 0000000000000001
RBP: 000055a030050220 R08: 00007fa61dbd1460 R09: 000000007fffffff
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000002
R13: 00007fa61dc1b780 R14: 00007fa61dc17600 R15: 00007fa61dc16a00
 </TASK>

Lockdep considers this an AA deadlock because the different resize_lock
mutexes reside in the same lockdep class, but this is a false positive.
Place them in distinct classes to avoid these warnings.

Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20240712031314.2570452-1-linmiaohe@huawei.com
Fixes: 8531fc6 ("hugetlb: add hugetlb demote page support")
Signed-off-by: Miaohe Lin <linmiaohe@huawei.com>
Acked-by: Muchun Song <muchun.song@linux.dev>
Cc: <stable@vger.kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Andrew Morton <akpm@linux-foundation.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Jul 26, 2024
When using cachefiles, lockdep may emit something similar to the circular
locking dependency notice below.  The problem appears to stem from the
following:

 (1) Cachefiles manipulates xattrs on the files in its cache when called
     from ->writepages().

 (2) The setxattr() and removexattr() system call handlers get the name
     (and value) from userspace after taking the sb_writers lock, putting
     accesses of the vma->vm_lock and mm->mmap_lock inside of that.

 (3) The afs filesystem uses a per-inode lock to prevent multiple
     revalidation RPCs and in writeback vs truncate to prevent parallel
     operations from deadlocking against the server on one side and local
     page locks on the other.

Fix this by moving the getting of the name and value in {get,remove}xattr()
outside of the sb_writers lock.  This also has the minor benefits that we
don't need to reget these in the event of a retry and we never try to take
the sb_writers lock in the event we can't pull the name and value into the
kernel.

Alternative approaches that might fix this include moving the dispatch of a
write to the cache off to a workqueue or trying to do without the
validation lock in afs.  Note that this might also affect other filesystems
that use netfslib and/or cachefiles.

 ======================================================
 WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
 6.10.0-build2+ #956 Not tainted
 ------------------------------------------------------
 fsstress/6050 is trying to acquire lock:
 ffff888138fd82f0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}, at: filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0

 but task is already holding lock:
 ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250

 which lock already depends on the new lock.

 the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

 -> #4 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_write+0x3b/0x50
        vma_start_write+0x6b/0xa0
        vma_link+0xcc/0x140
        insert_vm_struct+0xb7/0xf0
        alloc_bprm+0x2c1/0x390
        kernel_execve+0x65/0x1a0
        call_usermodehelper_exec_async+0x14d/0x190
        ret_from_fork+0x24/0x40
        ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30

 -> #3 (&mm->mmap_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        __might_fault+0x7c/0xb0
        strncpy_from_user+0x25/0x160
        removexattr+0x7f/0x100
        __do_sys_fremovexattr+0x7e/0xb0
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #2 (sb_writers#14){.+.+}-{0:0}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        percpu_down_read+0x3c/0x90
        vfs_iocb_iter_write+0xe9/0x1d0
        __cachefiles_write+0x367/0x430
        cachefiles_issue_write+0x299/0x2f0
        netfs_advance_write+0x117/0x140
        netfs_write_folio.isra.0+0x5ca/0x6e0
        netfs_writepages+0x230/0x2f0
        afs_writepages+0x4d/0x70
        do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0
        filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0
        __filemap_fdatawrite_range+0xa8/0xf0
        file_write_and_wait_range+0x59/0x90
        afs_release+0x10f/0x270
        __fput+0x25f/0x3d0
        __do_sys_close+0x43/0x70
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #1 (&vnode->validate_lock){++++}-{3:3}:
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_read+0x95/0x200
        afs_writepages+0x37/0x70
        do_writepages+0x1e8/0x3e0
        filemap_fdatawrite_wbc+0x84/0xa0
        filemap_invalidate_inode+0x167/0x1e0
        netfs_unbuffered_write_iter+0x1bd/0x2d0
        vfs_write+0x22e/0x320
        ksys_write+0xbc/0x130
        do_syscall_64+0x9f/0x100
        entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

 -> #0 (mapping.invalidate_lock#3){++++}-{3:3}:
        check_noncircular+0x119/0x160
        check_prev_add+0x195/0x430
        __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
        lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
        down_read+0x95/0x200
        filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
        __do_fault+0x57/0xd0
        do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320
        __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320
        handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260
        do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500
        exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90
        asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30

 other info that might help us debug this:

 Chain exists of:
   mapping.invalidate_lock#3 --> &mm->mmap_lock --> &vma->vm_lock->lock

  Possible unsafe locking scenario:

        CPU0                    CPU1
        ----                    ----
   rlock(&vma->vm_lock->lock);
                                lock(&mm->mmap_lock);
                                lock(&vma->vm_lock->lock);
   rlock(mapping.invalidate_lock#3);

  *** DEADLOCK ***

 1 lock held by fsstress/6050:
  #0: ffff888113f26d18 (&vma->vm_lock->lock){++++}-{3:3}, at: lock_vma_under_rcu+0x165/0x250

 stack backtrace:
 CPU: 0 PID: 6050 Comm: fsstress Not tainted 6.10.0-build2+ #956
 Hardware name: ASUS All Series/H97-PLUS, BIOS 2306 10/09/2014
 Call Trace:
  <TASK>
  dump_stack_lvl+0x57/0x80
  check_noncircular+0x119/0x160
  ? queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x4be/0x510
  ? __pfx_check_noncircular+0x10/0x10
  ? __pfx_queued_spin_lock_slowpath+0x10/0x10
  ? mark_lock+0x47/0x160
  ? init_chain_block+0x9c/0xc0
  ? add_chain_block+0x84/0xf0
  check_prev_add+0x195/0x430
  __lock_acquire+0xaf0/0xd80
  ? __pfx___lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
  ? __lock_release.isra.0+0x13b/0x230
  lock_acquire.part.0+0x103/0x280
  ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_lock_acquire.part.0+0x10/0x10
  ? rcu_is_watching+0x34/0x60
  ? lock_acquire+0xd7/0x120
  down_read+0x95/0x200
  ? filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_down_read+0x10/0x10
  ? __filemap_get_folio+0x25/0x1a0
  filemap_fault+0x26e/0x8b0
  ? __pfx_filemap_fault+0x10/0x10
  ? find_held_lock+0x7c/0x90
  ? __pfx___lock_release.isra.0+0x10/0x10
  ? __pte_offset_map+0x99/0x110
  __do_fault+0x57/0xd0
  do_pte_missing+0x23b/0x320
  __handle_mm_fault+0x2d4/0x320
  ? __pfx___handle_mm_fault+0x10/0x10
  handle_mm_fault+0x14f/0x260
  do_user_addr_fault+0x2a2/0x500
  exc_page_fault+0x71/0x90
  asm_exc_page_fault+0x22/0x30

Signed-off-by: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/2136178.1721725194@warthog.procyon.org.uk
cc: Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>
cc: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
cc: Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>
cc: Jeff Layton <jlayton@kernel.org>
cc: Gao Xiang <xiang@kernel.org>
cc: Matthew Wilcox <willy@infradead.org>
cc: netfs@lists.linux.dev
cc: linux-erofs@lists.ozlabs.org
cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org
[brauner: fix minor issues]
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 9, 2024
When l2tp tunnels use a socket provided by userspace, we can hit
lockdep splats like the below when data is transmitted through another
(unrelated) userspace socket which then gets routed over l2tp.

This issue was previously discussed here:
https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/87sfialu2n.fsf@cloudflare.com/

The solution is to have lockdep treat socket locks of l2tp tunnel
sockets separately than those of standard INET sockets. To do so, use
a different lockdep subclass where lock nesting is possible.

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.10.0+ #34 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  iperf3/771 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8881027601d8 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);
    lock(slock-AF_INET/1);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  10 locks held by iperf3/771:
   #0: ffff888102650258 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: tcp_sendmsg+0x1a/0x40
   #1: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #2: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #3: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   #4: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0xf9/0x260
   #5: ffff888102650d98 (slock-AF_INET/1){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: tcp_v4_rcv+0x1848/0x1e10
   #6: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x4b/0xbc0
   #7: ffffffff822ac220 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x17a/0x1130
   #8: ffffffff822ac1e0 (rcu_read_lock_bh){....}-{1:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0xcc/0x1450
   #9: ffff888101f33258 (dev->qdisc_tx_busylock ?: &qdisc_tx_busylock#2){+...}-{2:2}, at: __dev_queue_xmit+0x513/0x1450

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 771 Comm: iperf3 Not tainted 6.10.0+ #34
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.15.0-1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   dump_stack_lvl+0x69/0xa0
   dump_stack+0xc/0x20
   __lock_acquire+0x135d/0x2600
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   lock_acquire+0xc4/0x2a0
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   ? __skb_checksum+0xa3/0x540
   _raw_spin_lock_nested+0x35/0x50
   ? l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_xmit_skb+0x243/0x9d0
   l2tp_eth_dev_xmit+0x3c/0xc0
   dev_hard_start_xmit+0x11e/0x420
   sch_direct_xmit+0xc3/0x640
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x61c/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   __tcp_send_ack+0x1b8/0x340
   tcp_send_ack+0x23/0x30
   __tcp_ack_snd_check+0xa8/0x530
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   tcp_rcv_established+0x412/0xd70
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x299/0x420
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1991/0x1e10
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x50/0x220
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x158/0x260
   ip_local_deliver+0xc8/0xe0
   ip_rcv+0xe5/0x1d0
   ? __pfx_ip_rcv+0x10/0x10
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core+0xce/0xe0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   __netif_receive_skb+0x34/0xd0
   ? process_backlog+0x28b/0x9f0
   process_backlog+0x2cb/0x9f0
   __napi_poll.constprop.0+0x61/0x280
   net_rx_action+0x332/0x670
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? find_held_lock+0x2b/0x80
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   handle_softirqs+0xda/0x480
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   do_softirq+0xa1/0xd0
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0xc8/0xe0
   ? __dev_queue_xmit+0xa2c/0x1450
   __dev_queue_xmit+0xa48/0x1450
   ? ip_finish_output2+0xf4c/0x1130
   ip_finish_output2+0x6b6/0x1130
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __ip_finish_output+0x217/0x380
   ip_output+0x99/0x120
   __ip_queue_xmit+0xae4/0xbc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? tcp_options_write.constprop.0+0xcb/0x3e0
   ip_queue_xmit+0x34/0x40
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x1625/0x1890
   tcp_write_xmit+0x766/0x2fb0
   ? __entry_text_end+0x102ba9/0x102bad
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   ? __might_fault+0x74/0xc0
   ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
   __tcp_push_pending_frames+0x56/0x190
   tcp_push+0x117/0x310
   tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x14c1/0x1740
   tcp_sendmsg+0x28/0x40
   inet_sendmsg+0x5d/0x90
   sock_write_iter+0x242/0x2b0
   vfs_write+0x68d/0x800
   ? __pfx_sock_write_iter+0x10/0x10
   ksys_write+0xc8/0xf0
   __x64_sys_write+0x3d/0x50
   x64_sys_call+0xfaf/0x1f50
   do_syscall_64+0x6d/0x140
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
  RIP: 0033:0x7f4d143af992
  Code: c3 8b 07 85 c0 75 24 49 89 fb 48 89 f0 48 89 d7 48 89 ce 4c 89 c2 4d 89 ca 4c 8b 44 24 08 4c 8b 4c 24 10 4c 89 5c 24 08 0f 05 <c3> e9 01 cc ff ff 41 54 b8 02 00 00 0
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd65032058 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000001
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000001 RCX: 00007f4d143af992
  RDX: 0000000000000025 RSI: 00007f4d143f3bcc RDI: 0000000000000005
  RBP: 00007f4d143f2b28 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
  R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00007f4d143f3bcc
  R13: 0000000000000005 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: 00007ffd650323f0
   </TASK>

Fixes: 0b2c597 ("l2tp: close all race conditions in l2tp_tunnel_register()")
Suggested-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Reported-by: syzbot+6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=6acef9e0a4d1f46c83d4
CC: gnault@redhat.com
CC: cong.wang@bytedance.com
Signed-off-by: James Chapman <jchapman@katalix.com>
Signed-off-by: Tom Parkin <tparkin@katalix.com>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240806160626.1248317-1-jchapman@katalix.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 12, 2024
Tariq Toukan says:

====================
mlx5 misc patches 2024-08-08

This patchset contains multiple enhancements from the team to the mlx5
core and Eth drivers.

Patch #1 by Chris bumps a defined value to permit more devices doing TC
offloads.

Patch #2 by Jianbo adds an IPsec fast-path optimization to replace the
slow async handling.

Patches #3 and #4 by Jianbo add TC offload support for complicated rules
to overcome firmware limitation.

Patch #5 by Gal unifies the access macro to advertised/supported link
modes.

Patches #6 to #9 by Gal adds extack messages in ethtool ops to replace
prints to the kernel log.

Patch #10 by Cosmin switches to using 'update' verb instead of 'replace'
to better reflect the operation.

Patch #11 by Cosmin exposes an update connection tracking operation to
replace the assumed delete+add implementaiton.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240808055927.2059700-1-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 13, 2024
Petr Machata says:

====================
net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16

In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network,
ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high
fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes,
a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into
8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like
1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough.

To that end, in this patchset increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16.

Patch #1 adds a flag that indicates whether the reserved fields are zeroed.
This is a follow-up to a new fix merged in commit 6d745cd ("net:
nexthop: Initialize all fields in dumped nexthops"). The theory behind this
patch is that there is a strict ordering between the fields actually being
zeroed, the kernel declaring that they are, and the kernel repurposing the
fields. Thus clients can use the flag to tell if it is safe to interpret
the reserved fields in any way.

Patch #2 contains the substantial code and the commit message covers the
details of the changes.

Patches #3 to #6 add selftests.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/cover.1723036486.git.petrm@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 21, 2024
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Preparations for FIB rule DSCP selector

This patchset moves the masking of the upper DSCP bits in 'flowi4_tos'
to the core instead of relying on callers of the FIB lookup API to do
it.

This will allow us to start changing users of the API to initialize the
'flowi4_tos' field with all six bits of the DSCP field. In turn, this
will allow us to extend FIB rules with a new DSCP selector.

By masking the upper DSCP bits in the core we are able to maintain the
behavior of the TOS selector in FIB rules and routes to only match on
the lower DSCP bits.

While working on this I found two users of the API that do not mask the
upper DSCP bits before performing the lookup. The first is an ancient
netlink family that is unlikely to be used. It is adjusted in patch #1
to mask both the upper DSCP bits and the ECN bits before calling the
API.

The second user is a nftables module that differs in this regard from
its equivalent iptables module. It is adjusted in patch #2 to invoke the
API with the upper DSCP bits masked, like all other callers. The
relevant selftest passed, but in the unlikely case that regressions are
reported because of this change, we can restore the existing behavior
using a new flow information flag as discussed here [1].

The last patch moves the masking of the upper DSCP bits to the core,
making the first two patches redundant, but I wanted to post them
separately to call attention to the behavior change for these two users
of the FIB lookup API.

Future patchsets (around 3) will start unmasking the upper DSCP bits
throughout the networking stack before adding support for the new FIB
rule DSCP selector.

Changes from v1 [2]:

Patch #3: Include <linux/ip.h> in <linux/in_route.h> instead of
including it in net/ip_fib.h

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/ZpqpB8vJU%2FQ6LSqa@debian/
[2] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240725131729.1729103-1-idosch@nvidia.com/
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240814125224.972815-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 23, 2024
Lockdep reported a warning in Linux version 6.6:

[  414.344659] ================================
[  414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[  414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted
[  414.346221] --------------------------------
[  414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
[  414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[  414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0
[  414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
[  414.351751]   lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460
[  414.352218]   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60
[  414.352769]   __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60
[  414.353289]   sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0
[  414.353829]   sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270
[  414.354338]   blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170
[  414.354807]   __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0
[  414.355335]   blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0
[  414.355847]   __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30
[  414.356367]   scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830
[  414.345155] WARNING: inconsistent lock state
[  414.345658] 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6 Not tainted
[  414.346221] --------------------------------
[  414.346712] inconsistent {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} -> {SOFTIRQ-ON-W} usage.
[  414.347545] kworker/u10:3/1152 [HC0[0]:SC0[0]:HE0:SE1] takes:
[  414.349245] ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0
[  414.351204] {IN-SOFTIRQ-W} state was registered at:
[  414.351751]   lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460
[  414.352218]   _raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x39/0x60
[  414.352769]   __wake_up_common_lock+0x22/0x60
[  414.353289]   sbitmap_queue_wake_up+0x375/0x4f0
[  414.353829]   sbitmap_queue_clear+0xdd/0x270
[  414.354338]   blk_mq_put_tag+0xdf/0x170
[  414.354807]   __blk_mq_free_request+0x381/0x4d0
[  414.355335]   blk_mq_free_request+0x28b/0x3e0
[  414.355847]   __blk_mq_end_request+0x242/0xc30
[  414.356367]   scsi_end_request+0x2c1/0x830
[  414.356863]   scsi_io_completion+0x177/0x1610
[  414.357379]   scsi_complete+0x12f/0x260
[  414.357856]   blk_complete_reqs+0xba/0xf0
[  414.358338]   __do_softirq+0x1b0/0x7a2
[  414.358796]   irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0
[  414.359262]   sysvec_call_function_single+0xaf/0xc0
[  414.359828]   asm_sysvec_call_function_single+0x1a/0x20
[  414.360426]   default_idle+0x1e/0x30
[  414.360873]   default_idle_call+0x9b/0x1f0
[  414.361390]   do_idle+0x2d2/0x3e0
[  414.361819]   cpu_startup_entry+0x55/0x60
[  414.362314]   start_secondary+0x235/0x2b0
[  414.362809]   secondary_startup_64_no_verify+0x18f/0x19b
[  414.363413] irq event stamp: 428794
[  414.363825] hardirqs last  enabled at (428793): [<ffffffff816bfd1c>] ktime_get+0x1dc/0x200
[  414.364694] hardirqs last disabled at (428794): [<ffffffff85470177>] _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x47/0x50
[  414.365629] softirqs last  enabled at (428444): [<ffffffff85474780>] __do_softirq+0x540/0x7a2
[  414.366522] softirqs last disabled at (428419): [<ffffffff813f65ab>] irq_exit_rcu+0x14b/0x1a0
[  414.367425]
               other info that might help us debug this:
[  414.368194]  Possible unsafe locking scenario:
[  414.368900]        CPU0
[  414.369225]        ----
[  414.369548]   lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait);
[  414.370000]   <Interrupt>
[  414.370342]     lock(&sbq->ws[i].wait);
[  414.370802]
                *** DEADLOCK ***
[  414.371569] 5 locks held by kworker/u10:3/1152:
[  414.372088]  #0: ffff88810130e938 ((wq_completion)writeback){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x357/0x13f0
[  414.373180]  #1: ffff88810201fdb8 ((work_completion)(&(&wb->dwork)->work)){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: process_scheduled_works+0x3a3/0x13f0
[  414.374384]  #2: ffffffff86ffbdc0 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00
[  414.375342]  #3: ffff88810edd1098 (&sbq->ws[i].wait){+.?.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x131c/0x1ee0
[  414.376377]  #4: ffff888106205a08 (&hctx->dispatch_wait_lock){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1337/0x1ee0
[  414.378607]
               stack backtrace:
[  414.379177] CPU: 0 PID: 1152 Comm: kworker/u10:3 Not tainted 6.6.0-07439-gba2303cacfda #6
[  414.380032] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS rel-1.14.0-0-g155821a1990b-prebuilt.qemu.org 04/01/2014
[  414.381177] Workqueue: writeback wb_workfn (flush-253:0)
[  414.381805] Call Trace:
[  414.382136]  <TASK>
[  414.382429]  dump_stack_lvl+0x91/0xf0
[  414.382884]  mark_lock_irq+0xb3b/0x1260
[  414.383367]  ? __pfx_mark_lock_irq+0x10/0x10
[  414.383889]  ? stack_trace_save+0x8e/0xc0
[  414.384373]  ? __pfx_stack_trace_save+0x10/0x10
[  414.384903]  ? graph_lock+0xcf/0x410
[  414.385350]  ? save_trace+0x3d/0xc70
[  414.385808]  mark_lock.part.20+0x56d/0xa90
[  414.386317]  mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110
[  414.386791]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  414.387320]  lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0
[  414.387901]  ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50
[  414.388422]  trace_hardirqs_on+0x58/0x100
[  414.388917]  _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x50
[  414.389422]  __blk_mq_tag_busy+0x1d6/0x2a0
[  414.389920]  __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x761/0x9f0
[  414.390899]  blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x1780/0x1ee0
[  414.391473]  ? __pfx_blk_mq_dispatch_rq_list+0x10/0x10
[  414.392070]  ? sbitmap_get+0x2b8/0x450
[  414.392533]  ? __blk_mq_get_driver_tag+0x210/0x9f0
[  414.393095]  __blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0xd99/0x1690
[  414.393730]  ? elv_attempt_insert_merge+0x1b1/0x420
[  414.394302]  ? __pfx___blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x10/0x10
[  414.394970]  ? lock_acquire+0x18d/0x460
[  414.395456]  ? blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x637/0xa00
[  414.395986]  ? __pfx_lock_acquire+0x10/0x10
[  414.396499]  blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x109/0x190
[  414.397100]  blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x66e/0xa00
[  414.397616]  blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x614/0x2030
[  414.398244]  ? __pfx_blk_mq_flush_plug_list.part.17+0x10/0x10
[  414.398897]  ? writeback_sb_inodes+0x241/0xcc0
[  414.399429]  blk_mq_flush_plug_list+0x65/0x80
[  414.399957]  __blk_flush_plug+0x2f1/0x530
[  414.400458]  ? __pfx___blk_flush_plug+0x10/0x10
[  414.400999]  blk_finish_plug+0x59/0xa0
[  414.401467]  wb_writeback+0x7cc/0x920
[  414.401935]  ? __pfx_wb_writeback+0x10/0x10
[  414.402442]  ? mark_held_locks+0xb0/0x110
[  414.402931]  ? __pfx_do_raw_spin_lock+0x10/0x10
[  414.403462]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0
[  414.404062]  wb_workfn+0x2b3/0xcf0
[  414.404500]  ? __pfx_wb_workfn+0x10/0x10
[  414.404989]  process_scheduled_works+0x432/0x13f0
[  414.405546]  ? __pfx_process_scheduled_works+0x10/0x10
[  414.406139]  ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x101/0x2a0
[  414.406641]  ? assign_work+0x19b/0x240
[  414.407106]  ? lock_is_held_type+0x9d/0x110
[  414.407604]  worker_thread+0x6f2/0x1160
[  414.408075]  ? __kthread_parkme+0x62/0x210
[  414.408572]  ? lockdep_hardirqs_on_prepare+0x297/0x3f0
[  414.409168]  ? __kthread_parkme+0x13c/0x210
[  414.409678]  ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[  414.410191]  kthread+0x33c/0x440
[  414.410602]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  414.411068]  ret_from_fork+0x4d/0x80
[  414.411526]  ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[  414.411993]  ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
[  414.412489]  </TASK>

When interrupt is turned on while a lock holding by spin_lock_irq it
throws a warning because of potential deadlock.

blk_mq_prep_dispatch_rq
 blk_mq_get_driver_tag
  __blk_mq_get_driver_tag
   __blk_mq_alloc_driver_tag
    blk_mq_tag_busy -> tag is already busy
    // failed to get driver tag
 blk_mq_mark_tag_wait
  spin_lock_irq(&wq->lock) -> lock A (&sbq->ws[i].wait)
  __add_wait_queue(wq, wait) -> wait queue active
  blk_mq_get_driver_tag
  __blk_mq_tag_busy
-> 1) tag must be idle, which means there can't be inflight IO
   spin_lock_irq(&tags->lock) -> lock B (hctx->tags)
   spin_unlock_irq(&tags->lock) -> unlock B, turn on interrupt accidentally
-> 2) context must be preempt by IO interrupt to trigger deadlock.

As shown above, the deadlock is not possible in theory, but the warning
still need to be fixed.

Fix it by using spin_lock_irqsave to get lockB instead of spin_lock_irq.

Fixes: 4f1731d ("blk-mq: fix potential io hang by wrong 'wake_batch'")
Signed-off-by: Li Lingfeng <lilingfeng3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Ming Lei <ming.lei@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Yu Kuai <yukuai3@huawei.com>
Reviewed-by: Bart Van Assche <bvanassche@acm.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240815024736.2040971-1-lilingfeng@huaweicloud.com
Signed-off-by: Jens Axboe <axboe@kernel.dk>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 23, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

Patch #1 disable BH when collecting stats via hardware offload to ensure
         concurrent updates from packet path do not result in losing stats.
         From Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.

Patch #2 uses write seqcount to reset counters serialize against reader.
         Also from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.

Patch #3 ensures vlan header is in place before accessing its fields,
         according to KMSAN splat triggered by syzbot.

* tag 'nf-24-08-22' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  netfilter: flowtable: validate vlan header
  netfilter: nft_counter: Synchronize nft_counter_reset() against reader.
  netfilter: nft_counter: Disable BH in nft_counter_offload_stats().
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822101842.4234-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Aug 27, 2024
…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter updates for net-next

The following batch contains Netfilter updates for net-next:

Patch #1 fix checksum calculation in nfnetlink_queue with SCTP,
	 segment GSO packet since skb_zerocopy() does not support
	 GSO_BY_FRAGS, from Antonio Ojea.

Patch #2 extend nfnetlink_queue coverage to handle SCTP packets,
	 from Antonio Ojea.

Patch #3 uses consume_skb() instead of kfree_skb() in nfnetlink,
         from Donald Hunter.

Patch #4 adds a dedicate commit list for sets to speed up
	 intra-transaction lookups, from Florian Westphal.

Patch #5 skips removal of element from abort path for the pipapo
         backend, ditching the shadow copy of this datastructure
	 is sufficient.

Patch #6 moves nf_ct_netns_get() out of nf_conncount_init() to
	 let users of conncoiunt decide when to enable conntrack,
	 this is needed by openvswitch, from Xin Long.

Patch #7 pass context to all nft_parse_register_load() in
	 preparation for the next patch.

Patches #8 and #9 reject loads from uninitialized registers from
	 control plane to remove register initialization from
	 datapath. From Florian Westphal.

* tag 'nf-next-24-08-23' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf-next:
  netfilter: nf_tables: don't initialize registers in nft_do_chain()
  netfilter: nf_tables: allow loads only when register is initialized
  netfilter: nf_tables: pass context structure to nft_parse_register_load
  netfilter: move nf_ct_netns_get out of nf_conncount_init
  netfilter: nf_tables: do not remove elements if set backend implements .abort
  netfilter: nf_tables: store new sets in dedicated list
  netfilter: nfnetlink: convert kfree_skb to consume_skb
  selftests: netfilter: nft_queue.sh: sctp coverage
  netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: unbreak SCTP traffic
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240822221939.157858-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 2, 2024
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
Unmask upper DSCP bits - part 2

tl;dr - This patchset continues to unmask the upper DSCP bits in the
IPv4 flow key in preparation for allowing IPv4 FIB rules to match on
DSCP. No functional changes are expected. Part 1 was merged in commit
("Merge branch 'unmask-upper-dscp-bits-part-1'").

The TOS field in the IPv4 flow key ('flowi4_tos') is used during FIB
lookup to match against the TOS selector in FIB rules and routes.

It is currently impossible for user space to configure FIB rules that
match on the DSCP value as the upper DSCP bits are either masked in the
various call sites that initialize the IPv4 flow key or along the path
to the FIB core.

In preparation for adding a DSCP selector to IPv4 and IPv6 FIB rules, we
need to make sure the entire DSCP value is present in the IPv4 flow key.
This patchset continues to unmask the upper DSCP bits, but this time in
the output route path.

Patches #1-#3 unmask the upper DSCP bits in the various places that
invoke the core output route lookup functions directly.

Patches #4-#6 do the same in three helpers that are widely used in the
output path to initialize the TOS field in the IPv4 flow key.

The rest of the patches continue to unmask these bits in call sites that
invoke the following wrappers around the core lookup functions:

Patch #7 - __ip_route_output_key()
Patches #8-#12 - ip_route_output_flow()

The next patchset will handle the callers of ip_route_output_ports() and
ip_route_output_key().

No functional changes are expected as commit 1fa3314 ("ipv4:
Centralize TOS matching") moved the masking of the upper DSCP bits to
the core where 'flowi4_tos' is matched against the TOS selector.

Changes since v1 [1]:

* Remove IPTOS_RT_MASK in patch #7 instead of in patch #6

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240827111813.2115285-1-idosch@nvidia.com/
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 4, 2024
Daniel Machon says:

====================
net: microchip: add FDMA library and use it for Sparx5

This patch series is the first of a 2-part series, that adds a new
common FDMA library for Microchip switch chips Sparx5 and lan966x. These
chips share the same FDMA engine, and as such will benefit from a
common library with a common implementation.  This also has the benefit
of removing a lot open-coded bookkeeping and duplicate code for the two
drivers.

Additionally, upstreaming efforts for a third chip, lan969x, will begin
in the near future. This chip will use the new library too.

In this first series, the FDMA library is introduced and used by the
Sparx5 switch driver.

 ###################
 # Example of use: #
 ###################

- Initialize the rx and tx fdma structs with values for: number of
  DCB's, number of DB's, channel ID, DB size (data buffer size), and
  total size of the requested memory. Also provide two callbacks:
  nextptr_cb() and dataptr_cb() for getting the nextptr and dataptr.

- Allocate memory using fdma_alloc_phys() or fdma_alloc_coherent().

- Initialize the DCB's with fdma_dcb_init().

- Add new DCB's with fdma_dcb_add().

- Free memory with fdma_free_phys() or fdma_free_coherent().

 #####################
 # Patch  breakdown: #
 #####################

Patch #1:  introduces library and selects it for Sparx5.

Patch #2:  includes the fdma_api.h header and removes old symbols.

Patch #3:  replaces old rx and tx variables with equivalent ones from the
           fdma struct. Only the variables that can be changed without
           breaking traffic is changed in this patch.

Patch #4:  uses the library for allocation of rx buffers. This requires
           quite a bit of refactoring in this single patch.

Patch #5:  uses the library for adding DCB's in the rx path.

Patch #6:  uses the library for freeing rx buffers.

Patch #7:  uses the library helpers in the rx path.

Patch #8:  uses the library for allocation of tx buffers. This requires
           quite a bit of refactoring in this single patch.

Patch #9:  uses the library for adding DCB's in the tx path.

Patch #10: uses the library helpers in the tx path.

Patch #11: ditches the existing linked list for storing buffer addresses,
           and instead uses offsets into contiguous memory.

Patch #12: modifies existing rx and tx functions to be direction
           independent.
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 9, 2024
…rnel/git/netfilter/nf-next

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter updates for net-next

The following patchset contains Netfilter updates for net-next:

Patch #1 adds ctnetlink support for kernel side filtering for
	 deletions, from Changliang Wu.

Patch #2 updates nft_counter support to Use u64_stats_t,
	 from Sebastian Andrzej Siewior.

Patch #3 uses kmemdup_array() in all xtables frontends,
	 from Yan Zhen.

Patch #4 is a oneliner to use ERR_CAST() in nf_conntrack instead
	 opencoded casting, from Shen Lichuan.

Patch #5 removes unused argument in nftables .validate interface,
	 from Florian Westphal.

Patch #6 is a oneliner to correct a typo in nftables kdoc,
	 from Simon Horman.

Patch #7 fixes missing kdoc in nftables, also from Simon.

Patch #8 updates nftables to handle timeout less than CONFIG_HZ.

Patch #9 rejects element expiration if timeout is zero,
	 otherwise it is silently ignored.

Patch #10 disallows element expiration larger than timeout.

Patch #11 removes unnecessary READ_ONCE annotation while mutex is held.

Patch #12 adds missing READ_ONCE/WRITE_ONCE annotation in dynset.

Patch #13 annotates data-races around element expiration.

Patch #14 allocates timeout and expiration in one single set element
	  extension, they are tighly couple, no reason to keep them
	  separated anymore.

Patch #15 updates nftables to interpret zero timeout element as never
	  times out. Note that it is already possible to declare sets
	  with elements that never time out but this generalizes to all
	  kind of set with timeouts.

Patch #16 supports for element timeout and expiration updates.

* tag 'nf-next-24-09-06' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf-next:
  netfilter: nf_tables: set element timeout update support
  netfilter: nf_tables: zero timeout means element never times out
  netfilter: nf_tables: consolidate timeout extension for elements
  netfilter: nf_tables: annotate data-races around element expiration
  netfilter: nft_dynset: annotate data-races around set timeout
  netfilter: nf_tables: remove annotation to access set timeout while holding lock
  netfilter: nf_tables: reject expiration higher than timeout
  netfilter: nf_tables: reject element expiration with no timeout
  netfilter: nf_tables: elements with timeout below CONFIG_HZ never expire
  netfilter: nf_tables: Add missing Kernel doc
  netfilter: nf_tables: Correct spelling in nf_tables.h
  netfilter: nf_tables: drop unused 3rd argument from validate callback ops
  netfilter: conntrack: Convert to use ERR_CAST()
  netfilter: Use kmemdup_array instead of kmemdup for multiple allocation
  netfilter: nft_counter: Use u64_stats_t for statistic.
  netfilter: ctnetlink: support CTA_FILTER for flush
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240905232920.5481-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 11, 2024
Daniel Machon says:

====================
net: lan966x: use the newly introduced FDMA library

This patch series is the second of a 2-part series [1], that adds a new
common FDMA library for Microchip switch chips Sparx5 and lan966x. These
chips share the same FDMA engine, and as such will benefit from a common
library with a common implementation.  This also has the benefit of
removing a lot of open-coded bookkeeping and duplicate code for the two
drivers.

In this second series, the FDMA library will be taken into use by the
lan966x switch driver.

 ###################
 # Example of use: #
 ###################

- Initialize the rx and tx fdma structs with values for: number of
  DCB's, number of DB's, channel ID, DB size (data buffer size), and
  total size of the requested memory. Also provide two callbacks:
  nextptr_cb() and dataptr_cb() for getting the nextptr and dataptr.

- Allocate memory using fdma_alloc_phys() or fdma_alloc_coherent().

- Initialize the DCB's with fdma_dcb_init().

- Add new DCB's with fdma_dcb_add().

- Free memory with fdma_free_phys() or fdma_free_coherent().

 #####################
 # Patch  breakdown: #
 #####################

Patch #1:  select FDMA library for lan966x.

Patch #2:  includes the fdma_api.h header and removes old symbols.

Patch #3:  replaces old rx and tx variables with equivalent ones from the
           fdma struct. Only the variables that can be changed without
           breaking traffic is changed in this patch.

Patch #4:  uses the library for allocation of rx buffers. This requires
           quite a bit of refactoring in this single patch.

Patch #5:  uses the library for adding DCB's in the rx path.

Patch #6:  uses the library for freeing rx buffers.

Patch #7:  uses the library for allocation of tx buffers. This requires
           quite a bit of refactoring in this single patch.

Patch #8:  uses the library for adding DCB's in the tx path.

Patch #9:  uses the library helpers in the tx path.

Patch #10: ditch last_in_use variable and use library instead.

Patch #11: uses library helpers throughout.

Patch #12: refactor lan966x_fdma_reload() function.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20240902-fdma-sparx5-v1-0-1e7d5e5a9f34@microchip.com/

Signed-off-by: Daniel Machon <daniel.machon@microchip.com>
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240905-fdma-lan966x-v1-0-e083f8620165@microchip.com
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 16, 2024
Ido Schimmel says:

====================
net: fib_rules: Add DSCP selector support

Currently, the kernel rejects IPv4 FIB rules that try to match on the
upper three DSCP bits:

 # ip -4 rule add tos 0x1c table 100
 # ip -4 rule add tos 0x3c table 100
 Error: Invalid tos.

The reason for that is that historically users of the FIB lookup API
only populated the lower three DSCP bits in the TOS field of the IPv4
flow key ('flowi4_tos'), which fits the TOS definition from the initial
IPv4 specification (RFC 791).

This is not very useful nowadays and instead some users want to be able
to match on the six bits DSCP field, which replaced the TOS and IP
precedence fields over 25 years ago (RFC 2474). In addition, the current
behavior differs between IPv4 and IPv6 which does allow users to match
on the entire DSCP field using the TOS selector.

Recent patchsets made sure that callers of the FIB lookup API now
populate the entire DSCP field in the IPv4 flow key. Therefore, it is
now possible to extend FIB rules to match on DSCP.

This is done by adding a new DSCP attribute which is implemented for
both IPv4 and IPv6 to provide user space programs a consistent behavior
between both address families.

The behavior of the old TOS selector is unchanged and IPv4 FIB rules
using it will only match on the lower three DSCP bits. The kernel will
reject rules that try to use both selectors.

Patch #1 adds the new DSCP attribute but rejects its usage.

Patches #2-#3 implement IPv4 and IPv6 support.

Patch #4 allows user space to use the new attribute.

Patches #5-#6 add selftests.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240911093748.3662015-1-idosch@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 16, 2024
Nelson Escobar says:

====================
enic: Report per queue stats

Patch #1: Use a macro instead of static const variables for array sizes.  I
          didn't want to add more static const variables in the next patch
          so clean up the existing ones first.

Patch #2: Collect per queue statistics

Patch #3: Report per queue stats in netdev qstats

Patch #4: Report some per queue stats in ethtool

 # NETIF="eno6" tools/testing/selftests/drivers/net/stats.py
KTAP version 1
1..5
ok 1 stats.check_pause # XFAIL pause not supported by the device
ok 2 stats.check_fec # XFAIL FEC not supported by the device
ok 3 stats.pkt_byte_sum
ok 4 stats.qstat_by_ifindex
ok 5 stats.check_down

 # tools/net/ynl/cli.py --spec Documentation/netlink/specs/netdev.yaml \
     --dump qstats-get --json '{"ifindex": "34"}'
[{'ifindex': 34,
  'rx-bytes': 66762680,
  'rx-csum-unnecessary': 1009345,
  'rx-hw-drop-overruns': 0,
  'rx-hw-drops': 0,
  'rx-packets': 1009673,
  'tx-bytes': 137936674899,
  'tx-csum-none': 125,
  'tx-hw-gso-packets': 2408712,
  'tx-needs-csum': 2431531,
  'tx-packets': 15475466,
  'tx-stop': 0,
  'tx-wake': 0}]

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/20240905010900.24152-1-neescoba@cisco.com
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/20240823235401.29996-1-neescoba@cisco.com
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240912005039.10797-1-neescoba@cisco.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Sep 27, 2024
…git/netfilter/nf

Pablo Neira Ayuso says:

====================
Netfilter fixes for net

v2: with kdoc fixes per Paolo Abeni.

The following patchset contains Netfilter fixes for net:

Patch #1 and #2 handle an esoteric scenario: Given two tasks sending UDP
packets to one another, two packets of the same flow in each direction
handled by different CPUs that result in two conntrack objects in NEW
state, where reply packet loses race. Then, patch #3 adds a testcase for
this scenario. Series from Florian Westphal.

1) NAT engine can falsely detect a port collision if it happens to pick
   up a reply packet as NEW rather than ESTABLISHED. Add extra code to
   detect this and suppress port reallocation in this case.

2) To complete the clash resolution in the reply direction, extend conntrack
   logic to detect clashing conntrack in the reply direction to existing entry.

3) Adds a test case.

Then, an assorted list of fixes follow:

4) Add a selftest for tproxy, from Antonio Ojea.

5) Guard ctnetlink_*_size() functions under
   #if defined(CONFIG_NETFILTER_NETLINK_GLUE_CT) || defined(CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS)
   From Andy Shevchenko.

6) Use -m socket --transparent in iptables tproxy documentation.
   From XIE Zhibang.

7) Call kfree_rcu() when releasing flowtable hooks to address race with
   netlink dump path, from Phil Sutter.

8) Fix compilation warning in nf_reject with CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n.
   From Simon Horman.

9) Guard ctnetlink_label_size() under CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS which
   is its only user, to address a compilation warning. From Simon Horman.

10) Use rcu-protected list iteration over basechain hooks from netlink
    dump path.

11) Fix memcg for nf_tables, use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT is not complete.

12) Remove old nfqueue conntrack clash resolution. Instead trying to
    use same destination address consistently which requires double DNAT,
    use the existing clash resolution which allows clashing packets
    go through with different destination. Antonio Ojea originally
    reported an issue from the postrouting chain, I proposed a fix:
    https://lore.kernel.org/netfilter-devel/ZuwSwAqKgCB2a51-@calendula/T/
    which he reported it did not work for him.

13) Adds a selftest for patch 12.

14) Fixes ipvs.sh selftest.

netfilter pull request 24-09-26

* tag 'nf-24-09-26' of git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/netfilter/nf:
  selftests: netfilter: Avoid hanging ipvs.sh
  kselftest: add test for nfqueue induced conntrack race
  netfilter: nfnetlink_queue: remove old clash resolution logic
  netfilter: nf_tables: missing objects with no memcg accounting
  netfilter: nf_tables: use rcu chain hook list iterator from netlink dump path
  netfilter: ctnetlink: compile ctnetlink_label_size with CONFIG_NF_CONNTRACK_EVENTS
  netfilter: nf_reject: Fix build warning when CONFIG_BRIDGE_NETFILTER=n
  netfilter: nf_tables: Keep deleted flowtable hooks until after RCU
  docs: tproxy: ignore non-transparent sockets in iptables
  netfilter: ctnetlink: Guard possible unused functions
  selftests: netfilter: nft_tproxy.sh: add tcp tests
  selftests: netfilter: add reverse-clash resolution test case
  netfilter: conntrack: add clash resolution for reverse collisions
  netfilter: nf_nat: don't try nat source port reallocation for reverse dir clash
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20240926110717.102194-1-pablo@netfilter.org
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 3, 2024
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat:

============================================
WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted
--------------------------------------------
syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock:
ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

but task is already holding lock:
ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

other info that might help us debug this:
 Possible unsafe locking scenario:

       CPU0
       ----
  lock(k-slock-AF_INET);
  lock(k-slock-AF_INET);

 *** DEADLOCK ***

 May be due to missing lock nesting notation

7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113:
 #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
 #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806
 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
 #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727
 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
 #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470
 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
 #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228
 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline]
 #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104
 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
 #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232
 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

stack backtrace:
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
Call Trace:
 <IRQ>
 __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
 dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
 check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline]
 validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
 __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142
 lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759
 __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
 _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
 spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
 sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328
 mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279
 subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874
 tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853
 tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267
 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
 NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
 __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline]
 __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
 process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108
 __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772
 napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline]
 net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963
 handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554
 do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455
 </IRQ>
 <TASK>
 __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
 local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
 rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline]
 __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450
 dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline]
 neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline]
 neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline]
 ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
 ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline]
 __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535
 __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
 tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline]
 tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729
 tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934
 sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline]
 __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004
 release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558
 mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733
 mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812
 sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
 __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
 ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
 ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
 __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737
 __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline]
 __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline]
 __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763
 do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
 do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
 entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9
Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004
RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240
R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300
 </TASK>

As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code
path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is
attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created
by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint.

Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the
listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via
such listener - its intended role.

Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the
incoming MPC request.

Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Reported-by: syzbot+f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Message-ID: <833cae5982ac5d5b3236845c6db4315e634f5705.1727974826.git.pabeni@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 4, 2024
The following calculation used in coalesced_mmio_has_room() to check
whether the ring buffer is full is wrong and results in premature exits if
the start of the valid entries is in the first half of the ring buffer.

  avail = (ring->first - last - 1) % KVM_COALESCED_MMIO_MAX;
  if (avail == 0)
	  /* full */

Because negative values are handled using two's complement, and KVM
computes the result as an unsigned value, the above will get a false
positive if "first < last" and the ring is half-full.

The above might have worked as expected in python for example:
  >>> (-86) % 170
  84

However it doesn't work the same way in C.

  printf("avail: %d\n", (-86) % 170);
  printf("avail: %u\n", (-86) % 170);
  printf("avail: %u\n", (-86u) % 170u);

Using gcc-11 these print:

  avail: -86
  avail: 4294967210
  avail: 0

For illustration purposes, given a 4-bit integer and a ring size of 0xA
(unsigned), 0xA == 0x1010 == -6, and thus (-6u % 0xA) == 0.

Fix the calculation and allow all but one entries in the buffer to be
used as originally intended.

Note, KVM's behavior is self-healing to some extent, as KVM will allow the
entire buffer to be used if ring->first is beyond the halfway point.  In
other words, in the unlikely scenario that a use case benefits from being
able to coalesce more than 86 entries at once, KVM will still provide such
behavior, sometimes.

Note #2, the % operator in C is not the modulo operator but the remainder
operator. Modulo and remainder operators differ with respect to negative
values.  But, the relevant values in KVM are all unsigned, so it's a moot
point in this case anyway.

Note #3, this is almost a pure revert of the buggy commit, plus a
READ_ONCE() to provide additional safety.  Thue buggy commit justified the
change with "it paves the way for making this function lockless", but it's
not at all clear what was intended, nor is there any evidence that the
buggy code was somehow safer.  (a) the fields in question were already
accessed locklessly, from the perspective that they could be modified by
userspace at any time, and (b) the lock guarding the ring itself was
changed, but never dropped, i.e. whatever lockless scheme (SRCU?) was
planned never landed.

Fixes: 105f8d4 ("KVM: Calculate available entries in coalesced mmio ring")
Signed-off-by: Ilias Stamatis <ilstam@amazon.com>
Reviewed-by: Paul Durrant <paul@xen.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20240718193543.624039-2-ilstam@amazon.com
[sean: rework changelog to clarify behavior, call out weirdness of buggy commit]
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 4, 2024
Use a dedicated mutex to guard kvm_usage_count to fix a potential deadlock
on x86 due to a chain of locks and SRCU synchronizations.  Translating the
below lockdep splat, CPU1 #6 will wait on CPU0 #1, CPU0 #8 will wait on
CPU2 #3, and CPU2 #7 will wait on CPU1 #4 (if there's a writer, due to the
fairness of r/w semaphores).

    CPU0                     CPU1                     CPU2
1   lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
2                                                     lock(&vcpu->mutex);
3                                                     lock(&kvm->srcu);
4                            lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
5                            lock(kvm_lock);
6                            lock(&kvm->slots_lock);
7                                                     lock(cpu_hotplug_lock);
8   sync(&kvm->srcu);

Note, there are likely more potential deadlocks in KVM x86, e.g. the same
pattern of taking cpu_hotplug_lock outside of kvm_lock likely exists with
__kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier():

  cpuhp_cpufreq_online()
  |
  -> cpufreq_online()
     |
     -> cpufreq_gov_performance_limits()
        |
        -> __cpufreq_driver_target()
           |
           -> __target_index()
              |
              -> cpufreq_freq_transition_begin()
                 |
                 -> cpufreq_notify_transition()
                    |
                    -> ... __kvmclock_cpufreq_notifier()

But, actually triggering such deadlocks is beyond rare due to the
combination of dependencies and timings involved.  E.g. the cpufreq
notifier is only used on older CPUs without a constant TSC, mucking with
the NX hugepage mitigation while VMs are running is very uncommon, and
doing so while also onlining/offlining a CPU (necessary to generate
contention on cpu_hotplug_lock) would be even more unusual.

The most robust solution to the general cpu_hotplug_lock issue is likely
to switch vm_list to be an RCU-protected list, e.g. so that x86's cpufreq
notifier doesn't to take kvm_lock.  For now, settle for fixing the most
blatant deadlock, as switching to an RCU-protected list is a much more
involved change, but add a comment in locking.rst to call out that care
needs to be taken when walking holding kvm_lock and walking vm_list.

  ======================================================
  WARNING: possible circular locking dependency detected
  6.10.0-smp--c257535a0c9d-pip #330 Tainted: G S         O
  ------------------------------------------------------
  tee/35048 is trying to acquire lock:
  ff6a80eced71e0a8 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffffffffc07abb08 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}, at: set_nx_huge_pages+0x14a/0x1e0 [kvm]

  which lock already depends on the new lock.

   the existing dependency chain (in reverse order) is:

  -> #3 (kvm_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         kvm_dev_ioctl+0x4fb/0xe50 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #2 (cpu_hotplug_lock){++++}-{0:0}:
         cpus_read_lock+0x2e/0xb0
         static_key_slow_inc+0x16/0x30
         kvm_lapic_set_base+0x6a/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_apic_base+0x8f/0xe0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_msr_common+0x9ae/0xf80 [kvm]
         vmx_set_msr+0xa54/0xbe0 [kvm_intel]
         __kvm_set_msr+0xb6/0x1a0 [kvm]
         kvm_arch_vcpu_ioctl+0xeca/0x10c0 [kvm]
         kvm_vcpu_ioctl+0x485/0x5b0 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #1 (&kvm->srcu){.+.+}-{0:0}:
         __synchronize_srcu+0x44/0x1a0
         synchronize_srcu_expedited+0x21/0x30
         kvm_swap_active_memslots+0x110/0x1c0 [kvm]
         kvm_set_memslot+0x360/0x620 [kvm]
         __kvm_set_memory_region+0x27b/0x300 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl_set_memory_region+0x43/0x60 [kvm]
         kvm_vm_ioctl+0x295/0x650 [kvm]
         __se_sys_ioctl+0x7b/0xd0
         __x64_sys_ioctl+0x21/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x15d0/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

  -> #0 (&kvm->slots_lock){+.+.}-{3:3}:
         __lock_acquire+0x15ef/0x2e30
         lock_acquire+0xe0/0x260
         __mutex_lock+0x6a/0xb40
         mutex_lock_nested+0x1f/0x30
         set_nx_huge_pages+0x179/0x1e0 [kvm]
         param_attr_store+0x93/0x100
         module_attr_store+0x22/0x40
         sysfs_kf_write+0x81/0xb0
         kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x133/0x1d0
         vfs_write+0x28d/0x380
         ksys_write+0x70/0xe0
         __x64_sys_write+0x1f/0x30
         x64_sys_call+0x281b/0x2e60
         do_syscall_64+0x83/0x160
         entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e

Cc: Chao Gao <chao.gao@intel.com>
Fixes: 0bf5049 ("KVM: Drop kvm_count_lock and instead protect kvm_usage_count with kvm_lock")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Reviewed-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Acked-by: Kai Huang <kai.huang@intel.com>
Tested-by: Farrah Chen <farrah.chen@intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
Message-ID: <20240830043600.127750-2-seanjc@google.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 7, 2024
Tariq Toukan says:

====================
net/mlx5: hw counters refactor

This is a patchset re-post, see:
https://lore.kernel.org/20240815054656.2210494-7-tariqt@nvidia.com

In this patchset, Cosmin refactors hw counters and solves perf scaling
issue.

Series generated against:
commit c824deb ("cxgb4: clip_tbl: Fix spelling mistake "wont" -> "won't"")

HW counters are central to mlx5 driver operations. They are hardware
objects created and used alongside most steering operations, and queried
from a variety of places. Most counters are queried in bulk from a
periodic task in fs_counters.c.

Counter performance is important and as such, a variety of improvements
have been done over the years. Currently, counters are allocated from
pools, which are bulk allocated to amortize the cost of firmware
commands. Counters are managed through an IDR, a doubly linked list and
two atomic single linked lists. Adding/removing counters is a complex
dance between user contexts requesting it and the mlx5_fc_stats_work
task which does most of the work.

Under high load (e.g. from connection tracking flow insertion/deletion),
the counter code becomes a bottleneck, as seen on flame graphs. Whenever
a counter is deleted, it gets added to a list and the wq task is
scheduled to run immediately to actually delete it. This is done via
mod_delayed_work which uses an internal spinlock. In some tests, waiting
for this spinlock took up to 66% of all samples.

This series refactors the counter code to use a more straight-forward
approach, avoiding the mod_delayed_work problem and making the code
easier to understand. For that:

- patch #1 moves counters data structs to a more appropriate place.
- patch #2 simplifies the bulk query allocation scheme by using vmalloc.
- patch #3 replaces the IDR+3 lists with an xarray. This is the main
  patch of the series, solving the spinlock congestion issue.
- patch #4 removes an unnecessary cacheline alignment causing a lot of
  memory to be wasted.
- patches #5 and #6 are small cleanups enabled by the refactoring.
====================

Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20241001103709.58127-1-tariqt@nvidia.com
Signed-off-by: Jakub Kicinski <kuba@kernel.org>
matttbe pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 7, 2024
Edward Cree says:

====================
sfc: per-queue stats

This series implements the netdev_stat_ops interface for per-queue
 statistics in the sfc driver, partly using existing counters that
 were originally added for ethtool -S output.

Changed in v4:
* remove RFC tags

Changed in v3:
* make TX stats count completions rather than enqueues
* add new patch #4 to account for XDP TX separately from netdev
  traffic and include it in base_stats
* move the tx_queue->old_* members out of the fastpath cachelines
* note on patch #6 that our hw_gso stats still count enqueues
* RFC since net-next is closed right now

Changed in v2:
* exclude (dedicated) XDP TXQ stats from per-queue TX stats
* explain patch #3 better
====================

Signed-off-by: David S. Miller <davem@davemloft.net>
MPTCPimporter pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 7, 2024
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat:

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
  ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
  ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(k-slock-AF_INET);
    lock(k-slock-AF_INET);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113:
   #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
   #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806
   #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
   #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228
   #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline]
   #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232
   #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
   #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
   check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline]
   validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
   __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142
   lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759
   __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
   _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
   spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
   sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328
   mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279
   subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874
   tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
   NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
   NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline]
   __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
   process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108
   __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772
   napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline]
   net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963
   handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554
   do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
   local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
   rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline]
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450
   dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline]
   neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline]
   neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline]
   ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
   ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline]
   __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
   tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline]
   tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934
   sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline]
   __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004
   release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558
   mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733
   mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
   __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
   ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
   ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
   __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737
   __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline]
   __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline]
   __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9
  Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004
  RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240
  R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300
   </TASK>

As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code
path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is
attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created
by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint.

Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the
listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via
such listener - its intended role.

Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the
incoming MPC request.

Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Reported-by: syzbot+f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e
Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20241007-mpc-hs-port-v2-1-0c9e7827bd0f@kernel.org>
MPTCPimporter pushed a commit that referenced this issue Oct 8, 2024
Syzkaller reported a lockdep splat:

  ============================================
  WARNING: possible recursive locking detected
  6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0 Not tainted
  --------------------------------------------
  syz-executor364/5113 is trying to acquire lock:
  ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
  ffff8880449f1958 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  but task is already holding lock:
  ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
  ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  other info that might help us debug this:
   Possible unsafe locking scenario:

         CPU0
         ----
    lock(k-slock-AF_INET);
    lock(k-slock-AF_INET);

   *** DEADLOCK ***

   May be due to missing lock nesting notation

  7 locks held by syz-executor364/5113:
   #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
   #0: ffff8880449f0e18 (sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg+0x153/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1806
   #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: lock_sock include/net/sock.h:1607 [inline]
   #1: ffff88803fe39ad8 (k-sk_lock-AF_INET){+.+.}-{0:0}, at: mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x11f/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1727
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #2: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: __ip_queue_xmit+0x5f/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:470
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #3: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_finish_output2+0x45f/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:228
   #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: local_lock_acquire include/linux/local_lock_internal.h:29 [inline]
   #4: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: process_backlog+0x33b/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6104
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_lock_acquire include/linux/rcupdate.h:326 [inline]
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: rcu_read_lock include/linux/rcupdate.h:838 [inline]
   #5: ffffffff8e938320 (rcu_read_lock){....}-{1:2}, at: ip_local_deliver_finish+0x230/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:232
   #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
   #6: ffff88803fe3cb58 (k-slock-AF_INET){+.-.}-{2:2}, at: sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328

  stack backtrace:
  CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 5113 Comm: syz-executor364 Not tainted 6.11.0-rc6-syzkaller-00019-g67784a74e258 #0
  Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2~bpo12+1 04/01/2014
  Call Trace:
   <IRQ>
   __dump_stack lib/dump_stack.c:93 [inline]
   dump_stack_lvl+0x241/0x360 lib/dump_stack.c:119
   check_deadlock kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3061 [inline]
   validate_chain+0x15d3/0x5900 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:3855
   __lock_acquire+0x137a/0x2040 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5142
   lock_acquire+0x1ed/0x550 kernel/locking/lockdep.c:5759
   __raw_spin_lock include/linux/spinlock_api_smp.h:133 [inline]
   _raw_spin_lock+0x2e/0x40 kernel/locking/spinlock.c:154
   spin_lock include/linux/spinlock.h:351 [inline]
   sk_clone_lock+0x2cd/0xf40 net/core/sock.c:2328
   mptcp_sk_clone_init+0x32/0x13c0 net/mptcp/protocol.c:3279
   subflow_syn_recv_sock+0x931/0x1920 net/mptcp/subflow.c:874
   tcp_check_req+0xfe4/0x1a20 net/ipv4/tcp_minisocks.c:853
   tcp_v4_rcv+0x1c3e/0x37f0 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:2267
   ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x22e/0x440 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:205
   ip_local_deliver_finish+0x341/0x5f0 net/ipv4/ip_input.c:233
   NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
   NF_HOOK+0x3a4/0x450 include/linux/netfilter.h:314
   __netif_receive_skb_one_core net/core/dev.c:5661 [inline]
   __netif_receive_skb+0x2bf/0x650 net/core/dev.c:5775
   process_backlog+0x662/0x15b0 net/core/dev.c:6108
   __napi_poll+0xcb/0x490 net/core/dev.c:6772
   napi_poll net/core/dev.c:6841 [inline]
   net_rx_action+0x89b/0x1240 net/core/dev.c:6963
   handle_softirqs+0x2c4/0x970 kernel/softirq.c:554
   do_softirq+0x11b/0x1e0 kernel/softirq.c:455
   </IRQ>
   <TASK>
   __local_bh_enable_ip+0x1bb/0x200 kernel/softirq.c:382
   local_bh_enable include/linux/bottom_half.h:33 [inline]
   rcu_read_unlock_bh include/linux/rcupdate.h:908 [inline]
   __dev_queue_xmit+0x1763/0x3e90 net/core/dev.c:4450
   dev_queue_xmit include/linux/netdevice.h:3105 [inline]
   neigh_hh_output include/net/neighbour.h:526 [inline]
   neigh_output include/net/neighbour.h:540 [inline]
   ip_finish_output2+0xd41/0x1390 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:235
   ip_local_out net/ipv4/ip_output.c:129 [inline]
   __ip_queue_xmit+0x118c/0x1b80 net/ipv4/ip_output.c:535
   __tcp_transmit_skb+0x2544/0x3b30 net/ipv4/tcp_output.c:1466
   tcp_rcv_synsent_state_process net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6542 [inline]
   tcp_rcv_state_process+0x2c32/0x4570 net/ipv4/tcp_input.c:6729
   tcp_v4_do_rcv+0x77d/0xc70 net/ipv4/tcp_ipv4.c:1934
   sk_backlog_rcv include/net/sock.h:1111 [inline]
   __release_sock+0x214/0x350 net/core/sock.c:3004
   release_sock+0x61/0x1f0 net/core/sock.c:3558
   mptcp_sendmsg_fastopen+0x1ad/0x530 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1733
   mptcp_sendmsg+0x1884/0x1b10 net/mptcp/protocol.c:1812
   sock_sendmsg_nosec net/socket.c:730 [inline]
   __sock_sendmsg+0x1a6/0x270 net/socket.c:745
   ____sys_sendmsg+0x525/0x7d0 net/socket.c:2597
   ___sys_sendmsg net/socket.c:2651 [inline]
   __sys_sendmmsg+0x3b2/0x740 net/socket.c:2737
   __do_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2766 [inline]
   __se_sys_sendmmsg net/socket.c:2763 [inline]
   __x64_sys_sendmmsg+0xa0/0xb0 net/socket.c:2763
   do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
   do_syscall_64+0xf3/0x230 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  RIP: 0033:0x7f04fb13a6b9
  Code: 28 00 00 00 75 05 48 83 c4 28 c3 e8 01 1a 00 00 90 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 b8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
  RSP: 002b:00007ffd651f42d8 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000133
  RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 0000000000000003 RCX: 00007f04fb13a6b9
  RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000020000d00 RDI: 0000000000000004
  RBP: 00007ffd651f4310 R08: 0000000000000001 R09: 0000000000000001
  R10: 0000000020000080 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 00000000000f4240
  R13: 00007f04fb187449 R14: 00007ffd651f42f4 R15: 00007ffd651f4300
   </TASK>

As noted by Cong Wang, the splat is false positive, but the code
path leading to the report is an unexpected one: a client is
attempting an MPC handshake towards the in-kernel listener created
by the in-kernel PM for a port based signal endpoint.

Such connection will be never accepted; many of them can make the
listener queue full and preventing the creation of MPJ subflow via
such listener - its intended role.

Explicitly detect this scenario at initial-syn time and drop the
incoming MPC request.

Fixes: 1729cf1 ("mptcp: create the listening socket for new port")
Reported-by: syzbot+f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e@syzkaller.appspotmail.com
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=f4aacdfef2c6a6529c3e
Cc: Cong Wang <cong.wang@bytedance.com>
Signed-off-by: Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Matthieu Baerts (NGI0) <matttbe@kernel.org>
Message-Id: <20241008-mpc-hs-port-v3-1-cec1363f0353@kernel.org>
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